Introduction

Second language writing has traditionally been viewed as a means of linguistic development, where learners practice grammar, expand vocabulary, and refine control of target language structures. However, recent perspectives emphasize that writing also functions as a mode of thinking and inquiry, enabling learners to construct meaning and engage with complex ideas (Hyland, 2019). Argumentative writing, in particular, requires not only linguistic accuracy but also the ability to reason through evidence, evaluate alternatives, and justify one’s stance (Hirvela, 2017; Hyland, 2019). Despite its central role in academic literacy, L2 argumentation has often been studied in limited ways, focusing on structural competence rather than the substance of reasoning: how learners form and justify their ideas.

Understanding how students reason in writing is essential for both pedagogical development and theoretical advancement in L2 writing. When students engage with authentic, complex issues, their writing reveals not only argumentative competence but also how they perceive social priorities and position themselves within broader debates (Flowerdew, 2017; Johns, 2015). Building on this view, the present study explores how Korean university students reason about international student policies through English argumentative essays. By analyzing their stances and reasoning patterns across two contrasting policy contexts -Canada’s restriction on international student enrollment and Korea’s expansion initiative- this study aims to illuminate how L2 argumentation functions as both linguistic performance and a form of situated reasoning.

Review of Literature

Methodology

Results

Introduction

Canadians in northern regions do not have the same access to health care as those living in southern regions. In principle, the same levels of funding and government support exist, but there are real differences in access, reflecting a variety of economic, structural and geographical challenges.

Canadian health care is the responsibility of the respective provinces – meaning that policies and per capita investment are equivalent across each province. Despite this, the health of persons living in the north is substantially worse than persons living elsewhere in the province. Persons in the northern areas of Ontario have a shorter life expectancy, are more likely to die prematurely from cardiovascular or respiratory diseases, and have overall higher rates of cardiovascular and respiratory diseases among men and women than those living elsewhere in Ontario (Health Quality Ontario, 2017; North East Local Health Integration Network, 2017).

There are a number of differences between Northern and Southern Ontario that are relevant to these outcomes. The geographical location and the type of community one resides within, has both direct and indirect impacts on healthcare access and health outcomes (McGibbon, 2016). Rural, remote, ‘fly-in’, northern, and urban locations all have a reduced spectrum of available health care services relative to urban areas. Northern, rural and remote communities also typically house a population with lower socioeconomic status – which in turn both directly and indirectly affects health care access. Directly, because education, wealth, and social resources help people access and make use of medical services. Indirectly, because if one choses to travel from their community to access health care there are expenses associated with transportation, accommodation, and, perhaps, the costs of health services and/or products themselves. Additionally, the flexibility of employment and ability to take time off work to access healthcare is another important factor, and is perhaps an even more significant factor in the northern regions as travel time, distance to services, and weather will affect health care access. All of these factors play a role in decision making as persons are determining when, how, and with whom, they interface with in order to receive healthcare.

Previous research has described health service use in Canada (Sibley & Weiner, 2011), the North (Young et al., 2015, 2016, 2019), in Ontario (Burnett et al., 2020), and specifically compared northern and southern areas of Ontario (Crighton et al., 2015; A. Gershon et al., 2013; A. S. Gershon et al., 2017) It is clear that the use of acute care services, rates of hospitalization, emergency department visits and ambulatory care visits are much higher in the northern, less populated areas than in the urban south (Crighton et al., 2015; A. Gershon et al., 2013) . However, the previous findings do not tell the whole story or fully explain differences noted regarding health service use in Ontario. A more nuanced view would include information regarding use of additional health services such as health services that are not publicly funded by the provincial government. It can also be important to distinguish between the access gaps for acute and chronic conditions.

Acute emergencies can be treated by transferring patients to the resources; and it is difficult to study differential outcomes as a function of health service because administrative databases rarely contain enough clinical detail to evaluate any impact of treatment delays. However, with chronic conditions, such as Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disease (COPD), we can investigate the long-term impact of access disparities.

COPD is often described as an ambulatory-care sensitive condition, meaning it is best managed in the primary care setting. Those living with COPD have multiple interface points with the healthcare system as they interact and seek healthcare services. In this study, COPD, is used to further explore self-reported health and self-reported health service use as it relates to geography. We aim to expand upon what is known regarding healthcare service availability and use, thus describing the interactions one reports with the healthcare system should occur with a population known to access the healthcare system in order to manage their chronic condition, such as persons living with COPD. Additionally, rates of COPD are higher in northern Ontario compared to other areas of the province (Crighton et al., 2015; Health Quality Ontario, 2017). The population of those living with this condition provides a suitable backdrop to better understand the accessibility and availability of different types of healthcare services. The exploration of the type and quantity of health services accessed and their impact on self-reported health, may help healthcare providers and policy makers better understand the healthcare needs of those living with COPD in this region.

This important healthcare issue warrants examination as one considers the broader implications of such a large population of affected persons. The number of persons living with COPD in Ontario and especially in northern Ontario is substantial and the evidence suggests there is a large gap in healthcare access and the overall health of these individuals. Further evidence to support policy change and care for this population has potential to affect a large proportion of Ontarians.

In this study, data were analysed from a nationally representative population-based, health survey, the Canadian Community Health Survey (CCHS). The Canadian Community Health Survey (CCHS) provides a unique perspective of the self-reported use of healthcare services. The CCHS also provides data on self-reported health service use beyond acute care services that may be accessed by persons living in Ontario and specifically, northern Ontario. This will expand upon previous findings and provide additional information critical to understanding a fuller picture of the type and amount of health services accessed by persons living in this geographical location. Within the Canadian context, an examination of this data at a provincial level is meaningful as healthcare funding and healthcare delivery are responsibilities of the respective provincial governments. Therefore, the most meaningful comparisons related to healthcare service and delivery can occur provincially within the same overall jurisdiction.

Purpose

This aim of this study is to describe associations of self-rated health and healthcare service use in an Ontario cohort of adults who self-identify as being diagnosed with COPD.

Research questions

This study aims to answer the following research questions.

1. What is the difference between the self-reported health of those with COPD living in northern Ontario compared to those living elsewhere in the province?
2. What healthcare services are used by persons living with COPD in Ontario and northern Ontario? Are the rate and types of services used related to self-reported health?

Data and Methods

Results

Discussion

The study researchers undertook a secondary analysis of provincial data within a national survey of self-reported health data, the CCHS, which examined the self-reported health status of Ontarians, the self-reported type of health services accessed, and self-reported challenges or barriers to accessing health services. As it is known that those living with COPD require health care services to manage their condition, this common, chronic illness of COPD was used to compare persons living with this condition to others not living with this condition, and to determine if there were any notable differences between the two populations of persons living in the northern regions of the province.

Overall, people in Ontario, Canada, who report having COPD are more likely to report poorer overall health compared to those without COPD. Additionally, those living in the northern regions of the province reported even lower health scores than those living elsewhere in the province. Those with COPD were more likely to report poor mental health compared to those without COPD and self reported mental health was even lower for those living with COPD in northern Ontario. Similar findings were found for self-reported mental health for those living in northern Ontario. Those with COPD were also more likely to report their life satisfaction as lower than those living without COPD, however, the reported percentages of those who rated their life satisfaction lower were similar for those living in northern Ontario as they were for those living elsewhere in the province. Overall, living with COPD regardless of where you live, decreases ones health and life satisfaction.

These findings relate to the nature of the chronic illness of COPD, as this condition is known to lessen quality of life especially when symptoms interfere with daily functioning, social relationships and work responsibilities (Cully et al., 2006; Public Health Agency of Canada, 2018; Verma et al., 2018; Williams et al., 2007) Daily activities such as getting out of bed, caring for self, eating, working, and having a conversation become increasingly difficult as individuals are unable to catch their breath. As a result of these debilitating symptoms, one may expect that those living with this condition would report poorer health than those not living with COPD. Findings of this study support what is known about living with this condition.

Further, these findings extend previous findings that have demonstrated that health is lower or poorer for those who live in northern regions (Young et al., 2019). These findings add to what is known regarding both self-reported health and COPD (Duff Cloutier et al., 2023), and health care disparities of those living in northern regions. Self-reported health is lower for persons living with COPD and this may be compounded and be reported even lower if one lives with COPD and lives in the north. Further, individuals living with COPD of lower socioeconomic status, from rural areas, and from marginalized communities often have decreased access to health care services (Pleasants et al., 2016). Pleasant’s et al. (2116) found that there is a greater burden of COPD in persons of lower socioeconomic status attributed to individual health behaviours and social, political and structural exposures. Not only is there increased risk of developing COPD, but there are worse COPD health outcomes for those persons. In this study, there are similar demographic profiles of individuals living with COPD in northern Ontario, as they have lower levels of education and lower income levels than those living elsewhere in the province. The lower ratings of self-reported health and the demographic characteristics reported of those living with COPD in the north may compound or influence health care access for this population.

This study also examined self-reported health care access. Individual’s access to a family doctor is often used as a measure of access to primary care. In this study, most persons report having access to a family doctor, regardless of whether they report having COPD. Interestingly, the highest numbers of persons reporting that their primary care provider was a nurse practitioner were highest in northern Ontario compared to elsewhere in the province. So many had access to primary care but with a different type of health care provider, perhaps indicative of the different types of service available in northern communities.

Overall, the majority of persons report seeking care for a minor health care problem at their family doctor’s office. Interestingly, for those living in northern Ontario, the second most common location identified for care for a minor problem was an emergency department, the reported percentage of persons who identified this location as a place to seek care was higher in this region compared to the those living elsewhere in the province.

In northern Ontario, community health centres were also commonly identified as a location for seeking care, as a greater number of persons living in northern Ontario reported this location more commonly than those living elsewhere in the province. These two locations, emergency room departments and community health centres, identified more commonly by those living in the north, highlight the types of health care services available to those living in the north and perhaps the accessibility of available health care services. Family doctor’s offices may not be available or open to walk in appointments at the time when care is required. Emergency departments are more likely to be accessible or open 24 hours a day, and community health centres, as they are typically multidisciplinary by nature, are likely staffed by more than just a family doctor. As such, these locations may be more likely to accommodate treatment for a minor problem and may offer more flexibility and more open access.

Although findings indicate that most persons have access to primary care, the wait times to be seen were highest in northern Ontario. Therefore, yes, persons do have access but the frequency that visits occur due to wait times requires further investigation examination regarding the impact on overall access to care.

Seeking health care in an emergency department is more commonly viewed as access to acute care services and is commonly viewed as an expensive type of health care service. It is also frequently viewed as a negative or less desirable form of health care service to generally manage COPD. COPD is often referred to as an ambulatory sensitive condition in other health care literature, meaning it is ideally managed in primary care and accessing acute care services, for example to manage exacerbations, are typically viewed as a marker of poor control or management over the condition. However, in the case of the provision of healthcare services in Northern Ontario, this may not be the case. Our study has indicated that more persons with COPD access emergency departments to receive care for a minor problem. While this may be an indicator or poor disease management, it may also be an accurate portrayal of the type of health care available in the North when care is required. This finding may extend previous work has suggested that patterns of emergency department visits may be an indicator of access to primary care and outpatient services and in some areas with less available primary care services, care that is required may be absorbed through emergency department visits (Clark et al., 2021; Mian & Pong, 2012; Roberge et al., 2007). Other researchers have also identified that physicians working in rural settings often work in primary care settings plus carry on call schedules and hospital responsibilities (Incitti et al., 2003; Wenghofer et al., 2014). Hence, visits that are occurring in emergency departments may actually be an extension of primary care and occurring in different locations as those are the locations where care providers are located at the time when care is needed.

Additionally, as those living with COPD experience exacerbations, periods of breathlessness and other troubling symptoms, they may seek care in an emergency department as a way to receive immediate help. While healthcare providers may sometimes view these visits as unnecessary, not the most appropriate location to receive help, and as a sign of poor self-management, persons living with this condition report a different perspective. Persons may report accessing these types of services as one option that is available and often report that there was a pressing need for this type of healthcare service and they required this type of care at the time (Langer et al., 2013). The perspective of the person accessing care is important to consider as it is in contrast to the position that the majority of research has stated. The high use and high cost of acute care services is well documented (A. Gershon et al., 2013; A. S. Gershon et al., 2017). Langer and colleagues (2013) also report that for socially or economically marginalized persons, unscheduled care like emergency room visits, offers access to clinical and social care that may be otherwise unavailable. This finding is of particular relevance to those living in the northern areas of the province as many persons may be marginalized as education and income levels are lower than in other areas of the province. Subsequently accessing these types of services may meet these additional needs for those living in the north. Further exploration of the person’s view of seeking care in an emergency room, or other types of unscheduled care is warranted.

Access to primary care is often referred to as a measure of health care service availability. Our study demonstrates that most persons have access to health care as most persons reported they have access to primary care since the majority report having a primary care provider. In addition to this common measure of service availability, persons were also asked if they needed health care and were unable to receive it. Reasons why one didn’t receive care when care was required were also collected. In northern Ontario, the most common reason identified for not receiving care when it was required was that care was not available in the area, and the second most common reason was that care was not available at the time. Yet again, this study finding further highlights the disparities and decreased availability of health care resources in this northern region of Ontario. The most common reason identified why care was needed, but not received, was that care was needed to manage a chronic condition, like COPD. Service availability is of particular importance to those living with COPD as COPD is both a progressive degenerative condition that also has episodic exacerbations. Health care service availability may be required to manage these both these episodic exacerbations and worsening symptoms over time.

In addition to access to primary care services, this study also examined access to other health care services, beyond primary care. Provincially, participants with self-reported COPD were also more likely to access health care services beyond primary care. Those whose health was reported as good/fair, or poor, were more likely to access other services. Females were more likely to access additional services than males. There was also an age effect, and an income effect, as older participants and those with higher incomes, were more likely to access additional services. As those experiencing poor self-rated health were also more likely to access services, they may have been seeking additional services to mitigate additional COPD symptoms. One possible explanation for those with higher incomes accessing more services may be that they have more disposable income as many of the additional health care services are not covered by the provincial government and participants may have to pay out of pocket or have additional private insurance to cover related health service costs. In northern Ontario, the model used to examine the amount of health service used was not statistically significant.

Another factor to consider is the expected heterogeneity of different areas of Ontario and northern Ontario with respect to the availability of healthcare services. The geographic area that encompasses the northern region of Ontario is very large, covering the majority of the land mass (80%) of the province and the communities and larger urban centres in the north may be many kilometers apart. The availability of healthcare services likely differs in different regions as some areas will have many different healthcare providers available to provide service. Other areas may have a smaller number of available service providers and they have different ones from the next community and so on. The total number of available healthcare service providers for an area or region is not part of this data set. Additionally, some persons may access health care services from areas outside of their home community, and may travel to other more serviced areas of the province to access healthcare service. As such, persons may report accessing healthcare service or report receiving healthcare service from a provider that was not located in their home community.

Overall, the nature of living with a chronic illness such as COPD, in a northern, perhaps marginalized setting with varying availability of healthcare service, is complex. Persons make decisions about how and when they chose to interact with the healthcare system in order to meet their self-identified health care needs. The choices they make do not necessarily align fully with the expectations of healthcare providers, such as the high use of acute care services instead of primary care services to manage a chronic condition. However, healthcare providers need to understand and appreciate the circumstances occurring at the times persons are making health care access decisions in order to fully appreciate and understand why they sought care in a particular location. It is simply to simplistic to say persons living with COPD use too many acute care services without fully understanding the surrounding conditions that influence the choices persons made at a given time. As such, there is tension among the healthcare providers and users of health care around healthcare services. Health care policies need to reflect the complex interplay among optimal management, the availability and the appropriateness of healthcare services, and the needs of the individuals living with COPD within this geographic region.

Conclusion

As there are known disparities for those living in the northern regions of Canada and Ontario, this study examined the differences in self-reported health, access to primary health care and access to additional health services among those living in the northern regions of Ontario and the rest of Ontario. This was accomplished by describing the self-reported health and service use of those living with COPD, a prevalent, chronic condition which requires interactions with the health care system for its management. This is especially important due to the large number of affected individuals and because the gap in healthcare service is so large. As such, healthcare policy should address this gap in service and strategically provide supportive services where the need is high, but access is low. Addressing the deficits in service will optimistically result in improved outcomes for those living with this condition. While this analysis has provided some additional insight into health and health service use relative to geography, further research is required to fully understand the complexity of health service use in this region.

This study has both strengths and limitations. One strength is the data are from a nationally representative, population-based survey and as the most meaningful comparisons regarding health and health status are made at a provincial level, it was possible to isolate and examine provincial data. The large provincial sample size is also a strength of the study. However, some populations are excluded from the CCHS data set, in particular, for example, those living on First Nations reserves and members of the Canadian Armed Forces. In addition, the CCHS is comprised of self-reported data and, as such, may be subject to recall bias or misclassification of data.

The 2017-2018 reporting interval was chosen because the next tranche available overlaps with the COVID period. This may have generated some specific issues in health perception and need for service for people with COPD.

Additionally, it is well known that the number of persons living with COPD is very likely to be underestimated (Baldomero, 2022; Hill et al., 2010; Labonté et al., 2016; Mannino & Holguin, 2006) as most persons are not diagnosed until their disease has progressed to later stages and have lived with the condition for many years prior to diagnosis, so a portion of those who self reported that they do not have COPD, may in fact have COPD. As such, analyses that attempted to determine differences between the two populations may not show differences as the two populations are indeed mixed.

Conflict of Interest Statement

The authors report that there is no conflict of interest. The results and views expressed are those of the authors and are not those of Statistics Canada.

Introduction

The transition to middle school constitutes a critical developmental period in which adolescents must adapt to a new physical environment while negotiating heightened social pressures and intra individual change (Park, 2024). School adjustment refers to a state in which students meet contextual demands, engage actively in academic tasks and social relationships, and maintain psychological well being (Ladd et al., 1997). Beyond academic attainment, school adjustment is regarded as a core indicator that predicts social competence, emotional well being, and peer relations across adolescence (Gilliam & Zigler, 2000; Kurt, 2022; Qin et al., 2022). Since the onset of the COVID 19 pandemic, several countries—including Korea and Canada—have reported increases in indicators of school maladjustment, including disrupted learning and reduced school belonging (Ministry of Education, Korea, 2023; Statistics Canada, 2022). Identifying the psychosocial mechanisms that promote school adjustment has therefore become a pressing priority across culturally diverse educational settings in Asia and Canada.

One key predictor of adolescents’ school adjustment is parental attachment. Attachment theory posits that secure attachment provides a secure base from which children explore their environments, thereby strengthening exploratory behavior and mastery motivation (Bowlby, 1988; Wang et al., 2013). Prior research shows that adolescents with secure relationships with parents demonstrate stronger social competence (Holt, 2014), heightened intrinsic motivation for learning, and greater classroom participation (Deci & Ryan, 2000). Across cultural contexts, parental attachment has been linked to higher self worth and social competence, which in turn promote school adjustment (Chen, 2017; Wang et al., 2023).

Empathy represents a central psychological mechanism that may connect parent–child relationships to school adjustment. Conceptualized as understanding and sharing another’s affective states (de Waal, 2012; Decety et al., 2016), empathy supports effective problem solving in peer conflict (Choi & Watanuki, 2014; de Wied et al., 2007; Yan et al., 2017). Low empathy, by contrast, is associated with peer difficulties and school maladjustment (Boele et al., 2019; Kim, 2025; Sunwoo & Choi, 2014), whereas higher empathy predicts stronger peer relations and better school adjustment—for example, greater social competence and fewer antisocial behaviors (Oh & Park, 2019; Qin et al., 2022).

Peer relationships constitute another robust predictor of school adjustment. Positive peer relations enhance satisfaction with school life, academic engagement, and emotional stability (Kurt, 2022; Zhang et al., 2022). Research with Japanese children similarly indicates that friendship quality improves enjoyment of school and adjustment (Honma & Uchiyama, 2014). Empathy and peer relationships are closely intertwined socioemotional factors (Zeng et al., 2025) and are linked in socioemotional pathways that predict stronger school adjustment (Oh & Park, 2019; Qin et al., 2022; Zhang & Deng, 2022). Related work also reports that parental attachment influences school adjustment through peer relationships (Zhang et al., 2022).

The strength and configuration of these family–peer socioemotional pathways may vary by cultural context. In Canada’s multicultural setting, Social and Emotional Learning (SEL) and school belonging are emphasized as key levers for academic engagement and psychological well being (Hymel et al., 2017; Willms, 2003). Approaches that integrate family–school connectedness and instruction targeting empathy and relationship skills have been advanced as educational strategies to foster inclusion and belonging (Adam, 2025; Falkenberg & Heringer, 2024; Hymel et al., 2017). Recent Canadian work has highlighted classroom practices such as “Co Active Coaching,” which integrates empathy, active listening, and self understanding as a practical model of SEL (Adam, 2025). This perspective aligns conceptually with the developmental pathway tested in the present study—linking parental attachment, empathy, and peer relationships to school adjustment—and resonates with empirical findings across diverse cultural contexts (Honma & Uchiyama, 2014; Oh & Park, 2019; Zhang & Deng, 2022; Zhang et al., 2022).

This study distinguishes maternal and paternal attachment and tests a structural model linking parental attachment to school adjustment through empathy and peer relationships among Korean middle-school students. Both parallel mediating effects—through empathy and through peer relationships—and the serial path from empathy to peer relationships are evaluated. The model is framed in relation to Canadian research and policy on SEL and school belonging, and cross-context implications are outlined for practices that strengthen family–school–peer linkages. The analyses draw solely on survey data from Korean middle-school students. Throughout the paper, Canadian SEL and school-belonging frameworks are used as conceptual and interpretive guides, not as direct sources of comparative empirical evidence.

Figure 1 presents the hypothesized model linking maternal and paternal attachment to school adjustment via empathy and peer relationships. This study addressed the following research questions (RQs):

Figure 1. Hypothesized structural model based on Canadian SEL and school-belonging frameworks, specifying empathy and peer relationships as mediators between parental attachment and school adjustment

Download Original Figure

Literature Review

Methods

Results

Structural model

Specified with the same constraints and degrees of freedom as the measurement model, the structural model yielded identical global fit indices (χ²(64) = 254.067, p < .001, CFI = .944, TLI = .920, RMSEA = .076, and SRMR = .053). These indices satisfy commonly used cutoffs (CFI/TLI ≥ .90; RMSEA ≤ .08; SRMR ≤ .08; Hair et al., 2010). As summarized in Figure 2, maternal attachment positively predicted empathy (β = .289, p < .001) and peer relationships (β = .217, p < .01), whereas paternal attachment positively predicted peer relationships (β = .361, p < .001).

Both empathy (β = .282, p < .001) and peer relationships (β = .792, p < .001) positively predicted school adjustment, while the direct paths from maternal and paternal attachment to school adjustment were non significant. The model explained 12.0% of the variance in empathy, 31.6% in peer relationships, and 78.1% in school adjustment.

Table 2. Factor loadings and convergent validity of the measurement model

Variables	Unstandardized Factor Loading	SE	C.R.	Standardized Factor Loading	AVE	Construct Reliability
Maternal attachment trust_MA communication_MA alienation_MA	1.100*** 1.052*** 1.000	.049 .048	22.378 21.819	.926 .852 .723	.875	.954
Paternal attachment trust_PA communication_PA alienation_PA	1.025*** .958*** 1.000	.041 .041	25.204 23.564	.938 .839 .769	.867	.951
Empathy emotional empathy cognitive empathy	.694*** 1.000	.119	5.839	.542 .773	.812	.894
Peer relationships peer 2 peer 1	.910*** 1.000	.090	10.125	.607 .670	.580	.733
School adjustment self-directedness cooperative participation school avoidance school liking	.560*** .554*** .520*** 1.000	.060 .053 .058	9.387 10.426 8.918	.489 .547 .456 .800	.449	.756
Acceptance Range1)			≥1.965	≥.40	≥.50	≥.70

Note. N = 511, ^***p < .001. MA = Maternal attachment; PA = Paternal attachment; AVE = Average Variance Extracted; SE = Standard Error; C.R. = Critical Ratio. ¹⁾Hair et al. (2010).

Download Excel Table

Figure 2. Final structural model with standardized path coefficients.

Download Original Figure

Discussion

Using structural equation modeling (SEM), this study examined the pathways from maternal and paternal attachment to school adjustment through empathy and peer relationships among Korean middle-school students. The direct effects of parental attachment on school adjustment were not statistically significant. In contrast, significant indirect effects emerged: maternal attachment predicted school adjustment indirectly through empathy, and both maternal and paternal attachment predicted school adjustment indirectly through peer relationships. The sequential indirect pathway through empathy and then peer relationships was not supported. Taken together, these findings are conceptually consistent with Canadian SEL and school-belonging perspectives, suggesting cross-context implications whereby supportive peer relationships link empathy to school adjustment. In this study, we treated Canadian SEL and belonging frameworks as a conceptual lens when interpreting the Korean data, rather than as evidence from a comparative study.

Our findings indicate that parental attachment does not directly predict school adjustment; instead, it operates indirectly through socioemotional mediators—empathy and peer relationships. During adolescence, parents appear to shape school functioning primarily by supplying emotional security and socioemotional resources rather than exerting direct effects. Parents continue to provide a secure base (Allen et al., 2003; Bowlby, 1988), yet adolescents tend to realize social integration and belonging within peer contexts that function as a key secondary socialization environment (Erath et al., 2008; Zhang et al., 2022). This developmental shift toward peer centered relationships underscores the importance of the indirect route through which affective security established at home extends into social adaptation at school.

The mediating effect of empathy was significant only in the pathway from maternal attachment to school adjustment. Maternal emotional connectedness appears to nurture adolescents’ empathic capacities, including perspective taking and the formation of social trust (Decety et al., 2016), which in turn facilitate social interaction and emotional adjustment in school (Qin et al., 2022). Accordingly, maternal attachment operates less as a direct predictor and more as an indirect psychological mechanism that promotes school adjustment through gains in empathy. This interpretation is consistent with evidence that emotional intimacy within parent–child relationships fosters socioemotional competencies such as empathy and cooperation (Knox et al., 2022; Kochanska et al., 2005; Xu et al., 2022). Empathy during adolescence functions as a relational competence shaped by social experience (Wölfer, et al., 2012), and maternal sensitivity and warm, authoritative parenting are linked to stronger empathy development—though effects can vary by child temperament—thereby strengthening this competence (Kiang et al., 2004; Wagers & Kiel, 2019).

Peer relationships significantly mediated the associations of maternal and paternal attachment with school adjustment. This pattern suggests that affective security derived from parents enhances adolescents’ social skills and interpersonal trust, thereby facilitating the development of positive peer relationships. These relations function as a central social pathway to school adjustment (Zhang & Deng, 2022; Zhang et al., 2022), promoting satisfaction with school life, academic engagement, and feelings of belonging. Taken together, the findings provide empirical support for an indirect route whereby the parent–child emotional bond generalizes to peer relationships and, in turn, increases adolescents’ social participation and emotional well being at school.

These results underscore the family–peer–school social network of development as a core context for adolescent adaptation and align conceptually with Social and Emotional Learning (SEL) frameworks in multicultural settings such as Canada. Canadian SEL research has identified relational supports across family, school, and peer contexts as key predictors of school belonging and engagement (Falkenberg & Heringer, 2024; Hymel et al., 2017; Willms, 2003). Peer belonging and supportive school climates also operate as protective factors for early adolescents’ emotional adjustment (Thomson et al., 2024). Accordingly, the present findings, grounded in the experiences of Korean adolescents, offer comparative–conceptual insights for understanding both similarities and differences in socioemotional developmental pathways across Asian and Canadian contexts.

Canadian K–12 work on Social and Emotional Learning (SEL) and school belonging has consistently underscored the role of students’ relationships with peers and teachers (Hymel et al., 2017; Schonert-Reichl, 2017; Willms, 2003). The pathway identified in this Korean sample—from empathy to peer relationships and then to school adjustment—sits comfortably within this tradition, echoing the Canadian emphasis on relational competencies and a sense of belonging at school. Read alongside Canadian SEL studies, our findings point to family–peer–school connectedness as a shared socioemotional basis for student well-being. Canadian education systems can build on this foundation through culturally responsive SEL efforts that strengthen family–school partnerships and nurture supportive classroom climates. Provincial initiatives such as School Mental Health Ontario (2024) and British Columbia’s ERASE strategy (Government of British Columbia, 2025) already offer concrete structures for this kind of work.

National-level documents in Canada tell a similar story. The Council of Ministers of Education, Canada (CMEC, 2020) treats attitudes, skills, knowledge, and values as intertwined dimensions of learning in its Pan-Canadian Framework for Global Competencies, highlighting personal, interpersonal, and intercultural capacities that support well-being, equity, and inclusion. The Canadian Council on Learning (2008) likewise draws attention to emotional and social development—and to broader well-being and social cohesion—as core ingredients of successful learning. More recently, Falkenberg and Heringer (2024) have described a growing national focus on social-emotional competencies and school belonging across Canadian education systems. Taken together, these perspectives point to a Canadian commitment to weaving socioemotional learning through policy, curriculum, and school culture, with relational principles at the centre.

At both policy and practice levels, provincial frameworks in British Columbia and Ontario call for systematic classroom work on emotion recognition and regulation, empathy, and relationship skills. Seen through these frameworks, our results suggest several practical routes for enhancing school adjustment and belonging: designing lessons that explicitly foster empathy, integrating relationship-centred activities that promote cooperation and communication, and investing in family–school partnerships. Such strategies bolster the socioemotional mediators—empathy and relationship skills—that link emotional security at home to the quality of peer relationships and participation in class, and they resonate with initiatives such as British Columbia’s Mental Health in Schools strategy and classroom guidance from School Mental Health Ontario.

At the school level, collaboration with families can be strengthened through regular two-way communication, culturally responsive parent education and counselling, and family-engagement initiatives that explicitly recognize empathy and peer relations as key socioemotional routes to school adjustment.

At the classroom level, SEL can be woven systematically into everyday instruction. Teachers might address empathy, emotion regulation, cooperation, communication, and conflict resolution in a developmentally sequenced way, using relationship-centred strategies such as cooperative learning, restorative conversations, and peer mentoring. These practices can be aligned with provincial SEL and school-mental-health frameworks in British Columbia and Ontario.

At the family level, parent education can be positioned as a core component of adolescents’ social–emotional development, with attention to parental emotional sensitivity, empathic communication, emotion coaching, and support for managing peer conflict and digital or academic stress.

The sample was limited to Korean middle school students, which constrains generalizability of the findings. To support cross cultural inference, future research should establish measurement invariance across Korean and Canadian samples—configural, metric, and scalar—using multi group confirmatory factor analysis (CFA).

Although SEM supported the hypothesized pathways, the study relied on self reports and a cross sectional design, precluding strong causal inference and multi informant perspectives. Subsequent work should employ longitudinal designs, incorporate multi informant and multi source data (students, teachers, caregivers), and include observational indicators to strengthen validity for empathy and relational constructs.

Finally, the present analysis offered a comparative conceptual discussion rather than empirical testing with Canadian data. Validity in Canadian contexts should be evaluated by first establishing cross national measurement invariance and then comparing structural path coefficients (and means, where warranted). Researchers should also apply multilevel models (student, classroom, school) to examine whether contextual variation—such as school climate and provincial policies—modulates the magnitude and structure of the pathways.

Conclusion

This study showed that parental attachment was linked to school adjustment mainly through empathy and peer relationships rather than through direct effects. From a Canadian standpoint, the study illustrates how empathy and peer relationships can serve as bridges between family life and school, a theme that runs through Canadian SEL and school-belonging frameworks. Although our analyses are limited to Korean adolescents, the pathways identified here overlap with Canadian priorities such as relationship-centred pedagogy, empathy-oriented classroom practice, and close collaboration between families and schools. In this study, we draw on Canadian SEL and school-belonging frameworks as a conceptual lens for interpreting Korean students’ socioemotional development, rather than treating them as sources of comparative data. Future studies that apply similar measures to Canadian samples could test whether the same socioemotional routes to school adjustment appear across contexts and help to deepen dialogue between Asian and Canadian perspectives on SEL.

Statements and Declarations

Competing interests

The authors declare that they have no competing interests.

Ethical approval

At the time of data collection, a formal institutional ethics review was not sought. The survey was conducted with administrative permission from each participating school and with the cooperation of classroom teachers. Participation was voluntary and anonymous, and no personally identifying information was collected.

Data availability

Due to ethical restrictions involving minors and existing institutional agreements, the raw data are not publicly available. De-identified materials (codebook, item wording, and analysis code) are available from the corresponding author upon reasonable request.

INTRODUCTION

The bilateral relationship between Mexico and Canada represents a significant partnership within the North American geopolitical and economic realms. Forged over eight decades of formal diplomatic engagement and renovated by the advent of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1994, this partnership has evolved from a diplomatic connection to an association characterized by deep economic integration, institutionalized labor mobility, within complex regional dynamics.

This article examines the evolution of this relationship, arguing that, at the present time, it is undergoing a critical phase of strategic redefinition, moving to its own distinct agenda. In the bilateral relationship, the Seasonal Agricultural Worker Program (SAWP) has been recognized by one of the world’s most established and managed temporary labor migration programs. Established in 1974, the SAWP is a paradigm of state-led, circular migration that supply Canadian agricultural labor demands with Mexican temporary workers.

More recently, the renegotiation and implementation of the USMCA in 2017-2020, updated the rules of free trade, introducing novel chapters on digital commerce, labor rights, and environmental standards. However, the return of protectionist trade policies under the second Trump administration in the United States (2025-2029), manifested in unilateral tariffs and rhetorical challenges to the USMCA framework, has introduced uncertainty and volatility into North America.

This external pressure has served as a forcing mechanism for Ottawa and Mexico City, inducing closer bilateral coordination, as can be seen in the Mexico-Canada Action Plan (2025-2028), signed in September 2025. The plan articulates a four-pillar agenda including Prosperity; Mobility, Inclusion, and Well-being; Security; and Environment and Sustainability.

Therefore, this article seeks to analyze the Mexico-Canada relationship at this crucial moment. It will explore the historical foundations laid by NAFTA, USMCA and the SAWP, assess the current economic and diplomatic contours of the partnership, and evaluate the prospects and challenges inherent in the new Action Plan. The article contributes to broader understandings of North America as a region, economic relations, and the strategies of both countries in an era of geopolitical change and economic nationalism.

Review of Current Canada and Mexico Relations

Mexico–Canada economic relations (2018–2024)

According to data from Global Affairs Canada, an agency of the Canadian government, Canada–Mexico two-way merchandise trade reached nearly USD 56 billion in 2024, making Mexico Canada's third-largest single-country trading partner after the U.S. and China, while Canada ranked as Mexico’s fifth-largest partner. In the first 2 quarters of 2025, the total value of Canada imports from Mexico reached $9.54 billion, while Canada exports to Mexico totaled $1.53 billion, consistent with the Canada trade data and Mexico customs data (TradeImex, 2025).

Formerly, in 2023, the Canada-Mexico bilateral trade stood at approximately USD 28.7 billion, so 2024's figure nearly doubles that amount, suggesting a major trade surge. This growth underscores deepening ties not just in traditional sectors but across emerging domains like technology and renewable energy components.

As can be seen, Table 1 presents the bilateral trade in goods between Canada and Mexico over the period 2014 - 2024. The data shows two annual values for each year: the value of goods Canada imports from Mexico and the value of goods Canada exports to Mexico. Table 1 also reveals a persistent trade deficit for Canada throughout the selected period, Canada's imports from Mexico consistently exceed its exports to Mexico, resulting in a significant trade deficit. The deficit grew from approximately $21 billion in 2014 to over $28 billion by 2024. Despite a sharper decline in 2020 due to the COVID-19 pandemic, imports have shown a strong upward trajectory. They grew from $26.07 billion in 2014 to $34.29 billion in 2024, marking an increase of over 31%.

Table 1. Canada and Mexico bilateral trade 2014-2024

Year of Trade	Canada Imports from Mexico ($)	Canada Exports to Mexico ($)
2014	$26.07 billion	$5.11 billion
2015	$24.44 billion	$5.20 billion
2016	$25.05 billion	$5.76 billion
2017	$27.36 billion	$6.05 billion
2018	$28.42 billion	$6.34 billion
2019	$27.87 billion	$5.51 billion
2020	$22.35 billion	$4.59 billion
2021	$27.01 billion	$6.54 billion
2022	$31.38 billion	$6.98 billion
2023	$34.19 billion	$6.56 billion
2024	$34.29 billion	$6.27 billion

Source: Prepared by the authors with data from TradeImex (2025)

Download Excel Table

On the other hand, according to data from the Mexican government, during the 2018–2024 period, total trade between Mexico and Canada expanded by approximately one third (Mexico’s Ministry of Economy, 2025). This growth was particularly driven by Mexican exports to Canada rose by 32.6% over the six-year period. The main products exported by Mexico were linked to, or derived from, the automotive sector, which accounted for nearly 58% of total sales, but also comprised electronics and electrical equipment, agri-food products, textiles and light manufacturing. On the other hand, Mexico’s principal imports from Canada consisted largely of components used precisely in the automotive industry, as well as industrial equipment and machinery, pharmaceutical and medical products, aerospace and electrical components, specialized agri-food products.

The strength of Mexico’s automotive sector has provided the country with both comparative and competitive advantages vis-à-vis its North American partners. These advantages were strengthened with the adoption of the USMCA in 2018, particularly through the introduction of a new automotive rule of origin provision that exempts 75% of the sector’s products manufactured within North America from tariffs (Mexican Institute of Competitiveness, 2020). For both the United States and Canada, northern Mexico has remained the preferred option in this context, as firms from both countries have established operations in the region over time, attracted by competitive wages and a progressively more skilled labor force (Molina, 2025).

Another notable indicator of the bilateral economic relationship concerns Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), referring to investment flows from companies based in Canada to Mexico. According to information published by the Ministry of Economy and displayed in Figure 1, Canadian FDI stocks in Mexico reached USD 46.4 billion in 2024, the highest number in 81 years of the bilateral relation. The amount registered in 2024 represents a 75% increase relative to the figure recorded six years earlier (2018), thereby highlighting the positive impact of the USMCA in attracting new investment.

Source: Created by the authors with data from Mexican Ministry of Economy and Government of Canada (2025)

Figure 1. Canada: Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) inflows in Mexico (2018-2024)

Download Original Figure

With respect to remittances, the amount of money sent from Canada to Mexico exceeded USD 1 billion in 2023 for the first time, a figure that, as illustrated in Figure 2, nearly doubled the amount received in 2018. It is worth noting that, despite this remarkable growth, remittances from Canada declined to approximately USD 698 million in 2024. Overall, the amount recorded in 2024 represented slightly more than 1% of all remittances received by Mexico from the rest of the world that year (Bank of Mexico, 2025).

Source: Created by the authors with data from Mexican Ministry of Economy (2025)

Figure 2. Canada: Remittances from Canada to Mexico (2018-2024) (US$ million)

Download Original Figure

Broadly speaking, although Mexico–Canada relations are less dynamic than the economic ties each country maintains with the United States (U.S.), the bilateral relationship has exhibited a positive upward trend across key economic indicators. Canada is Mexico’s third-largest trading partner, following only the U.S. and China. Within the context of negotiations for the new USMCA in 2026, both countries play a strategic role in counterbalancing U.S. hegemonic objectives in the region. In this context, in September 2025, the heads of government of both countries agreed to move forward with a Joint Action Plan for 2025–2028.

Perspectives of Canada and Mexico Relations

Conclusion

Over the past three decades, the bilateral relationship between Mexico and Canada has evolved from a distant association into an increasingly strategic partnership. Accelerated by economic integration under NAFTA and USMCA and deepened by external geopolitical pressures, this relationship has been consolidated by the formulation of the Joint Action Plan 2025–2028 in September 2025. This plan is more than just another cooperation agenda; it recognizes that the bilateral partnership is a fundamental pillar of the prosperity of both nations within the North American context.

In recent history, both countries had prioritized their relations with the United States over those with each other. However, the current situation offers an opportunity for both countries to consolidate their relationship and move to a higher level of integration. This is precisely the spirit that motivated the signing of the Mexico-Canada Action Plan for 2025-2028. We can summarize various concluding points of this article.

First, the bilateral relationship has been reinforced by the implementation of specific programs. Mechanisms such as the Seasonal Agricultural Worker Program (SAWP), functioning since 1974, and the Mexico–Canada Partnership, established in 2004, demonstrate the commitment of both states to create enduring binational institutional frameworks of collaboration. The SAWP, in particular, is an international model of highly regulated circular labor migration, under an umbrella of legal and consular protection. This proclivity to institutionalize cooperation in key areas, such as human mobility, provides a foundation of trust upon which the new Action Plan is built.

Second, the economic analysis shows that they depend on each other in a different way.. Trade data from 2014 to 2024 show a growing trade deficit for Canada. This deficit is driven by the dynamism of Mexican manufacturing exports, particularly from the automotive sector, which is integrated into North American value chains. In contrast, Canadian foreign direct investment in Mexico, concentrated in mining, manufacturing, and services, reached an all-time high in 2024, indicating long-term commitment of Canadian investment to the Mexican economy.

The third important finding is the recognition of the bilateral relationship as an instrument for both countries to work together in the face of U.S. leadership. The political context of the second Trump administration (2025–2029), characterized by protectionism and unilateral tariffs, has forced closer coordination between Ottawa and Mexico City. The USMCA is going to be renegotiated in 2026. This creates a situation where both countries, as "middle powers" in the North American region, have a vital interest in working together. They should see this cooperation as a way to strengthen North America, not as a coalition against Washington.

Nevertheless, these advances face challenges. The overwhelming economic dependence of both countries on the U.S. market conditions any action perceived in Washington as a challenge to its leadership.

Finally, the Mexico-Canada Joint Action Plan 2025–2028 is an important step towards a complete and well-planned partnership. It represents the evolution of a relationship that advanced from a byproduct of NAFTA into a proactive bilateral partnership.

Organized around the pillars of Prosperity, Mobility, Security, and Sustainability, its architecture reflects a comprehensive understanding of 21st-century bilateral cooperation, transcending free trade and commerce to incorporate human well-being, collective security, and environmental sustainability.

In a world characterized by geoeconomic fragmentation and rivalry among major powers, strengthening this middle-power partnership is in the best interest of both Mexico and Canada. It is also a vital contribution to the stability, competitiveness, and regional governance of the entire North American region.

INTRODUCTION

Since the 20th century, strategic relationships between Canada and South Korea (hereinafter, Korea) have been overwhelmingly positive, given Canadian missionary engagements in Korea, Canada’s participation in the Korean War, Canadian-Korean economic interests, Koreans immigration to Canada, and academic interchange between the blood ally (Park, 2018; Sullivan, 2020; KoreaNet, 2023; Government of Canada, 2024). In accordance with such mutually beneficial collaborations at the higher education level, there are many international exchange and partnership programs in Canada/Korea (Korean Consulate General Toronto, 2024). As a result, numerous Korean doctoral graduates turn out from Canada-based higher education institutes year by year. According to the doctorate registration system operated by the Ministry of Education, Korea, the number of Ph.D. holders from Canadian post-graduate schools appears to be the seventh biggest among all Korean doctorates from overseas universities (National Research Foundation of Korea, 2025). Nonetheless, published academic studies in the context of Canada-Korea are rarely seen around the Korean social sciences arena compared to extensive attention to other Western countries, while the two partners have demonstrated longstanding cooperation, including people-to-people scientific interchange and diverse cultural exchanges, in many fields and disciplines over the six decades (Lee, 2014; Canadian Heritage, 2024).

In these situations, this scoping review study in the form of systematic classification is designed to (i) provide a synthesized overview of social sciences research focused on Canada from the Korean/Canadian academia, (ii) identify the existing knowledge covered in the Korean national journals and (iii) offer a better understanding of the research gap from the categorized evidence to scholar and practitioners whose research interests are related to Canadian studies. In a bid to achieve those aims, a primary question is proposed as follows: What do Canada-focused papers in the Korean social sciences literature deal with? Based on the overarching question, the four sub-questions are mainly formulated in line with the PCC (Participant-Concept-Context) framework of Pollock et al. (2021) that is used for scoping review studies:

This study will make a bilateral contribution to engaging our wider attention to social sciences research in accordance with the Canada-Korea partnership programs, improving the academic exchanges locally/regionally between the two countries, and promoting more expanded scholarly initiatives among Canada-focused researchers.

Rationale of the Study

In recent years, the bilateral relationship between Canada and Korea has evolved into a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, emphasizing collaboration across various sectors, including diplomacy, security, economy, and education. This partnership was underscored by the Action Plan implemented by both nations, aiming to strengthen ties and mutual understanding (Government of Canada, 2024b). Since then, strategic research collaborations at the higher educational level between the two countries have been pivotal in this evolving relationship; as a result, the three-year agreement between Mitacs of Canada and National Research Foundation of Korea facilitates research internships, promoting industrial innovation, academic exchanges and joint initiatives. Such multidisciplinary programs not only enhance engineering cooperation but also foster cultural understanding and knowledge exchange from innovative research (Mitacs, 2016). More recently, on an economic dimension, both countries have initiated collaborative industrial research and development programs by encouraging small/medium-sized enterprises to engage in joint projects with high commercialization potential. These programs are primarily supported by organizations like the National Research Council of Canada, which provides funding and advisory services to facilitate international collaborations (Government of Canada, 2019; 2025).

Both Canada and Korea would benefit from an extended study on each side, as multiple Canadian universities have managed Korean Studies centers, and the Korean language is taught in a wide range of schools in Canada (Coates, 2017). However, despite these advancements across industries and government institutes, there remains a noticeable gap in social sciences studies focusing on the Korea-Canada academic relationship. While technological, economic, and scientific technique collaborations are well-documented, studies exploring socio-cultural dynamics, sociological processes, public perceptions, and policy impacts between the two nations are relatively limited (Sullivan, 2020). Addressing this academic gap may be crucial for a holistic understanding of long-lasting bilateral relationships, for the body of knowledge on social issues is steadily growing within a globalized complex society. Meanwhile, recent initiatives sponsored by the Academy of Korean Studies (AKS) at a Canadian University emphasize the importance of exploring democratic politics, popular culture, and everyday life in Korean studies. Integrating such perspectives into Korean-Canada research can provide deeper insights into the societal underpinnings of the bilateral relationship (York University, 2018). Likewise, Canada and Korea continue to strengthen their many-sided partnership because there is an imperative need to expand social sciences studies by developing research platforms that bring together scholars from multiple faculties and preparing third-party funding opportunities that delve into the humanistic and societal aspects of this relationship (KOFICE, 2019; CEFIA, 2024). Such research front driven by social sciences Canadianists in both countries will not only complement existing the bonds of friendship but also contribute to a more comprehensive and nuanced understanding of the ties that bind these two nations (Coates, 2017).

Methodology

Data collection and analysis

This work utilizes a well-organized procedure of literature collection strategies, AI-driven analytic tools and results presentation suitable for scoping reviews, as depicted in Figure 1 that ranges from selecting the literature data pool to discussing the knowledge synthesis and the presentation of results (Lee & Cho, 2021). To secure generalizability at most, data collection and data analysis activities that this study adopted in January and February 2025 were demonstrated by multiple scoping studies that Kitchenham et al. (2011), Petersen et al. (2015), and Lee and Cho (2021), and undertook and generated by artificial intelligence (AI) services. For data collection, the researcher entered a single keyword as “Canada” in Korean syllables (i.e., ) on the search window of the Korea Citation Index website (www.kci.go.kr, KCI), and then clicked seven options on the publication information, including ‘social sciences’ as journal types and ‘from 2005 thru 2024’ as published year, to screen relevant research papers used for the study.

Figure 1. Process of data handling and reporting

Download Original Figure

As a result of the high-level search, the work included 211 pieces of literature, except for four non-academic articles from the initial 215 listings. Next, to extract informative bibliographic data in the RIS format that is compatible with EndNote/Zotero Reference Management Software, this study activated 15 bibliographic filtering boxes available on the search page, followed by downloading RIS-formatted files multiple times from the KCI’s database. As shown in Figure 2, all 15 attributes of the standard bibliographic information were imported to the Zotero program and the MS-Excel 365 program. Four fields of English-written names, titles, abstracts, and keywords in a simple text layout were then selected for the systematic classification stage. Lastly, this researcher utilized ChatGPT 4o to analyze text data in a time-effective manner; the Generative AI’s Large Language Model (LLM) engine enabled us to run qualitative descriptive coding methods in analyzing a large volume of the documentary data, followed by a valid and reliable Non-negative Matrix Factorization (NMF) method from ChatGPT 4o (see Appendix).

Figure 2. Screen captured bibliographic data on Zotero and MS-spreadsheet

Download Original Figure

By interpreting the structured outputs made by ChatGPT’s descriptive coding jobs, knowledge synthesis in accordance with Kitchenham et al.’s (2011) and Petersen et al.’s (2015) guidelines on scoping studies, and presentation of the evidence primarily in a tabular format were carried out.

Findings

As mentioned, a total of 211 KCI Canada-focused papers within social sciences are selected to highlight the results, including research trends, institutional affiliations, topical shifts, research focus, research patterns, and methodology spectrum, as well as to identify key findings on gaps in knowledge.

Research trends

This study looks over temporal trends in publication. To understand the trends in Canada-related studies, it classified the selected papers based on publication year. Figure 3 depicts the publication trend across the time period; the paper counts are grouped into 5-year periods as 2005~2009, 2010~2014, 2015~2019, and 2020~2024. Here, we may easily discover that the amount of research increases by the classified period.

Figure 3. Research distribution over time

Download Original Figure

Publication rates have increased from 27 pieces in 2005~2009 to 80 pieces in 2020~2024; the number of papers has nearly tripled in 15 years, indicating gradually growing academic interest in Canada between the two countries. However, this quantitative rise masks a qualitative stagnation in the diversity of topics or methods, as revealed in later sections. Judging from the full English name of the first authors, this scoping study is able to look into the national dynamics of authorship (See Table 1). Among 211 primary authors, 194 Koreans occupy while 17 pieces are made by non-Koreans, including 15 pieces by Canadian (or Westerners) and two pieces by Chinese authors; Korean authors dominate the literature in social sciences, accounting for nearly 92% of the studies. Only a handful of Canadians make up less than 8% of the total, and two Chinese contributors are represented. These figures clearly show a mono-directional knowledge flow, where Korean perspectives shape the entire discourse on Canada-related social issues. While this demonstrates active Korean scholarly engagement, it also reflects a missed opportunity for co-authored transnational scholarship, limiting the dialogic nature of bilateral studies.

Table 1. Publications by the primary author’s nationality

Nationality	Korean	Canadian(Western)	Chinese
Papers	194 (91.9%)	15 (7.1%)	2 (1.0%)

Download Excel Table

More specifically, this study investigates the work’s form combined with the citizenship of the first author. The number of sole authors is 138 pieces (65.4%), and the number of co-authors is 73(=58+10+5) pieces (34.6%). It appears that Korean authors prefer single works indeed, whereas non-Koreans would rather go with collaborations (see Figure 4).

Figure 4. Publication by form of the research

Download Original Figure

Institutional affiliations

Understanding the distribution of institutional affiliations is crucial; the information gives us authors with resources, support and research impact. Figure 5 illustrates that nearly 162 over 211 (77%) originate from universities/post-graduate schools in Korea, with minimal contributions from overseas, national research centers, or governmental bodies. This institutional concentration implies predominant academic insulation—social sciences research on Canada is conducted largely within Korean universities, with little engagement from practitioners or cross-sector actors such as legal firms, private research groups, or individual researchers with primary/secondary schools.

Figure 5. Types of institutes (Affiliation of the primary author)

Download Original Figure

Research highlights

This mapping study also undertakes a twofold word cloud analysis corresponding to titles and keywords of 211 articles, followed by a thematic cluster based on 211 abstracts using ChatGPT’s NMF technique (see Appendix B), around five core research areas as illustrated in Figure 6 and Table 3, respectively.

Figure 6. Word clouds

Download Original Figure

First, in regard to article titles, research highlights are addressed as follows. Education, curriculum development, and social system reforms are frequent topics. Legal system studies appear as well, highlighting governance and public policy dimensions. International development and student mobility emerge as secondary yet noticeable themes. Studies highlight curriculum reforms in fields such as science and career education, often benchmarking Ontario models. Attention to multicultural aspects and ethnic identity reflects Canada’s influence on social structure. Policy comparison between Korea and Canada seems a backbone approach in many papers. Overall, Canadian studies are used as a lens to critique or inform Korean educational and policy frameworks.

Table 3. Thematic cluster

Research areas: Governance, Public policy, Language rights
Key morphemes	Focus on the research
policy, tax, political, development, language, Quebec	This cluster captures studies centered on Canadian government policy, federalism, language rights (particularly in Quebec), political systems, development planning, and tax systems. Therefore, these works often examine comparative governance, constitutional issues, or public administration aspects of Canada-related topics.
Research areas: Curriculum, Education, Pedagogy
Key morphemes	Focus on the research
curriculum, education, career, school, students, science, Ontario	This arena focuses on educational content, especially around science and career education, often comparing Korean and Canadian curricula (notably from Ontario). The studies explore curriculum development, educational reform, and competency-based education.
Research areas: Trade, Economy, Free Trading
Key morphemes	Focus on the research
FTA, trade, agreement, origin, rules, investment, energy, renewable	This thematic area includes research on Free Trade Agreements, rules of origin, international investment law, and renewable energy policy. It features strong engagement with Korea-Canada FTA, NA(North America)FTA, and CETA(Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement)-related case studies.
Research areas: Law, Rights, Legal Frameworks
Key morphemes	Focus on the research
act, court, legal, rights, treatment, personal, law, constitutional	This cluster covers legal analysis, including constitutional interpretation, human rights, corrections, and mental health legislation. Studies in this group often address court decisions, legal doctrines, and institutional obligations.
Research areas: Multiculturalism, Identity, Immigration
Key morphemes	Focus on the research
multiculturalism, immigration, policy, social, integration, diversity, society	These studies deal with multicultural society, immigration policy, civic identity, and integration challenges. Canada is frequently examined as a multicultural model, with reflections on ethnic diversity, anti-discrimination law, and identity negotiation in transnational contexts.

Download Excel Table

Then, pertaining to keywords in the papers, an intense concentration on FTA suggests a major economic and legal interest. Curriculum development remains central, reflecting Canada's educational influence. Multiculturalism and immigration topics appear frequently, emphasizing Canada's social diversity. Social systems and policy development in Canada are studied as models for Korean adaptation. Environmental issues, such as climate policy, energy transition, and environmental law are emerging. Electronic governance and digital transformation have started to appear but remain less dominant. Legal frameworks like the Canadian Charter of Rights are often explored comparatively. Continually, based on 211 abstracts, Table 3 provides outputs of the thematic cluster around five research sectors supported by ChatGPT’s NMF service. The first research areas are primarily related to governance and policy, with an emphasis on Canadian federalism, tax law, and Quebec’s language rights. While these studies suggest a comparative constitutional interest in the region, they do not deeply engage with Canadian public administration theory. The second domain contains education and pedagogical-related topics, with a focus on curriculum comparison between two countries, often benchmarking Ontario as a meaningful policy reference. This cluster is methodologically diverse but usually lacks policy-to-practice linkage. The third case relates to the matter of international trade, which FTA is involved in, and in this domain, economic issues are also addressed; such writings also provide detailed information on NAFTA/CETA implications and rules of origin, but they often neglect supply chain policy or the dynamics of green trade. The fourth research groups are within legal systems and human rights; topics range from indigenous legal rights to mental health justice, yet few studies integrate indigenous epistemologies or intersectional legal critiques. Lastly, multiculturalism and identity are also key research areas; the focus of the research reflects growing attention to Canada’s multicultural model, often in contrast to Korea’s monoethnic narrative. However, few works examine diasporic identity formation or lived immigrant experience, despite the fact that there are more than 240 thousand Korean immigrants living in Canada nationwide (Korean Consulate General Toronto, 2024).

Methodology spectrum

Lastly, methodological approaches are depicted in Figure 7. The research methods applied in the literature are predominantly descriptive or unclear, with only a minority using rigorous qualitative, quantitative, or mixed-method basis. As international social sciences literature, this methodological underdevelopment signals an urgent need for deeper empirical engagement, including fieldwork, ethnography, and data modelling.

Figure 7. Research methods

Download Original Figure

Discussion

This scoping review aimed to categorize and interpret systematically the literature of Canadian-focused social sciences studies published in Korea in the past 20 years. In concert with the overarching research question (i.e., What do Canada-focused papers in the Korean social sciences literature deal with?) and with four sub-questions discussed as above in the introduction, the discussion weaves together the findings around participants, conceptual trends, contextual characteristics, and gaps in knowledge.

Results disclose a remarkable dominance of Korean scholars conducting research on subjects associated with Canada in Korean social sciences journals. Roughly 92% of the initial authors were Korean nationals, and the study involved a few Canadian and foreign scholars. Also, the preference among Korean researchers for single authors is in contrast to the collaborative tendency of non-Korean authors. This indicates that most Canadian-focused research done in Korea is rooted in the domestic sphere, devoid of significant intercultural or binational scholarship (Coates, 2017; Sullivan, 2020). Consequently, the field risks an inward-looking orientation, missing opportunities for comparative depth and intercultural enrichment that joint authorship could provide.

Even though the number of Canada-related articles in papers increases yearly, the trends over the 20-year time period also show topic change in theme evolution, as we look at the evolution of thematic focus over time, the years. The earlier papers, for example, stressed that Korea’s focus became focused on macroeconomic themes like Korea-Canada FTA, NAFTA, CETA, and globalization (e.g., trade priorities). In the mid-2010s, multiculturalism, education reforms, and governance structures became the leading themes. And in another instance, the discourse grew to encompass criminal justice, correctional reform, discrimination, and climate change. A handful of articles have recently demonstrated how Canadian experiences are mined for Korean policy innovation. In particular, thematic clusters identified from word-cloud analysis and the NMF method were all governance, education, economy, law, and multiculturalism. However, the coverage remains superficial, with very little interdisciplinary depth or theoretical diversity, even with these added subjects.

The overwhelming use of the Korean language (approximately 86% of the papers) underscores a linguistic silo that restricts the international accessibility and visibility of Korean research on Canada. Citation analysis further reveals a low impact, with over 90% of articles cited fewer than 10 times, and nearly 30% remaining uncited. Such patterns suggest an insular academic ecosystem, where research is mostly disseminated within a country’s borders, without international connections. Methodologically, the literature is dominated by descriptive or uncertain approaches, and few studies have undertaken strong qualitative, quantitative, or mixed methods designs. This methodological conservatism suggests a need for enhanced empirical sophistication, including the adoption of ethnography, longitudinal analysis, or policy modeling.

This study pinpoints a number of key gaps in the existing body of work. There is a striking absence of intercultural co-authored scholarship, leaving scholars with little scope for comparative or dialogical insights. In Canada, Indigenous issues have received relatively low attention, and there is very little written on the intricacies of Canadian society. Francophone Canada is significantly neglected, despite its substantial cultural and political importance. Moreover, there is an absence of research that analyzes how Canadian experiences could inform Korean policy or societal reforms. We can also address that the voices of the Canadian local immigrants, as well as ethnographic perspectives, are scarce, resulting in a lack of grounded insights into multicultural realities and not long-lasting relationships between the Korean communities/institutes in Canada (Moon, 2003; Hong, 2020). Finally, minimal cross-sectoral participation from Koreans suggests an urgent need for interdisciplinary collaboration across academia, law, policy and non-governmental organizations in civil society sectors where Canada is one of the supportive Western countries in terms of international human rights and freedom as well as feminist foreign policy (Sohn, 2011; Seol, 2022; Choi & Kwon, 2023). In summary, while Canada-focused research formally published in the KCI journals has expanded quantitatively over the last two decades, qualitative limitations persist, however. Addressing these gaps will require a deliberate pivot toward intercultural collaboration, methodological rigour, thematic diversification, and global scholarly dialogue.

Conclusion and Implications

This scoping review presents the first comprehensive mapping of Canada-related social sciences research that is introduced in the Korean/Canadian academia over the past twenty years. It documents the gradual but clear growth of scholarly interest in Canada, reflected in the increasing number of publications, expansion of topical diversity, and evolving research themes aligned with broader global academic trends. Despite these quantitative advances, the study reveals persistent structural limitations in the selected 211 KCI literature. There is a significant domestic authorship dominance with scant cross-border collaboration. While the research themes have expanded, their thematic and methodological scope remains constrained and tends to be more descriptive in nature, with relatively little depth in theoretical or empirical contribution. Furthermore, the linguistic barrier posed by Korean-only publications, combined with low citation visibility, suggests a restricted global academic impact. In addition, research is largely divided between economic agreements (FTA) and social policies, including multiculturalism and social integration. Studies are also heavily dependent on a simple literature review, comparative policy analysis, and international implications rather than empirical testing. Such works may emphasize arbitrary results or individual judgment rather than experimental validation, not suggesting a conceptual orientation; this is mainly because focusing on a frequent term from research titles and abstracts implies a tendency toward narrow, case-specific research designs.

The identification of significant knowledge gaps—particularly the neglect of indigenous issues, Francophone perspectives, immigrant experiences, and policy feedback mechanisms—highlights critical areas for future inquiry. To cultivate a more robust and globally relevant body of Canada-focused research, Korean scholars must actively pursue intercultural co-authorship, interdisciplinary methodological frameworks, and bilingual publication strategies. Engaging with Canadian scholars, institutions, and diverse communities can significantly enrich the quality, relevance, and global connectivity of future studies. Practically, this study implies that academic institutions, research funding bodies, and policymakers should incentivize collaborative research models, support the development of bilingual research outputs, and facilitate cross-sectoral dialogue. In doing so, they can not only deepen the scholarly understanding of Canada-Korea relations but also contribute to the creation of an inclusive, dynamic research ecosystem that resonates with both domestic and international audiences.

In conclusion, while Canada-related research within Korean social sciences journals has made promising strides, its true potential remains untapped. A conscious, strategic shift toward intercultural, interdisciplinary, and globally engaged scholarship is necessary to foster a richer, more nuanced understanding of the Canadian experience and its relevance to Korean society. This paper, in the form of a scoping study that concentrates on classifying research types, structuring a research scope and providing knowledge synthesis by responding to a set of high-level, has a limitation in that it does not cover the in-depth evaluation nor critical appraisal of all relevant literature on the specific boundary that systematic literature reviews generally do. Thereby, while the present scoping review successfully classified overarching trends and thematic concentrations in Canada-focused social sciences research, it primarily adopted a descriptive mapping approach rather than undertaking a critical meta-synthesis; the study was limited in its ability to infer deeper theoretical implications, causal linkages, or paradigm shifts within the field, which would have enriched the interpretative depth of the findings. Therefore, this study serves as a foundation for future research initiatives that can be built to achieve that vision further and will contribute to more prosperous scholarly activities in the Canadian-Korean context.

Statements of Artificial Intelligence (AI) Usage

In line with the research design and methods as specified in 3. METHODOLOGY, this scoping study widely employed a Generative AI tool, ChatGPT 4o to conduct descriptive coding, analyze a large volume of textual dataset, and produce the mapped outcomes (i.e., major topics, word cloud and thematic cluster on page 8-9/17-18), as well as Grammerly, an AI writing assistant to support semantic refinement, textual coherence, and grammatical correction in the manuscript; all AI-generated coding/analyzing skills and AI-assisted outputs in writing were thoroughly reviewed, evaluate, and where necessary, modified by the author to ensure consistency, accuracy, clarity, and originality in accordance with academic standards of scoping review.

INTRODUCTION

Immigrants have been coming to Canada for centuries, however, the majority of new immigrants now tend to settle in Montreal, Toronto, and Vancouver (MTV), as opposed to smaller communities, citing the attraction and support available from an already established immigrant community (McQuillan, 2024). Job prospects, family reunification, standard of living, and escaping political or economic conditions are just a few of the reasons for immigration to Canada that have been examined (Alfred, 2002). Several studies have explored the reasons why newcomers arrive and settle in Ontario (Esses et al., 2021), and in particular, choose the City of Toronto (Preston et al., 2022; Triadafilopoulos, 2021). Family reunification, better employment prospects, desire for improved quality of life, better educational opportunities are just a few of the reasons for immigration to Canada that have been researched (Esses et al., 2021; Zhang et al., 2023; Schinnerl & Ellermann, 2023; Statistics Canada, 2022). Some researchers argue that the choice of settlement area has very little to do with services offered and more to do with family and kin residing in a given area (Picot & Sweetman, 2012).

Settlement choices are influenced by the many challenges faced by immigrants in the process of establishing themselves in the new country. Several of these challenges, have been outlined in the literature for the case of Southern Ontario, (Picot & Sweetman, 2012). The more prevalent of these barriers is access to settlement services (Mukhtar et al., 2015). Better clusters of services are available in Montreal, Toronto and Vancouver (MTV). Transportation access issues are recognized as another barrier as many newly arrived immigrant women do not have driver’s licenses or access to cars and larger cities are better equipped to offer a breath of transportation services (Susanna, 2024).

Consequently, small cities and communities appear to be excluded as attractive settlement areas for new immigrants. This pattern has been changing in the recent years with more newcomers settling in smaller urban or rural areas (McQuillan, 2024). Hence, there is a need to understand the rationale behind this shift, in order to better address the needs for services of these newcomers. While it relates back to the reasons for arrival in Canada, this point is important when discussing settlement barriers because it is shown that even a small established community of immigrants can act as a draw for further settlement, which has the potential ability to refocus services to new areas as immigration shifts to cities outside of these three major hubs, the services will have to relocate accordingly (Picot & Sweetman, 2012). In addition, the services to aid in settlement and promote integration among newly arrived immigrants are significantly strained in larger cities where immigration numbers tend to be higher. If the settlement patterns can be dispersed to smaller communities, with reliable service availability, access, and delivery, then there is the potential to alleviate the immigration related pressures on urban areas.

Unfortunately, there have been very few studies that explored the nature of immigration and the settlement barriers to immigrants arriving in Northern Ontario. The only studies we have found was a report by Chris Southcott (2007) that found that Northern Ontario tends to attract few immigrants and a study by Yantha (2020), which examines the challenges and prospects of an immigration pilot project in Northern Ontario. Furthermore, a study by Kelly and Nguyen (2023) explores non-metropolitan cities in Ontario and explains why immigrants choose to remain in smaller centers including the ones in Northern Ontario. However, most of the newcomers were students and/or contract workers on temporary visas rather than immigrants.

Much focus is being placed on the role immigration plays in the Ontario labour landscape. It has been estimated that net migration to the province of Ontario will account for 68 percent of all population growth in the next 25 years (Ministry of Finance, 2011). Labour force dynamics in the province of Ontario and especially in the north is affected by baby boom exits, significant changes in the production levels of Ontario’s main industries, emigration to economically booming provinces, trade relationships with the US, and more general global economic forces.

Future workforce growth is expected to come from immigrating professionals to Canada (Reitz, 2005, p. 413), yet Northern Ontario has experienced ongoing out-migration of skilled workers. The 2012 Canadian Federal Budget, “Jobs, Growth, and Long-Term Prosperity” (Ministry of Finance, 2012) and the 2012 Ontario Budget, “Strong Action for Ontario” (Ministry of Finance, 2012) both refer to the North’s natural resources and its ability to create jobs and attract skilled immigrants valued by Canadian employers. The five major cities in Northern Ontario are now collaborating under ‘One North’ to develop an economic development and immigration attraction strategy recognizing that they must act now.

Canada's official multiculturalism policy promotes both cultural diversity and equitable participation in society (Kymlicka, 2010). However, despite this welcoming policy framework, internationally trained immigrants face persistent integration challenges, particularly in credential recognition and labor market access (Reitz & Banerjee, 2007). These challenges may be amplified in Northern Ontario due to geographic isolation and limited settlement services.

This study constitutes the second component of a broader research project examining the economic and social integration of internationally trained immigrants, undertaken through the Professions North/Nord initiative in Northern Ontario (Robichaud et al., 2022). In this study, we analyze the settlement of immigrants aimed at identifying the main socio-cultural barriers to the integration of new immigrants in Northern Ontario communities. Our main motivation in conducting this research is to bridge the gap in the existing literature, regarding the settlement of immigrants in Northern Ontario. The objectives are to profile the type of the newcomers, the reasons why they make this choice, and the challenges they face in Northern Ontario communities. Our paper is organized as follows: section 2, reviews the literature on the socio-cultural dimensions of immigration in Canada; followed by methodology in section 3; results and analysis in section 4; finally, discussion, recommendations, and conclusions in section 5.

Literature Review

The body of literature regarding immigrant integration in Canada is vast and varied in education (Lo et al., 2001; Reitz 2001; Walton-Roberts, 2011), employment (Robichaud et al., 2022; Lo et al., 2001; Owen & Lo, 2008; Orme 2007; Picot & Sweetman, 2012; Reitz, 2001; Truelove, 2000; Walters et al., 2006), integration services (Albert et al., 2012; Picot & Sweetman, 2012; Reitz, 2001; Truelove, 2000), and social integration processes (Entzinger & Biezeveld, 2003; Li, 2003; Reitz 2007). These different factors affect the arrival experience of immigrants, their socio-cultural and economic integration experiences, that can alter outcomes.

Methodology and Research Questions

This study focused on immigrants in the five main communities in Northern Ontario: Sudbury, Thunder Bay, North Bay, Sault Ste. Marie, and Timmins. We collected data from 74 respondents: 27 from Sudbury, 12 from North Bay, 10 from Timmins, 10 from Thunder Bay, and 15 from Sault Ste Marie. Interviews were conducted over a two year period from the summer of 2011 to 2013. This timeframe allowed us to recruit participants across different seasons, capturing experiences during both summer and winter months?an important consideration given Northern Ontario's climate challenges that participants frequently mentioned as affecting their integration. Following Berry (1997), we conceptualized social integration as encompassing labor market participation, social network formation, and access to settlement services.

In-depth, face-to-face interviews were selected as the primary data collection method for several reasons (Creswell & Poth, 2018; Rubin & Rubin, 2012). First, our research objective was exploratory?to understand the lived experiences and subjective perspectives of ITIs in Northern Ontario, a population and context underrepresented in existing literature. Interviews allow participants to articulate complex narratives about their integration journey in their own words (DiCicco-Bloom & Crabtree, 2006). Second, face-to-face interviews enabled rapport-building and cultural sensitivity, particularly important given participants' diverse linguistic and cultural backgrounds. Third, this method allowed flexibility to probe emerging themes and clarify participants' meanings, yielding richer data than structured surveys could provide. The conversational nature of interviews was especially appropriate for exploring sensitive topics such as unmet expectations and experiences of discrimination.

The integration barriers examined in this study emerged inductively from our data analysis rather than being predetermined. Following grounded theory principles (Charmaz, 2014), we conducted iterative thematic analysis of interview transcripts to identify recurring challenges participants reported. Initial open coding revealed patterns across multiple domains: credential recognition, language proficiency, social network development, and access to settlement services. These themes were refined through constant comparison across interviews and consultation with community stakeholders. This inductive approach allowed us to capture barriers most salient to ITIs' lived experiences in Northern Ontario rather than imposing a priori categories that might not reflect regional realities.

Results and Analysis

Expectations and reasons for coming to Canada

An analysis of the initial expectations for coming to Canada and Northern Ontario shows that some people made some research before coming to Canada (89%) and other people not (11%). The expectations observed are classified and presented in Table 2. These expectations were similar, regardless of the Northern Ontario city where the respondent was living in.

Immigrants, who came to Canada to join family or friends, because of its quality of life, or for other reasons, generally faced greater challenges in their social integration. Expectations prior to arrival were often overly optimistic, and based on word-of-mouth referrals from friends, family, and other immigrants. These individuals tended to underestimate the requirement for Canadian credentials and lacked preparedness for social networking, such as cultural awareness. For example, a young woman from India who immigrated to Canada in 2004 described her expectations as follows:

“...[my initial expectations were] like money is growing on trees in Canada and you think ‘oh my god’ we are just going there and grabbing it but when I come to Canada it was kind of a shock for me like no, it’s not. You have to work really hard to get what you want but if you have potential then you can grab it.” [Respondent # 2]

Table 2. Initial expectations for coming to Canada and Northern Ontario

	Frequency	Percentage
Expected that it is easy to get a job	24	16
Expected cold weather	21	14
Expected to have better education	17	11
Expected to have a better life	16	11
Expected tough integration and challenges	13	9
Expected a developed economy (big cities)	9	6
Expected difficulties getting employment	9	6
Expected safe environment	8	5
Expected friendly people	8	5
Expected a peaceful environment	6	4
Expected to integrate into a liberal environment	3	2
No research before coming and Other	16	11

Download Excel Table

Overall, 50% of the respondents indicated that they came to Northern Ontario for jobs, 38% for education, and 12% for family reasons, as illustrated in Figure 1. However, the situation in each of the five communities in more contrasted. Immigrants in Timmins in their large majority (90%) moved there for employment reasons. Employment is the major reason for settlement in North Bay and Sault St Marie. However, in Thunder Bay and Sudbury, education as the main reason for coming to Northern Ontario, at 60% and 56% respectively. This of course is consistent with the fact that Northern Ontario postsecondary institutions are mainly located in the two cities.

The reasons given by the respondents for coming to Northern Ontario are similar to the reasons for coming to Canada studied in other works (Alfred, 2002; Clark, Hatton and Williamson, 2002; Portsmouth, 2002) and can be grouped into 5 categories: work opportunities (19%), education or skills-training (18%), to join family or friends (35%), quality of life (5%) and other (15%).

Figure 1. Reasons for coming to Northern Ontario

Download Original Figure

There is a difference between immigrants who came directly to Northern Ontario upon immigrations and those who came after. From the 74 respondents, 38% came directly to Northern Ontario and 62% came to Northern Ontario a few months to a few years after immigrating to Canada. For those who came directly to Northern Ontario, their principal reasons were for family, education, or got a job before immigrating. The immigrants who move to Northern Ontario, after some time elsewhere in Canada, did it mainly to mainly pursue their education or because they managed to get a job or an opportunity in Northern Ontario.

The following testimony shows that family played a big part in the reasons for immigrants coming directly to Northern Ontario. This individual came directly to North Bay from Kenya.

“Basically I have a relative who is based here in North Bay. He is a lecturer; he is a lecturer at Nipissing University. So I have come so that he will give the first few weeks assistant as I get to settle on my own. Yeah.” [Respondent #32]

This individual demonstrates that the only reason that he came to Northern Ontario was to re-educate himself in order to improve his chances of getting opportunities.

“…I landed in Toronto and I stayed for a couple of years, then I moved on to Sudbury Here, and it happened by chance because I got admission in Laurentian University and that’s the reason I relocated to Northern Ontario.” [Respondent #5)]

Other respondents came to Northern Ontario because of employment opportunities. As example, this individual stated that employment was a priority.

“…I just got a job here and then moved here. Initially in Brandon [Manitoba] we had a friend who hosted us for maybe 3 weeks in his house our family. He just offered us accommodation and many other things and we stayed with him for about 3 weeks and then moved into our house and then when I got a job here, we just moved to Thunder Bay.” [Respondent #53]

Social and cultural networks

The social and cultural networks are described as the different organizations that were used to help integrate immigrants into society. Figure 2 illustrates the social and cultural networks accessed by our sample.

Figure 2. Services used upon arrival to Canada and Northern Ontario

Download Original Figure

The main organizations used were: employment services, accessed by 38% of the participants; multicultural association services, accessed by 36%; academic institutions, accessed by 35%; settlement services accessed by 22% and language training by 20%. Note that none of the immigrants in Timmins used a language training service, while all the immigrants who went to Thunder Bay used the Multicultural Organization services.

With over 78% of surveyed immigrants knowing one of the 2 official languages of Canada and 20% using language training, the language was not perceived to be a barrier to integration. The majority of immigrants indicated that they know they have an accent but they manage to adapt to the Canadian language, which indicated that language is not a problem. As an example, most immigrants who had language barriers to employment were able to overcome their barriers with the help of language training centres, universities, and other language resources. The language barrier was manageable, and once a minimum standard for employment was achieved, the individuals were able to continue to develop their English and French language skills in a professional setting, on the job. A Japanese woman recounts arriving in Northern Ontario in 2007 with no prior English language training and using a settlement agency to find English-as-a-Second-Language (“ESL”) classes to facilitate her social and economic integration:

“I think I am having good experiences. The first time I came here, I didn’t understand at all and I couldn’t speak and I went to ESL class and I learned English for about a year and after that I got the job at the retail and I could practice more there” [Respondent #24]

The successes of immigrants who seek language training can be seen in other conversations with immigrants facing language barriers. These findings correspond to the findings identified in the literature review placing an emphasis on settlement services as an aid to integration (Lo et al., 2000). Some authors (Hiebert, 2009; Lo et al., 2000; Omidvar 7 Richmond, 2003) examining issues such as social integration, propose that the only real solution is an increase in availability and the assurance of access to employment and settlement services for newcomers. Participants in our study clearly indicated that they had an easier time integrating once these services were obtained:

“Employment opportunity is the biggest thing. Once you have employment opportunities for newcomers, everything else falls into place there after that. They are able to socialize and make these social connections. They are then able to go out to look at recreational activity. They are then able to focus on all these other things but the first priority has to be employment. If there are no employment opportunities, they are going to leave and if there is only employment opportunities for only one of the family, there is still a greater likelihood of them leaving. It’s been talked about to death here in this community that I have heard for the past 5 years but there is no movement forward on that and ok, you can talk about it, you can pay lip service, but where is the action? And until the city looks at it and understands that, and moves forward in an impactful way, it’s still going to be, you’re gonna attract them and they are still going to leave. So until they address that, nothing is going to change.” [Respondent # 70]

Some survey participants discussed difficulties due to a deficiency in language, particularly during the job application process. Effort in understanding job requirements, difficulty communicating during the interview process, and difficulty socializing on the job have been cited as challenges for new immigrants whose principal language is not one of Canada’s official languages. These results are not surprising considering that 22% of the participating group did not list English or French as one of their principal languages (Table 2). While language as a barrier was not teased out in the literature review as a subtopic, the idea that the immigration system, and specifically the immigrant selection criteria as a whole was examined. In order to guarantee immigrants full participation and integration into the workforce, the selection criteria must ensure candidates are able to speak one of the official languages to find a job; the results of this survey clearly demonstrate an issue with immigration policy as a whole. In addition to a language barrier, there seems to be a lack of confidence with respect to language and communication that is proving to be a barrier to employment. One recent Chinese immigrant describes his perception of his employability based on his limited proficiency with the English language:

“There are lots of people native English speaker who apply for these kind of professional position in university and I cannot compete with them.” [Respondent # 1]

It is evident that language skills are required by employers and some new immigrants are citing language as a barrier to employment. A young Swahili-speaking man from Kenya, immigrated to Northern Ontario with a college diploma in accounting and foreign work experience as an accountant. He applied for several jobs without receiving an interview, and was encouraged to place a follow up phone call to employers. During the conversation with employers, the applicant found it challenging to communicate due to a strong language barrier:

“Work, you see I’ve have done so many applications, and I got realise none of them is even getting short-listed, so I used to wonder what kind of qualification are even required to get a job? so until I was advised you need to make so many follow ups, you make follow ups, particularly you make a phone call, you mess up with everything sometimes it doesn’t even sound like you are talking English... Particularly when you make a call, you try do a follow -up, and you make a call, maybe the employer will feel like you are not up to the standard in terms of talking; language, so you lose the job.” [Respondent # 3]

The applicant is now in the process of obtaining Canadian education, and working on his language skills to be more job-ready. Overall, skilled immigrants have found that in a competitive job market, communication skills can be a deciding factor for employees, when all else is equal:

“I will like really to probably take some options or courses just to improve more my English. I think that is going to help me because the type of business that I’m doing, you can see that between two people that you can pick with the same amount of knowledge and everything but one that has better communicating, I think the person is gonna select that person instead of the other, you know. So I haven’t been able to put this formally, but I think that it’s time for me to do something more on a professional way; just look for some alternatives that I can improve my pronunciation and everything in the English language.” [Respondent # 22]

Social and Cultural Integration into Society

Taking an average of all five communities in Northern Ontario, 50 percent had a good integration into society, 20 percent had a bad integration into society, and 30 percent are considered as unknown. The people classified in the unknown category are either unsure themselves of their social integration or have given mixed signals as far as their integration (some good things and some bad things). This indicates that the immigrants are split on the question of social integration; some of them have had difficulties integrating socially into Northern Ontario while others have not.

Based on the results from the different communities in Northern Ontario, two of them stand out. Timmins and Sault-St. Marie are the two cities with the worst level of integration into society. 30 percent of the immigrants in Timmins indicated that they have had a bad integration into society while 40 percent of the immigrants in Sault-St. Marie indicated the same trend. These are the exceptions to Northern Ontario as the other communities have a much higher satisfaction rate.

Figure 3. Social integration per community

Download Original Figure

Some of the survey participants that described Northern Ontario communities as unwelcoming to newcomers and resistant to change identified networking as a key source of employment opportunities in Northern Ontario. Breaking in to the social circle is the first step towards social integration, and it appears that social integration is a very important step towards economic participation. A young male from St. Lucia, describes his experience in Northern Ontario as trying to join a new family.

“Because you have such a small group of people who knows everybody and when you have such a group they don’t like change and they don’t like seeing new faces moving in. And it is basically like one big family, you are trying to move into a family. I always stick to that thing, it is who you know and who knows you and you have to have somebody to help you get in.” [Respondent # 16]

A young Chinese man, who has been living in Northern Ontario for 3 years, describes a job market dominated by personal referrals:

“when you try to find a job, people tend to hire someone they know so it’s not easy, especially difficult for the newcomers to get a job.” [Respondent # 19]

He goes on to compare his experiences in Northern Ontario to Toronto:

“Toronto is a big city, busy and the people don’t have much close connection with each other and I think that’s the difference” [Respondent # 19]

The problem seemed to be present in all of the surveyed communities. A young man from Ethiopia describes his challenges finding work in Northern Ontario without having entered the personal networks of friends here:

“...Especially [I thought] searching a job will be easy but I found it very difficult. It is very difficult than I thought before because here, you can’t get a job unless you have some connection with people that you know so it’s so hard to find a job here especially” [Respondent # 72]

Immigrants who had success breaking into the social circles in Northern Ontario often had a champion; either a friend, colleague, or family member. A young Caucasian, English-speaking female from New Zealand moved to Northern Ontario with her husband, and found employment as a contract Geologist. Despite coming from a similar culture, and having full-time employment, she found it took a long time to make friends in the community:

“It’s been difficult socially here ... I have been here for 3 years and I’ve finally just started to make friends outside of family.” [Respondent # 61]

Her husband also faced barriers to social and economic integration:

“I was my wife’s shadow. Wherever she went, I went and I went through a period of ... about the first two and half years I was here, I went into a serious bout of depression…So when you’re looking at integrating, the process of integration for me was complete when I can go out and I can make my own friends. I’ve met them and we are now friends, or acquaintances or whatever, where I’d live and I feel comfortable going to this person’s house to hang out and have a beer. So two and half years, there was a combination of factors of not working in my field so everything that I’ve worked for to get educated and qualified I could no longer do. I didn’t know anyone so having to start again at the age of 30 just isn’t that appealing to try and establish relationships and build the rapport it’s just that it was hard so two and a half years it took for me to feel comfortable in the community to finally say that this is home [Respondent # 62]

The lack of diversity in Northern Ontario communities was also noted:

“When I came five years ago I would say that it was hard to live in such a homogenous society where it’s just, its white faces, it’s white, white, white! There’s a lack of colour for lack of a better words, there was a lack of language. You know when you live in these southern Ontario or big cities and you just walk around and each person that you walk past is speaking a different language or looks different and no one even blinks or stops and it’s like give you a look, right? Here, I’ve seen a Muslim woman walk through the food court at the mall and the entire food court, 200-300 people moved their heads together in unison as she walks past and they just give it the whole from right to left and she knows that she’s being watched, she’s being looked at and stared at and people are whispering and people are talking and little children are pointing at her but that it’s just I don’t understand it. But when you live in such a closed off community because it’s geographically isolated and it has been so resistant to change there’s a lack of diversity. Five years later where we’re now we’re not overflowing with diversity but comparatively speaking where were five years ago as a city to where we’re now its night and day.” [Respondent # 63]

Likelihood of Staying in Northern Ontario

Immigrants have fewer preferences in terms of where they are staying and are more concerned about getting better jobs. Only 26 percent have indicated that they will stay in Northern Ontario, 23 percent are definitively not staying, and 51 percent were unsure. The community with the highest percentage of immigrants leaving is once again Sault-St. Marie (40%) while the community with the highest percentage of immigrants staying is Sudbury (66.67%). These statistics along with the statistics from the social integration into society indicate that the community of Sault-St. Marie is not favourable for immigrants. There are a lot of bad experiences coming from this area of Northern Ontario, which pushes immigrants to leave and pursue other opportunities.

Figure 4. Likelihood of staying in Northern Ontario per community

Download Original Figure

The reasons given by respondents for either leaving or staying in Northern Ontario are the following: jobs (79%), education (3%), family (8%) and other reasons (10%). The other category could mean a variety of things like: there aren’t enough cultural services or food, not well integrated into society, etc. Every community has a high percentage (over 60%) for employment as a reason for leaving or staying in Northern Ontario. The majority of people who were classified in the “maybe” category had like main reason of jobs as well. Their decisions for leaving or staying will be strictly made on their employment status.

Figure 5. Reasons for staying or leaving Northern Ontario

Download Original Figure

Immigrants have employment like main priority, and the community of city that they live in is less important. Many survey participants indicated that they would move wherever the jobs are, even if they do like Northern Ontario. Here are some testimonies:

“That depends, it’s 50/50. If I find a job in Northern Ontario, then I am staying in Northern Ontario, I like Northern Ontario. If not, then I will move to bigger cities whereby I can work one job and then another one, two jobs, you know. If I don’t get anything in my field, first of all, I have to work anything. I put myself on a strong stand because I don’t want to continue accumulating money for OSAP, and then I don’t know how I am going to pay that with no experience, so I have to build my first career, thereby finding jobs here and there, it’s a hustle and so its kind 50/50.” [Respondent #67]

“…I would love to have a house here in and then be here or a business, I’d like to stay here. If I don’t see my career going any further then of course, I will move or if my business is not successful then I will move…” [Respondent #37]

“Yeah it depends. If I find a job in other places like Toronto or Vancouver or anywhere, then I will move. Toronto is not my hometown. I can go anywhere; I can move anywhere once I get a job.” [Respondent #42]

Education is also another reason for immigrants leaving Northern Ontario. This particular individual is moving to a southern city with her family to pursue Teacher’s College. They will try to find employment in this southern area before looking for opportunities in other cities.

“Well I don’t know. Actually we are going to Kingston in a couple of weeks for 8 months. My husband is going to teachers college there in Kingston so then we will try a southern city for a while and after that it depends on the working situation. If there’s work, then we’ll come back, so time will tell.” [Respondent #64]

Discussion, Recommendations, and Conclusions

Northern Ontario faces particular challenges based on geography and population, as compared to Southern Ontario, with the large territory of the north coupled with a small population density and long distances between communities complicate providing access to certain services to the general public and especially to immigrants. In this respect, immigrants might not always be able to access the services that would help them to integrate and flourish in their northern community.

This study revealed several key themes about immigrant experiences in Northern Ontario that may differ from larger urban centres. Most newcomers in our sample had difficulty entering employment and socio-cultural networks in Northern Ontario without someone to facilitate the introduction. Newcomers reported feeling less supported and more alone in Northern Ontario communities, a feeling they alleged was less prevalent in larger centres. The lack of cultural food, services and ethnicity communities within the northern cities was also seen as an issue when it came to social integration into society. Respondents felt that Northern Ontario placed a larger emphasis on Canadian credentials and experience as compared to Southern Ontario. Survey respondents verbalized the discrepancy with socio-cultural and economic integration between Northern Ontario and Toronto, and some survey respondents reported their intent to relocate to Toronto or other locations due to the degree of foreign earned credential devaluation in Northern Ontario. In order to gain Canadian experience, some immigrants turned to volunteering, but opportunities are limited and hard to come by. The individuals that did volunteering upon arrival to Canada have, in majority, seen it pay off. On a positive note, those immigrants who arranged employment or education prior to arriving in Northern Ontario had the greatest success in social and economic integration and were most pleased with their decision to locate in Northern Ontario.

Our findings connect family networks explicitly to labor market opportunities, illuminating the dual nature of family social networks in labor market entry. Consistent with Ryan et al. (2008), bonding capital provided by family and co-ethnic networks facilitated initial settlement but did not always translate into employment success. Participants who relied solely on family networks for pre-arrival information developed unrealistic expectations about credential recognition and job prospects. Conversely, those who supplemented family support with bridging capital?through Canadian educational institutions or diverse professional networks?experienced smoother labor market transitions. This suggests that while family networks are crucial for social and emotional support, labor market integration in Northern Ontario requires deliberate cultivation of connections beyond one's immediate ethnic community.

In relation to the literature review, most of the findings of the Northern Ontario sample were similar to the findings of comparative works. As examples, immigrants who come to Northern Ontario for Canadian education tend to be better prepared to manage the integration process. Language was often cited as a barrier but one that immigrants could manage through language training courses offered at resource centres in the Northern Ontario cities. Canadian experience and education were significant barriers to entry into the workforce, causing immigrants to take ad-hoc low-paying jobs and volunteer positions. In some cases, work discrimination was encountered as immigrants indicated that their exotic name was a problem as employers automatically passed judgement. If the newcomers didn’t have support from contacts, getting employment was a big challenge in part caused by the closed mentality of employers and communities towards immigrants. Immigrants are looking for equal opportunities from the local employers. These are typical challenges defined in literature and in various cities and regions. A number of possible solutions can be devised at all levels of government and through various community interactions for a holistic approach to solving the challenge of improving socio-cultural and economic integration for newcomers. Although this survey does not provide an idealistic picture of the Northern Ontario experience, it may explain some of the decline in immigration over time and is a call for action to all stakeholders.

More recently, a poll showed that Canadian views on immigration are hardening blaming newcomers for increasing housing costs and calling on government to reduce annual immigration targets and increase deportations as there are about 500,000 undocumented immigrants living in Canada. Consequently, the federal government has responded with reductions in immigration targets going forward with 395,000 new permanent residents in 2025; 380,000 in 2026; and 365,000 in 2027; down from earlier targets of 500,000 newcomers per year. Of poll respondents, aware of the lowered immigration targets, 67 percent still said that was too many and of those not aware of lowered targets, 79 per cent said Canada was taking in too many people, while 61 percent said immigrants make important cultural contributions to Canada (Dawson, 2024).

In conclusion, labour migration is not only a Canadian issue but also relevant for other countries across the world that are struggling with a decreasing population base and labour shortages to sustain their economies. Consequently, as people move from one country to another to build a better life for themselves and their families many social, cultural, economic and political policy challenges will have to be addressed in order to integrate immigrants with different identities, education, language, skills and work experience. Discourse on the importance and intersectionality of identity, diversity, equality and inclusion will play a key role in achieving successful outcomes and experiences for everyone involved. While our focus was on the social integration challenges, we acknowledge that participants' experiences suggest the importance of exclusionary dimensions and family support. Thus, we note that these aspects warrant deeper investigation. Future research could explicitly examine exclusionary processes and the dual role of family networks using frameworks such as Ager and Strang (2008) and Guo and Guo (2016) to explore integration/exclusion and family support more deeply.

Introduction

This study aims to examine the roles played by Korean immigrant churches, which make up a significant part of the Korean immigrant community, in supporting new immigrants’ settlement, their perceptions of the process, and potential cooperation strategies with local communities and municipal governments.

The role of immigrant churches in the lives and adaptation of immigrants in a new society has been extensively studied by many scholars (e.g., Ley, 2008; Park, 2011, 2018, 2022, 2024). In particular, the role of Korean immigrant churches in the United States has been actively researched. According to Min (1992), Korean immigrant churches in the U.S. play four key roles: they provide a space for connection and emotional support, offer practical assistance and resources, grant roles or titles to enhance social status, and create opportunities to preserve the Korean language and traditions. Moreover, unlike alumni or regional associations, these churches do not impose special conditions for participation, allowing anyone to join freely (Yoo, 1999). Similarly, Korean immigrant churches in Canada have also functioned as places for information sharing and for maintaining language and culture ( Ley, 2008; Park, 2011, 2018).

However, most existing studies have been conducted in the U.S., and systematic research in Canada is rare. Where such research exists, it tends to focus narrowly on the maintenance of the Korean language and culture among second-generation Korean Canadians (Jeon, 2010). Previous research has also focused mainly on first-generation immigrants who settled long ago and second-generation individuals who immigrated at a young age or were born locally. In contrast to European immigrant churches in North America, where new immigration has significantly declined, Korean immigration remains ongoing and has recently increased rapidly. Therefore, research on the role of Korean immigrant churches in the settlement of newly arrived immigrants is both timely and meaningful.

This study focuses specifically on the role of Korean immigrant churches for adult newcomers who have arrived in the past five years. While previous studies have highlighted the social, linguistic, and cultural roles of these churches, they have often done so in a fragmented manner. This study seeks to analyze more comprehensively the overall functions of Korean immigrant churches, how new immigrants perceive these roles, and how churches have responded and adapted to their needs and circumstances. In other words, this study goes beyond the existing research on mother tongue and identity maintenance for second-generation immigrants and examines the social and religious roles of Korean churches in supporting the stable settlement of new immigrants.

The geographical focus of this study is Montreal, a major multicultural city in the eastern province of Quebec, Canada. In fact, Montreal, Quebec, is known to have the highest population of people fluent in three or more languages among North American cities (Lamarre & Paredes, 2003; Maguire, 2010). Within this multilingual and multicultural setting, social integration for new immigrants demands considerable effort. Unlike in other Canadian provinces, newcomers to Quebec must acquire both English (a federal official language) and French (the provincial official language), which complicates the settlement process.

In this context, analyzing the roles played by Korean immigrant churches, where many Korean newcomers participate, and immigrants’ perceptions of these churches is crucial to supporting their successful integration and adaptation to the new society.

Research Context and Background

Theoretical Framework

This study adopts the theoretical framework of faith-based social support and lived religion. Faith-based social support integrates the institutional support provided by religious communities with the personal practice of faith in daily life, encompassing emotional, spiritual, and material assistance (Jahani & Parayandeh, 2024). Lived religion, in turn, examines how individuals express their faith through relationships, routines, and community ties beyond formal institutions (Ammerman, 2015). These viewpoints show how religion functions both as a faith-based support network and as a dynamic force shaped by individual experiences and societal context (Ammerman, 2015; Jahani & Parayandeh, 2024).

Immigrant churches serve as vital hubs of social connection and cultural preservation rather than being solely religious places of worship, particularly for immigrants facing difficulties integrating into the host society (Cadge & Ecklund, 2006).

Beyond their role as resource centers, these churches serve as safe havens during periods of immigration related uncertainties. Newly arrived immigrants often rely on them for psychological and emotional stability, particularly when facing linguistic challenges, bureaucratic pressures, and social isolation. Through spiritual care, mutual support, and the shared familiarity of cultural practices, immigrant churches provide a space of comfort, reinforcing Cadge and Ecklund’s (2006) claim that religious involvement increases when immigrants face difficulties integrating into the host society.

Furthermore, the symbolic role of immigrant churches shows how they maintain cultural identity by offering traditional rituals, services in heritage languages, and social gatherings within the same ethnic community. In a diasporic context, these practices help new immigrants maintain their connection to their heritage culture, language, and identity. In particular, the pressures introduced by Bill 96 in Quebec (National Assembly of Québec, 2022), which enforces French-language adaptation and may marginalize non-Francophone immigrant communities, further reinforce this symbolic function by positioning churches as protective spaces where cultural identity can be preserved despite external linguistic and social changes.

Overall, this study highlights how Korean immigrant churches in Montreal function beyond religious spaces, shaping community resources, emotional well-being, and cultural maintenance.

Multilingual and Multicultural Contexts of Contemporary Canada

According to the 2021 census data, linguistic and cultural demographics in Canada have undergone significant transformation according to the 2021 census data, and thus the immigration population has reached a notable milestone, with 8.3 million individuals (23.0% of the total population) holding landed immigrant or permanent resident status in Canada (Statistics Canada, 2023b).

Linguistic diversity has similarly expanded, with 41.2% of Canadians demonstrating conversational ability in multiple languages, which is an increase from 39.0% in 2016 (Statistics Canada, 2023b). Regarding Canada’s recent linguistic landscape reflecting the country's increasing diversity, nearly 3 in 10 Canadians (10.7 million people) could converse in a non-official language while 98% of Canadians knew at least one of the country's two official languages (English and French) (Statistics Canada, 2025b). This marks a substantial increase from 2001 when 21.8% of the population spoke a non-official language. The rise in linguistic diversity coincides with the growth of immigrants in Canada who speak non-official languages, increasing from 4.9 million in 2001 to 6.7 million in 2021. Moreover, the number of people with a mother tongue other than English or French has grown from 11.8% of the population in 1951 to 23.2% in 2021.

The linguistic diversity of Canada encompasses over 200 immigrant languages spoken as mother tongues. Among these, Mandarin leads with 679,000 speakers, followed by Punjabi (i.e., 667,000 speakers), Cantonese (i.e., 553,000 speakers), and Spanish (i.e., 539,000 speakers) (Statistics Canada, 2023b). The household patterns also show this diversity, with 21.0% of Canadian households (exceeding 3.1 million) classified as multilingual along with 4.6 million Canadians (12.7%) who primarily use a non-official language, which is a language other than two official languages (i.e., English & French) (Statistics Canada, 2023b). The populations from East and Southeast Asian communities contribute significantly to this demographic diversity, with approximately 3.4 million individuals reporting full or partial ethnic background from these regions. Among them, the Chinese community represents the largest group at 1.7 million, followed by Filipino (i.e., 925,490 people), Vietnamese (i.e., 275,530 people), and Korean (i.e., 217,650 people) populations (Statistics Canada, 2024a).

The use of non-official languages extends beyond home environments into the workplace (Statistics Canada, 2025b). In 2021, approximately 1 in 25 workers in Canada used a language other than English or French at work, totaling nearly 670,000 people. Of these, 546,000 used English or French alongside a non-official language, while over 123,000 used only a non-official language. The prevalence of specific non-official languages varied by sector, with languages like Cantonese, Vietnamese, and Korean being more common in the accommodation and food services sector, while Spanish, Russian, Persian, and Bengali were more frequently used in professional, scientific, and technical services. This linguistic diversity in the workplace further underscores Canada's evolving multicultural and multilingual character.

About the Province of Quebec, the province presents distinct linguistic patterns within the national context. While its proportion of multilingual households (18.3%) falls slightly below the national average, the province ranks second nationally in households using three or more languages (5.4%), with only Ontario having more multilingual households (5.7%) (Statistics Canada, 2023b).

Concerning the Montreal area, which is the largest city of the province, the city stands out for its linguistic complexity. In fact, over 80% of people in Montreal can communicate in at least three languages (i.e., English, French, & their ethnic languages) ( Maguire, 2010), which makes the city the most multilingual area with “the highest percentage of trilinguals in Canada” (Lamarre & Paredes, 2003, p. 64). As such, the metropolitan area of Montreal demonstrates exceptional rates of multilingualism among its workforce, with 80% of workers possessing at least bilingual capability (i.e., 69% specifically in English-French bilingualism) and 28% demonstrating proficiency in three or more languages which substantially exceeds those of other major Canadian urban centers (Statistics Canada, 2023a).

Major Language Events Regarding Official Languages in Canada and in the Province of Quebec

At the federal level, Canada recognizes both English and French as official languages with equal status, rights, and privileges in federal government institutions, as established by the 1969 Official Languages Act, which declared French and English to be Canada's official languages and it also declared their equality of status as well as equal rights and privileges with regard to their use in all institutions of Parliament and the Government of Canada (Government of Canada, 2023).

While provinces can choose their own official language(s), Quebec stands unique as the only province to designate French as its sole official language through Bill 22 (i.e., Quebec’s Official Language Act) and Bill 101 (i.e., the Charter of the French Language) (National Assembly of Québec, 2024; Office of the Commissioner of Official Languages, 2022). Bill 22 passed 1974 made French the only official language in the province of Quebec. In 1977, Bill 101 was enacted in Quebec, empowering French language protections by establishing French as the official language of Quebec’s legislature and courts, making French the primary language of business, education, and public services, regulating English-language education access, and setting rules for commercial signage in French (National Assembly of Québec, 2024; Office of the Commissioner of Official Languages, 2022).

Bill 96, officially known as “An Act respecting French, the official and common language of Québec,” was passed by Québec’s National Assembly in June 2022 (National Assembly of Québec, 2022). This legislation amends the Charter of the French Language (Bill 101) and aims to protect and strengthen French as the official language within the province. Key aspects of Bill 96 (National Assembly of Québec, 2022) affect multiple sectors. In business, the legislation extends francization requirements to smaller businesses with 25-49 employees, matching rules previously applied only to larger companies. Under the bill, public contracts must be written exclusively in French. In education, the bill implements enrollment caps for English-language colleges, restricting English-language student numbers to 17.5% of the French-language student population. Regarding immigration, newcomers are required to learn French within six months of arrival to access most government services in the province. During their first six months in Quebec, immigrants may communicate in languages other than French with hospitals, school service centers (previously known as school boards), and government bodies. However, after this six-month period, these institutions must communicate with them in French. Overall. these measures aim to preserve and promote the use of French in various aspects of Québec society, including government, business, education, and social life. While Bill 96 is supported by French speakers (77%), the bill faced opposition from English speakers (95%) and allophones whose first language is neither English nor French (67%). Though passed decisively, critics argue that addressing fundamental issues like low French-speaker birth rates might better preserve Quebec's linguistic character than language restrictions (Rocher, 2023).

Bill 96’s language requirements, though not specifically targeting Korean immigrants, may discourage Korean and other non-French-speaking immigrants from choosing Quebec as their destination or remaining in the province.

Korean Immigrants in Canada

Recent Korean immigrants in Canada, Province of Quebec, and Montreal

As of 2024, the total population of Canada is 41,465,298, with 9,100,249 in Quebec (Statistics Canada, 2024b). According to Statistics Canada in 2025, the urban population in Canada has experienced significant growth, with the total population of its 41 census metropolitan areas (CMAs) reaching 30,893,239 people on July 1, 2024 (Statistics Canada, 2025a). International migration has been the primary driver of this growth, contributing to increased urbanization, with 74.8% of Canadians now living in CMAs. The three largest CMAs (i.e., Toronto, Vancouver, & Montreal) have seen remarkable expansion. The population of Toronto population surpassed 7 million, growing by 268,911 people (i.e., +3.9%) in a single year. Vancouver added over 127,000 people (i.e., +4.2%), exceeding 3 million residents, while Montreal grew by nearly 132,000 people (i.e., +2.9%), reaching over 4.5 million.

According to recent data (Statistics Canada, 2022), the Korean immigrant population in Canada originating from South Korea totals 138,355, with the majority concentrated in three provinces: Ontario (62,750), British Columbia (47,520), and Quebec (5,180), primarily settling in major urban centers such as Toronto (48,770), Vancouver (42,090), and Montreal (4,640). In 2021, 85% of the Korean population in Canada were born outside Canada, with 14% born in Canada to at least one parent born outside Canada, and 2% born in Canada to Canadian-born parents (Statistics Canada, 2025c).

Overview of recent Korean ethnic communities in Canada, Province of Quebec,and Montreal

Korean immigrant communities in Canada have grown significantly since the 1960s. The majority of Korean immigrants have settled in major cities such as Toronto, Vancouver, and Montreal. Korean immigrants have established a distinct cultural identity within Canadian society, maintaining their heritage language and culture through local ethnic institutions such as Korean immigrant religious institutions, Korean language schools, and business networks. Many Korean immigrants are skilled workers or professionals, contributing to the economic growth of Canada in various sectors (Bai et al., 2019). In Quebec, the Korean immigrant community is smaller compared to other provinces, with 5,180 Korean immigrants recorded in the province while Montreal, as the largest city in Quebec, is home to 4,640 Korean immigrants (Statistics Canada, 2022).

While specific data on Korean religious communities in the province of Quebec is limited, the trend of Korean immigrants establishing immigrant churches is likely present in the province as well. Korean churches in Canada have historically played a crucial role in supporting new immigrants, providing not only religious services but also assistance with settlement, language acquisition, and social networking (Bai et al., 2019; Park, 2022, 2024).

Korean immigrant churches in Montreal, like in other Canadian cities, serve as central institutions for the Korean community. These churches often function as more than just places of worship. They are hubs for cultural preservation, community support, and social gatherings. The first Korean church in Canada was established in Vancouver in 1965, and similar institutions have since spread across the country, including Montreal (Bai et al., 2019). These churches help Korean immigrants maintain their cultural identity while adapting to Canadian society, offering services in Korean and organizing various community activities. However, it is important to note that while churches play a significant role, they are not the only religious or community organizations serving Korean immigrants in Montreal, since they maintain their language and cultural identity through a variety of organizations, including local cultural associations, university alumni, language schools for younger generations, and business associations (Bai et al., 2019; Park, 2022, 2024).

Several prominent Canadian universities have established Korean studies programs that serve both the Korean immigrant population and other Canadians, fostering academic engagement with Korean culture and promoting exchange opportunities (Bai et al., 2019). Universities such as the University of Toronto, the University of British Columbia, York University, and McGill University, contribute to the field of Korean studies in Canada. These academic efforts, combined with community-based organizations, play a crucial role in preserving and promoting Korean language and culture within Canadian society while encouraging cultural understanding among all Canadians (Bai et al., 2019).

Korean immigrant churches in Montreal

According to the most recent data, there were 4,454 Korean churches in the United States (Seo, 2018) as of 2018. In other countries outside the U.S., 1,693 Korean churches were counted. Korean churches serving Korean diaspora communities worldwide total 6,147, with North America dominating this landscape. The United States and Canada together host 4,937 Korean churches, making up 80% of all Korean immigrant churches globally. Canada specifically has 483 churches, while other notable concentrations are found in Japan with 231 churches, Australia with 205 churches, and various European countries including Germany with 138 churches and the United Kingdom with 73 churches. Several Latin American nations also have significant Korean church presence, with Brazil and Argentina having 60 and 53 churches respectively. New Zealand maintains 37 Korean churches, while Mexico and France have smaller but notable numbers at 27 and 25 churches respectively (Seo, 2018). Specifically in Montreal, there are 15 Korean immigrant churches including one Korean Catholic church in 2025 (Hanca, n.d.).

The Role of Immigrant Churches in Immigrant Integration and Settlement

Research Method

This study explores the role of Korean immigrant churches in Montreal in supporting the settlement of newly arrived immigrants. The churches’ contributions to social integration encompass linguistic, cultural, social, and religious aspects. To investigate this, a qualitative research methodology was employed since qualitative research facilitates an in-depth understanding of individuals’ lived experiences and behaviors in natural, real-world settings (Johnson & Christensen, 2004). Therefore, semi-structured qualitative interviews served as the primary research tool.

Research Context

The research site consisted of a Korean immigrant congregation in Montreal, comprising approximately 180 to 200 members. The membership size and organizational structure of the selected congregation are consistent with typical conditions observed in Korean immigrant churches, suggesting its suitability as a research site. While this church cannot be definitively characterized as the most representative Korean immigrant church in Montreal, it does not exhibit any unusual characteristics that would set it apart from other similar Korean immigrant religious institutions in the area. This suggests that the selected church can serve as a reasonable representation of Korean immigrant churches in the area for research purposes, and its members may provide insights into the broader Korean immigrant community. Data collection for the study was carried out over one month period.

Data Collection and Analysis

This study was conducted over the course of one month within a Korean immigrant church located in the Montreal area. The primary and sole research method employed was individual, one-on-one interviews utilizing a semi-structured format. All interviews were carried out in Korean and supplemented by a questionnaire designed to gather demographic information from participants. The duration of the interviews was between 20 and 30 minutes. The questionnaire and interview protocols were designed to explore a broad spectrum of perspectives held by newly arrived Korean immigrants regarding their settlement and integration experiences in Canada. The central questions and thematic areas focused on the perceived role of Korean immigrant churches in facilitating the integration and settlement process of newcomers, the contributions of other Korean immigrant communities and organizations, excluding religious institutions, in supporting the settlement journey of recent arrivals, and the extent and nature of collaboration between Korean immigrant churches and non-religious Korean community organizations within Montreal's multilingual and multicultural context. In addition, the instruments collected demographic information from participants, including self-reported levels of proficiency in the two official languages of Canada, English and French, as well as in the sole official language of Quebec, French. This linguistic component is particularly relevant given the distinct sociolinguistic environment of Quebec, which places a strong emphasis on French language acquisition and usage for successful integration. The recorded interviews were fully transcribed for analysis.

For data analysis, this study employed a qualitative approach that relied on inductive methods. The analysis emphasized the use of participants’ own words, and the interpretation of meaning conveyed through their actual language to enhance the trustworthiness and authenticity of the data (Denzin et al., 2023; Seidman, 1991). An interpretive and descriptive analysis framework was used to accurately capture the data while creating a representation of reality that participants themselves would find authentic (Maykut & Morehouse, 1994). While the analysis was mainly inductive in nature, it incorporated some pre-established categories derived from the interview questions. Additional subcategories naturally developed from patterns that repeatedly appeared in the data. The initial categories were applied only when the data clearly aligned with them. When content fell outside this original structure, new categories were developed to capture it. This process involved segmenting the data into significant components, and constructing appropriate categories based on these elements (Johnson & Christensen, 2004). The analysis concluded with a systematic organization of the data using both predefined and newly generated categories, following an iterative process to address the objectives and research questions of the study (Johnson & Christensen, 2004; Maykut & Morehouse, 1994).

Research Participants

Seventeen Korean immigrant parents residing in Montreal and attending Korean churches participated in this study. All participants had lived in Montreal for less than five years and were selected based on the criterion that they had at least one child. They were recruited through purposeful sampling (Patton, 1990, p. 169), ensuring that participants met criteria directly aligned with the objectives of the study (Johnson & Christensen, 2004). The reason for selecting parents who had been in Canada for less than five years and had at least one child was to examine the perspectives of newly immigrated parents on the role of Korean immigrant churches in supporting their social integration into Canadian society and their children’s heritage language maintenance within the church context. Montreal was the first settlement location for all participants, with an average duration of residence in Canada and Montreal of 3.76 years (SD = 1.30). The participants had an average of 2.22 children (SD = 0.55), with the average age of children being 8.75 years (SD = 3.69). Of the 18 participants (11 fathers & 7 mothers), the mean age was 42.11 years (SD = 5.25). Notably, four participants had no prior experience attending church in Korea and began participating in Korean churches only after immigrating to Montreal. On average, participants had been involved in Korean church communities in Montreal for 3.11 years (SD = 1.45).

Among the 17 participants, only two reported that their children were enrolled in English-language schools, while the remaining 15 indicated that their children attended French-language schools. The two cases of English-language schooling were attributed to the parents’ temporary residence in Canada for purposes such as study or employment, which allowed for exemptions to Quebec's language education policies. Due to the enactment of Bill 101, which designates French as the principal language of instruction from kindergarten through secondary education in Quebec, all immigrant students are required to attend French-language instruction in public or government-subsidized private schools (Ministère de l’Éducation, 2025). Regarding language use at home, all 17 participants confirmed that Korean was the primary language spoken within the household. In Quebec, immigrant students must meet strict eligibility criteria to access English-language education in public or government-subsidized private schools, requiring the issuance of a Certificate of Eligibility (Ministère de l'Éducation, 2025). Temporary authorization to attend English-language schools may be granted to children whose parents are in Quebec on a temporary basis, such as those holding work or study permits under the Canadian Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (Ministère de l'Éducation, 2025).

From an ethical standpoint, participants were guaranteed the confidentiality of their real names. Distinct codes are assigned to identify the participants (e.g., PF represents Participant Father, while PM denotes Participant Mother). Those who took part in interviews were informed that no identifiable information about them or any incidents would be disclosed. In addition, it was emphasized that any remarks made during the study would not be shared, either orally or in written form, in a manner that could potentially identify individuals or events. The researcher also clarified that participation was entirely voluntary and that participants retained the right to withdraw from the study at any time.

Findings

Participants’ Proficiency in French and English

To examine the relationship between participants’ proficiency in French and English, they were asked to self-assess their language abilities using a 7-point scale, with 7 indicating a high level of fluency (see Table 1).

The findings indicate that participants generally reported lower proficiency in French compared to English. Moreover, the comparable standard deviations for both languages suggest limited variability in self-reported proficiency levels across the two languages.

This finding can be interpreted considering the participants’ prior language learning experiences. In South Korea, formal English education has typically begun in the third grade of elementary school since 1997; prior to that, English was introduced as a mandatory subject at the secondary level (Shin & Shim, 2011). English instruction then continues throughout secondary and post-secondary education. As a result, many adult Korean immigrants arrive in Canada with at least a basic foundation in English, although their levels of proficiency may vary. In contrast, French is not widely taught or used in Korea outside of specialized educational or professional contexts. Therefore, for most Korean immigrants, meaningful exposure to French begins only after their arrival in Montreal. Consequently, their proficiency in French tends to be significantly lower than in English, reflecting both the limited opportunities to acquire the language prior to immigration and the relatively recent and context-specific nature of their engagement with it in Quebec.

The Role of a Korean Immigrant Church for Newly Arrived Korean Immigrants’ Integration and Settlement in Canada

First, participants were asked whether they believed that Korean immigrant churches have a responsibility and role in supporting the settlement of new immigrants in Canadian society. They were also asked to indicate the level of importance they placed on this issue using a 7-point Likert scale, where 1 indicated least important and 7 indicated most important. The participants’ responses yielded a mean score of 5.50 (SD = 1.20), suggesting that the majority of immigrant adults believed that Korean immigrant churches should play a role in facilitating newcomers’ settlement. The findings indicate that most participants view the church not as a for-profit institution, but as a community resource. They believe that when church members are well-established and have the means to support others, it is important for them to extend help to newcomers particularly in areas such as job searching, obtaining permanent residency, legal and tax consultation, and supporting children's education. Sharing this type of practical information is considered highly beneficial.

In addition to this general view, some participants emphasized the community role of the church in providing emotional and psychological support for new immigrants, rather than focusing solely on practical or informational assistance.

Several responses also highlighted the dual role of Korean churches emphasizing both their spiritual function and their capacity as community institutions in relation to the social integration of Korean newcomers.

It should be noted, however, that not all participants agreed on the obligation of Korean immigrant churches. Among the 17 participants, four indicated that they did not believe Korean immigrant churches bear such a responsibility. While they acknowledged that it is beneficial for these churches to support the social settlement of new immigrants, they emphasized that such involvement should not be regarded as a mandatory obligation.

The findings of the study highlight the importance of emphasizing indirect support over direct assistance for newly arrived immigrants adapting to a new society. Several respondents proposed that social settlement support should be facilitated indirectly through interpersonal relationships and fellowship among congregants, rather than being framed as a formal responsibility of the church. They also stressed the church's fundamental role as a religious institution, suggesting that engagement in settlement support should be seen as a supplementary activity driven by the voluntary goodwill of individual members, rather than as part of the church's primary mission of the church.

Furthermore, one participant specifically reinforced the idea that the church’s role in immigrant settlement should remain rooted in its spiritual and religious mission.

Lastly, as all participants are parents with children, they shared opinions on the role of Korean immigrant churches in their children’s Korean language education. One parent highlighted that many Korean immigrant churches operate Korean language schools, which play a vital role in preserving ethnic identity. However, these schools, often managed independently by the churches, frequently lack sufficient support, particularly in terms of Korean language textbooks and other educational resources provided by the Korean government. The parent suggested that it would be advantageous for Korean Ministry of Education or a government agency overseeing Korean language education for overseas Koreans to develop and distribute formal guidelines or recommendations. These measures would aim to enhance the effective operation of language schools within immigrant churches abroad.

The Role of Other Korean Immigrant Communities, Excluding Churches, in Supporting Newly Arrived Korean Immigrants' Settlement in Canada

Participants were asked to rate the importance they assigned to the role of Korean immigrant communities, excluding Korean immigrant churches, using a 7-point Likert scale, with 1 representing least important and 7 representing most important. The responses yielded a mean score of 5.88 (SD = 1.13), indicating that most immigrant adults believed Korean immigrant communities should play a role in aiding newcomers' settlement. Notably, this score is higher than the mean score of 5.50 assigned to the role of Korean immigrant churches.

Collaboration between Korean Immigrant Churches and Other Non Religious Korean Community Organizations

The findings of this study also underscore the need for strategic collaboration between Korean immigrant churches and other non-religious Korean community organizations. One participant strongly emphasized the need for Korean immigrant churches to build closer partnerships with non-religious Korean community associations, especially to better support newly arrived Koreans in the host society. He noted that Korean immigrant churches are typically organized through church councils, which often prioritize inter-church gatherings. However, it is equally important for these churches to engage in broader community efforts that contribute to identity formation. From the standpoint of preserving the Korean language and cultural heritage, it is not ideal for church organizations to refrain from participating in community events such as those organized by non-religious Korean cultural or ethnic associations simply because they lack religious significance. In addition, the findings reveal that whereas the relief work of the Korean immigrant church is rooted in religious devotion and service, non-religious Korean ethnic community organizations must adopt a form of relief that is grounded in securing immigrants’ social foundations.

Overall, the findings of the study emphasized the role of Korean immigrant churches along with other non-religious Korean communities, and the collaboration of the Korean immigrant churches and the other non-religious Korean community organizations for the Korean immigrants’ integration and settlement in Canada. Beyond being religious institutions, Korean immigrant churches in Montreal serve as multi-functional hubs of support for newly arrived immigrants. Interview data revealed that churches play essential roles in helping newcomers gain access to practical resources, emotional resilience, and social inclusion. Most of the participants expressed the idea that the church should offer settlement support ranging from navigating Canadian systems to sharing culturally relevant coping strategies. Some emphasized the capacity of the church to serve as an information hub, populated with experienced immigrants capable of guiding newcomers. Others emphasized its emotional role, such as fostering a mindset shift for those experiencing cultural conflict. Theological perspectives framing support as a form of modern charity also emerged, with biblical references underscoring the significance of hospitality and care for foreigners.

Nonetheless, a small portion of participants maintained that churches should not institutionalize social services but rather encourage fellowship-based and voluntary help. This reveals a balanced perspective, acknowledging the importance of immigrant support while also guarding the spiritual identity of the church. Emotional and spiritual care was repeatedly identified as equally important as practical help.

DISCUSSION

This study confirms that Korean immigrant churches in Montreal function not only as spiritual shelters but also as informal hubs for community support. These churches serve as trust-based information networks, offering practical settlement guidance, legal advice, and even mental health resources. However, a tension emerged between the religious mission of the churches and their evolving social role. Some participants emphasized that social service should not overshadow the primary religious mission of the church. This highlights the need for churches to maintain theological integrity while fostering community inclusion.

The research also emphasized the vital role of other non-religious Korean community organizations, such as the Association of Koreans in Montreal and the Korean Foundation of Quebec. These institutions provide structured programs including employment assistance, language training, and cultural preservation and were sometimes perceived as more relevant than churches in offering settlement support. This presents a strong case for strategic collaboration. While churches provide foundational trust and spiritual care, community groups offer structured programs and resources. Partnerships between the two could amplify their collective impact.

This study highlights the significant role of churches in supporting newly arrived Korean immigrants. One key implication of the findings is the necessity for coordinated efforts among Korean immigrant churches in Montreal. Establishing a networked framework for collaboration would enable churches to consolidate resources, exchange best practices, and improve service outreach and efficiency. Furthermore, churches possess valuable human capital. Thus, using these internal resources could greatly expand the scope of support services.

Another critical implication involves the expansion of partnerships between Korean immigrant churches and external institutions. Working together with local schools, city officials, and government agencies can offer a great opportunity. These partnerships could make the role of the churches in integration more official and open access to funding or training. Korean churches could also host government programs for settlement, language learning, and community support.

Finally, in the face of the linguistic and social challenges posed by Bill 96, Korean immigrant churches in Quebec are uniquely positioned to support both immigrant integration and the preservation of cultural identity. This study highlights their potential to facilitate the smooth adaptation of newly arrived Koreans by offering practical resources such as free or low-cost French classes, bilingual worship services, and translation during services (Park & Cha, 2016). These efforts not only help members meet workplace and public service language requirements but also foster a sense of belonging. Beyond language support, churches can further assist integration by providing legal and employment workshops, translation services, and targeted resources for Korean business owners navigating new regulations. Emotional and spiritual needs may also be met through counseling, fellowship groups, and cultural events. Collaborations with Francophone churches, community organizations, and government programs can amplify these efforts. Through a holistic and inclusive approach, Korean immigrant churches can become vital bridges between their communities and the host society.

Overall, future research should examine the linguistic and social framework of Quebec, particularly the implications of Bill 96, which mandates rapid French language acquisition for immigrants to access essential services. Studies should explore how partnerships between government bodies and ethnic institutions, such as Korean immigrant churches, can facilitate more accessible and culturally responsive integration pathways. Within this context, Korean immigrant churches emerge not only as cultural and spiritual centers but also as strategic partners in broader public integration efforts.

Conclusion

This study highlights the essential yet often overlooked role of Korean immigrant churches in Montreal as more than just religious institutions. By situating the findings within the framework of faith-based social support, this study reveals how Korean immigrant churches in Montreal provide multi-layered assistance that extends beyond formal religious services (Jahani & Parayandeh, 2024). They act as cultural mediators, emotional shelters, and sources of practical support, helping newly arrived immigrants struggling with the complexities of immigration and settlement in the host society. The findings of this study reveal that emotional and spiritual guidance are viewed as equally important as practical assistance such as information or resources while there is variation in how formalized that support should be. In addition to the institutional role of Korean immigrant churches, Korean community organizations offer complementary, and often more pragmatic, support in the integration process.

Furthermore, through the theoretical lens of lived religion, this study also reveals how newly arrived Korean immigrants incorporate faith into their daily lives not only through organized worship but also through interpersonal relationships, shared rituals, and everyday cultural practices (Ammerman, 2015). These expressions of religion are particularly significant in the face of challenges such as language barriers or policy constraints like those introduced under Bill 96. Thus, the findings of the study emphasized both the functional and symbolic importance of immigrant churches in enhancing perseverance, cultural continuity, and mutual support for newly arrived Korean immigrants within diasporic communities (Jahani & Parayandeh, 2024).

The study makes a significant contribution to existing research by emphasizing the distinct trilingual and multicultural environment of Montreal. In contrast to earlier studies that focused on second-generation youth or the preservation of cultural identity within churches, this research highlights the experiences of first-generation immigrants grappling with immediate settlement challenges. The findings suggest that immigrant churches should be recognized not only as religious institutions but also as community hubs. Policies and efforts are encouraged to invest in faith-based outreach efforts and foster collaboration between organizations to create comprehensive support networks. By enabling churches and Korean community groups to work in partnership with public institutions, Canada can enhance its efforts to cultivate inclusive, multilingual, and socially cohesive environments for newcomers.

Introduction

In a globalized world, the right to work has been established across multiple domains. Labor integration has evolved not only within nation-states but also through an increasing number of agreements between countries, creating employment frameworks with specific characteristics. These international arrangements now often involve coordinated actions across different levels of government. Historically, labor programs facilitating the employment of migrant workers were introduced, particularly during wartime periods. However, labor relations and governmental action are neither static nor mechanical. Over time, nation-states, labor organizations, and other social actors have reshaped labor dynamics.

In the era of global neoliberal globalization, state involvement has been intermittent. Public policies reflect not only a government’s obligations to its citizens but also how it engages with and manages international agreements and programs aimed at partially addressing issues like unemployment. In Mexico’s case, this is evident in the historical agreements facilitating the employment of Mexican workers abroad. The most well-known is the Bracero Program with the United States, and the still-active Seasonal Agricultural Workers Program (SAWP) with Canada. The latter has increasingly been criticized for marginalizing the role of federal and provincial governments while granting employers greater control over the program.

This article aims to describe the dynamics of the Seasonal Agricultural Workers Program (SAWP), known in Mexico as the Programa de Trabajadores Agrícolas Temporales México-Canadá (PTAT). This article questions whether Mexico's migration trends toward the U.S.—exacerbated by punitive and enforcement-driven immigration policies—might revitalize or expand other regulated labor pathways such as that with Canada. It also explores the emergence of alternative frameworks such as the Low-Skilled Workers Program (LSWP), which undermine subnational involvement and introduce deregulation that negatively affects labor conditions.

Methodologically, the analysis adopts a subnational perspective, emphasizing local actors engaged in the bilateral dynamics between Mexico and Canada. The chapter examines the objectives of these programs, identifying differences and their implications. Although the SAWP was initiated in 1974 as a binational cooperation model, the discussion is temporally limited to developments during the first two decades of the 21st century. A notable feature of the program is its ongoing assessment mechanism aimed at ensuring improved labor conditions for migrant workers and promoting a safe, temporary, orderly, controlled, and legal migration flow.

The Dynamics of the Seasonal Agricultural Workers Program (SAWP)

The Mexico-Canada Seasonal Agricultural Workers Program (SAWP) commemorated its 50th anniversary in 2024. Launched in 1974, it is recognized as a successful binational model for orderly and rights-based labor migration, providing Mexican agricultural workers with decent employment opportunities in Canada. Over its history, the program has benefited more than 522,000 workers, with a record number of contracts (145,028) issued during the previous administration of President Andrés Manuel López Obrador (December 2018 – September 2024) (SRE, 2024).

In 2024 alone, nearly 26,000 Mexican workers registered to work in Canada, backed by comprehensive support from Mexico’s Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare (STPS) and consular services. At a commemorative event in Mexico City, government officials (including Labor Secretary and Canada's Ambassador to Mexico) praised the workers' contributions to food security and economic development in both countries. Veteran workers with over 20 years in the program were recognized for their dedication (SRE, 2024).

SAWP has also expanded beyond agriculture to sectors like food processing, construction, and tourism, and has generated significant remittances—over 388 million Canadian dollars in 2023 alone. As part of a broader Mexico-Canada relationship, SAWP exemplifies what can be achieved through regulated migration agreements. Authorities reaffirmed their commitment to improving labor conditions and ensuring workers' rights as the program continues to grow and diversify (SRE, 2024).

By the 20th century, Mexico had firmly established itself as a country of emigrants. More recently, in the second decade of the 21st century, Mexico not only continues to send labor migrants abroad, but also receives migrants and serves as a transit country for millions of others facing hazardous journeys. Thus, international migration is a complex and dynamic process that has generated subnational ties between places of origin and destination. Here, "subnational" refers to entities within nation-states that create and manage agreements with external actors.

According to Zepeda, 2019), various subnational actors—both governmental and non-governmental—shape public policy beyond national borders, becoming key hubs of governance. These actions aim to promote decentralized cooperation in crucial areas such as education, training, science and technology, and the sharing of experience. These efforts include civil society groups, NGOs, transnational corporations, among others, who become important stakeholders in regional governance (Zepeda, 2019).

In parts of Mexico, migration strategies involve parallel actions by governments and hometown associations, forming geopolitical enclaves that establish bilateral relationships. These are driven not only by geographic proximity or migration traditions but also by international programs linking countries, regions, states, and provinces. This is particularly evident in the case of Mexican workers in Canada.

Unlike the U.S. Bracero Program (1942–1964), the Canadian program was formalized through a Memorandum of Understanding integrating Mexico into the SAWP.

It is important to remark that consulates of Mexico in Canada are not responsible for securing employment; this is the role of Mexico’s National Employment Service (SNE by its Spanish initials), under the Secretariat of Labor and Social Welfare (STyPS by its Spanish initials), through its state offices. The consulates are, however, tasked with ensuring that workers’ human and labor rights are upheld from arrival in Canada to their return. Provincial and federal labor laws in Canada protect these rights, and workers receive provincial health insurance. The maximum stay is eight months.

According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (SRE), SAWP requirements include: being a farmworker or currently employed in agriculture; age between 22 and 45; education between third grade of primary and third grade of secondary school; and being married or in a common-law union (single individuals with dependents may also qualify).

The program is specifically targeted at rural Mexican workers. Like the Bracero Program, it responds to labor supply and demand. The SAWP has contributed to a steady rise in remittances, thereby improving workers' living conditions. However, the introduction of the LSWP in 2002 raised concerns due to its adverse effects on labor conditions and its implications for subnational governance.

Mexican agricultural migration to Canada is highly regulated. This regulation aims to prevent imbalances in labor supply and demand while also discouraging mass, generational reproduction of migration patterns as seen in the U.S. In addition to Mexico, Canada has extended the program to include countries such as Barbados, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago—nations with English-language compatibility that once formed the majority of temporary agricultural workers in Canada.

Despite the program’s 50-year history and having mobilized over half a million Mexican workers, its viability began to be questioned in the early 21st century due to Canada’s progressive withdrawal from regulatory mechanisms. Since 2010, more than 10,000 Mexican workers have traveled to Canada annually under this program. They work on farms under bilateral agreements regulated by both Mexican and Canadian governments. In the first half of 2015 alone, the SNE facilitated the placement of 21,499 workers. This number rose to 26,039 in 2023 and 27,000 in 2024. Key destination provinces include Ontario, British Columbia, Quebec, Alberta, and more recently, Nova Scotia and Saskatchewan. Most workers come from the State of Mexico, Tlaxcala, Veracruz, and Puebla, with recent additions from Michoacán and Morelos (UPM, 2022).

The SAWP consolidation is not only the result of institutional mechanisms but also due to the structural crisis of Mexican agriculture, which has led to a lack of opportunities, low profitability, and declining competitiveness—factors reflected in deteriorating labor conditions. From an institutional perspective, the program is often viewed as a successful model of international labor mobility that meets Canada’s agricultural labor needs. Nonetheless, it is important to consider how the program also accommodates the interests of Canadian employers, focusing on flexibility—an aspect some studies link to the dominant role of provincial business groups.

Regions supplying this labor may benefit, as temporary migration facilitates remittances and institutional relationships that help mitigate the risks of labor migration. In 2015 alone, 21,499 Mexican agricultural workers in Canada reported sending back CAD 225,052,091 in remittances. Female participation has also increased: in 2018, of 25,331 Mexican agricultural workers, 751 were women; in 2019, 774 of the 26,399 workers were female (STyPS, 2016; SRE, 2020). According to the Migration Policy Unit, from 2015 to 2022, a total of 194,431 seasonal workers participated in the program, 97% male (188,955) and 3% female (5,476) (UPM, 2024).

This temporary program reflects joint policy interactions, albeit less developed and coordinated than U.S. programs like the now- extinct 3x1 Program involving governments and businesses. In the Canadian case, federal and provincial participation generates subnational effects. This allows for a novel consideration of subnational units as key actors in labor migration policy, along with influencing factors such as human rights and transit policies (Sánchez, 2017).

To understand the continuity and consolidation of the SAWP, it is essential to recognize the role of subnational units. These programs are institutional agreements managing labor mobility flows through intergovernmental mechanisms, administered by both federal and state authorities in Mexico and Canada—with Canadian employers playing an essential role.

The Canadian business sector, as a powerful actor, provides program operability. Employers are required to offer housing that meets provincial standards, as well as meals, airfare, and health insurance. However, some studies indicate that employers recoup much of their upfront costs through wage deductions, highlighting the risk of regulated yet abusive practices. This underscores the importance of the employment contract.

As Escobar (2020) argues, contracts recognized by labor laws between employer and employee serve as a cornerstone of formal labor relations. These agreements establish the legal recognition of rights and obligations, allowing workers to construct employment trajectories that ideally lead to a fair and dignified conclusion of working life.

The Need for Bilaterally Regulated Labor Relations

Within the labor program between Mexico and Canada, it is essential to implement continuous evaluations, given the exponential increase in regulated migration and the formalization of programs linked to subnational units that aim to safeguard workers’ integrity. This is particularly the case in states such as Tlaxcala and Puebla, where subnational units have become significant as labor suppliers. In coordination with governmental institutional mechanisms, they generate synergies that may produce local benefits, albeit often at the cost of deteriorating labor conditions.

As noted in the works of Binford, Carrasco, and Arana (2004), and Becerril (2003), Mexican workers from central states—especially Tlaxcala and Puebla—face vulnerable conditions marked by extreme labor exploitation: wages and earnings below the minimum wage, no payment for overtime, and no consideration of seniority, as newly arrived workers earn the same as those with more experience. Consequently, the only way for these workers to increase their weekly income is by working more hours. Workers' narratives reveal that more than a third did not receive even a single day of rest, in violation of the program’s contractual regulations. This echoes the Jamaican case denounced by the Migrant Workers Alliance for Change (2002), which described practices tantamount to systemic slavery.

Becerril’s 2003 study (cited in Sánchez, 2017:8), focusing on Mexican workers in Leamington, Ontario—known as Canada’s “tomato capital”—argues that Mexican transnational agricultural labor in Canada reflects broader processes of productive restructuring and new organizational forms in the workplace. These spaces are also marked by a strict gendered and ethnic division of labor, which leads to discrimination in task assignments, positions, and work schedules, thereby fostering labor segmentation and segregation. Furthermore, there is an underutilization of labor, particularly concerning women strawberry workers, who, despite possessing qualifications, continuous training, and experience, receive no formal recognition from Canadian employers. This results in negative impacts on their earnings.

This reinforces Molinet’s argument (in Sánchez, 2017) that subnational units—particularly in the destinations—experience asymmetries and conflicts in employer-worker relations. These dynamics reveal varying degrees of control or governance that should, in principle, be formally upheld through the administrative representations of workers’ places of origin, grounded in a framework of bilateral relations.

Flexibility and Deregulation: Obstacles in Labor Trajectories

In 2002, the Canadian government implemented the Low Skilled Workers Program (LSWP), also known as the Low-Skilled Foreign Workers Program (LSFWP) or the Low Skilled Pilot Program (LSPP). Unlike the more historically established labor program, the LSWP is characterized by flexibility based on the worker’s country of origin, which predefines their potential skills. This approach reflects a neoliberal logic, given the absence of direct Canadian government involvement in agreements between employers and workers. As a result, not only is employer control amplified, but deregulation also deepens the workers’ vulnerability in terms of labor rights and conditions.

The primary objective of this program is to recruit low-skilled labor from underdeveloped countries at low wages, offering alternative recruitment or subcontracting arrangements—without intermediaries—for various niches in the agricultural sector. As previously noted, the establishment of bilateral contracts with diplomatic oversight offers dual-layer protection for migrant workers. Without such protections, the market—via employers—can distort or undermine labor rights and obligations. Non-consensual changes to regulations enable the implementation of subcontracting or outsourcing schemes.

Unlike other programs, LSWP workers typically remain in Canada for one to two years. However, this program features minimal government supervision and regulatory oversight of working conditions—unlike the SAWP, where consular structures play an active role in labor monitoring. Additionally, Canadian employers and intermediaries from both countries receive little support from Canadian institutions in their dealings with public and private entities. This scenario exemplifies the erosion of subnational dynamism. It reveals the weakening of subnational structures in both origin and destination communities, as legal and institutional mechanisms for mediation and conflict resolution between employers and workers are absent (Muñoz, 2011).

It is necessary that both the Mexican and Canadian governments—at all administrative levels—act not merely as administrators of the program, but as guarantors of the labor and human rights of enrolled workers. This would enhance not only the bilateral relationship between nation-states and their subnational entities but also reflect a multilateral commitment to the protection of migrants as citizens beyond national borders.

Despite the Canadian government’s 2007 announcement of improved compliance measures to protect temporary foreign workers, ongoing verification of employer compliance with labor conditions for low-skilled workers is imperative. Sanctions must be imposed on employers who violate contracts and exploit workers. These exploitative conditions have raised serious concerns about the need for regulatory frameworks that legitimize the program. Since 2009, the Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration has recommended that the Canadian government: establish a consultative board for temporary foreign workers, issue sector-specific work permits, impose employer fees to support unemployed foreign workers, create a pathway to permanent residency based on minimum employment periods, and enhance protections for temporary foreign workers (Fudge & MacPhail, 2009).

Tertiary Labor and the Erosion of Labor Rights

It is not an exaggeration to associate this program with the broader phenomenon of labor tertiarization. This connection stems from the reality that global production systems have also transformed agricultural production, integrating it into transnational corporate structures dependent on labor as a key input. AsEscobar (2020) points out, the new phase of capitalism has created value chains that span various parts of the world. In this context, migrant labor is indispensable, and employers frequently use deregulated mechanisms that undermine labor relations and their associated responsibilities. This creates a façade of legality that facilitates the evasion of employer obligations under the guise of collective contracting, ultimately worsening labor conditions.

This situation underscores the need for joint government intervention. If the program is to be truly understood within the framework of subnational units, governments at all levels must engage in political negotiation and programmatic governance. Subnational units should be recognized as public policy actors rooted in specific localities.

The Low Skilled Workers Program (LSWP) and the Disempowerment of Labor

Under this program, labor relations have become individualized and detached from governmental frameworks, facilitating direct employer-worker relationships governed by market logic. Employer companies have modified their relationships with federal and provincial governments, as well as labor organizations, in a push to modernize administrative and work structures. These companies now define job requirements autonomously, reshaping the relationship between skilled and unskilled labor. This has intensified income inequality and deepened the disadvantages faced by uncertified workers (Zapata, 2001).

Previously, the strength of subnational units in the decision-making process provided some level of protection and shared benefits. Under the current model, there is a notable lack of job security. The erosion of labor representation has affected not only work distribution and wage demands but also the presence of effective governmental oversight over employment contracts and labor conditions.

As discussed earlier, regulating migration through subcontracting schemes with high labor flexibility—as in some cases involving U.S. H2B visas—creates triangular intercompany relationships that relieve employers of legal responsibilities toward workers (Sánchez, 2017). This structure has led to numerous reports of labor violations, undermining the intended goals of these programs.

To address these challenges, it is necessary to implement international labor governance policies managed by subnational governmental actors, NGOs, and labor organizations to ensure institutional legitimacy and labor security. As Calvento (2014) argues, this creates opportunities in the global context and positions Canadian labor markets as tools for bilateral local development.

Although the 2007 Statement of Objectives called for improvements in temporary worker programs and the protection of labor rights, the Labor Mobility Working Group has failed to prioritize these issues, focusing instead on expanding segmented labor market opportunities.

The subnational dynamic that has existed for decades between the governments of Mexico and Canada, alongside other actors, has historically provided a degree of regulation over both labor practices and employer behavior, offering a measure of protection for Mexican workers. The absence of diplomatic-level government intervention risks undermining these programs, which, despite their limitations, have partially addressed regional problems in workers’ communities of origin—through remittances—and helped meet labor demands among Canadian employers.

Conclusions

For decades, the temporary labor program for Mexican workers in Canada operated in an orderly manner and included elements that significantly enhanced workers’ labor security. However, the emergence of alternative programs is characterized not only by a deregulatory approach to labor migration flows but also by a tendency to undermine optimal working conditions.

There is a clear discrepancy between the political discourse and the actual practice regarding labor rights, particularly due to the restrictive nature of work permits. The requirements for job placement may limit workers’ labor rights under the guise of protective measures. As Tigau (2015) points out, recruitment practices—especially within the framework of subnational unit cooperation—often allow regional strategies in destination localities to benefit from the labor force while excluding other dimensions of migrant workers’ trajectories. Similarly, we concur with Kurczyn and Pastrana’s (2016) position that employment contracts must acknowledge and account for the inequalities among the actors involved. In other words, labor contracts should be framed in equitable terms that reduce workers’ disadvantages within employment relationships, while also ensuring that the Canadian employer’s demands are met in a fair and ethical manner.

It is important to recognize the relevance of labor programs based on the competitive advantages of the participating countries. However, the need to adapt to new organizational and multilateral regulatory frameworks may establish optimal conditions for competitiveness and productivity in regional labor markets. Success and sustainability should not be assessed solely on the basis of workers’ wages. Therefore, it is necessary to implement conditions that reflect labor guarantees and produce a dual benefit in both the places of origin and destination. When designed from the perspective of subnational units and regulated by the state and other stakeholders in a coordinated manner, such programs allow for local operational autonomy while minimizing labor risks. It must be remembered that migratory dynamics generate sustainable ways of living and working. Migration is not solely about income; rather, it involves creating synergies for regional development with mutual benefits.

Thus, any bilateral, trilateral, or multilateral labor program will remain vulnerable in its operation unless institutional mechanisms are in place to ensure mutual oversight between governments and agencies in the interest of protecting workers. Moreover, employment contracts that fail to guarantee optimal working conditions and respect for labor rights must be rendered invalid. One possible challenge would be to establish a mechanism similar to the Rapid Response Labor Mechanism (RRLM), which has been applied under the, but specifically designed for labor programs. Such a mechanism would ensure optimal workplace conditions and facilitate the consolidation of trilateral labor programs in North America.

Introduction

The Korea–Canada Free Trade Agreement (CKFTA), enacted in 2015, marked Canada’s first bilateral FTA with an Asian country. Over the past decade, CKFTA has significantly reshaped trade flows between the two economies, resulting in increased volume, diversification of traded goods, and evolving industrial linkages. Korea has become a prominent exporter of high-tech finished products such as automobiles, EV batteries, and electronics, while Canada has increasingly specialized in exporting intermediate goods—particularly mineral-based inputs like coal, copper, and nickel.

These trade patterns have deepened bilateral supply chain interdependence, reflecting not only economic complementarities but also strategic considerations. In a period marked by global uncertainty—triggered by COVID-19 disruptions, the U.S.–China rivalry, and geopolitical tensions in Eastern Europe—the concept of “economic security” has emerged as a new lens through which trade policy is being assessed.

This study aims to provide a strategic reassessment of CKFTA after ten years, with a particular focus on intermediate goods dynamics and value-added linkages. Rather than focusing solely on tariff elimination or headline trade volumes, we explore how CKFTA has contributed to structural shifts in production and supply networks. Using a combination of bilateral trade statistics, HS code-level data, and the OECD’s Trade in Value Added (TiVA) framework, this paper offers both a descriptive and interpretive analysis of Korea–Canada trade transformation.

Our findings inform policy discussions around supply chain resilience, trade governance, and the potential for deeper cooperation under multilateral frameworks such as the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP).

Literature Review

Economic analyses of free trade agreements have traditionally drawn upon theories of trade creation and diversion (Viner, 1950), gravity models (Tinbergen, 1962), and more recently, global value chain perspectives such as the Trade in Value Added (TiVA) framework developed by the OECD and WTO (2013). These models highlight how FTAs affect both the volume and the composition of trade, particularly through their influence on production fragmentation and input sourcing.

In the context of Korea–Canada trade, previous studies have mostly focused on early CKFTA outcomes. Lee and Macdonald (2017) found immediate gains in Korea’s automotive exports and Canada's agricultural products. Park et al. (2021) expanded this view by linking FTAs to global value chain (GVC) integration, emphasizing Korea’s strategic use of intermediate inputs across industries.

However, gaps remain in understanding how CKFTA has influenced bilateral supply chain dynamics over time, particularly with respect to upstream–downstream specialization. Most existing studies are either cross-sectional or lack sector-specific TiVA tracing. Recent work by the OECD (2023) and UNCTAD (2022) highlights the increasing importance of intermediate goods trade in strategic sectors such as electric vehicles, semiconductors, and clean energy—domains where both Korea and Canada are actively expanding.

This paper contributes to the literature by combining macro-level trade data with TiVA analysis to trace Canada’s embedded value in Korea’s exports. By focusing on the evolving composition of intermediate and finished goods, our approach sheds light on the structural consequences of trade liberalization and identifies opportunities for institutional coordination in supply chain governance.

Trade Structure Trends and Intermediate Goods Dynamics

This section examines the evolution of Korea–Canada trade flows over the past decade, highlighting the increasing dominance of intermediate goods in Canada’s exports to Korea and the structural reorientation of Korea’s exports to Canada toward high-value finished goods. By integrating trade statistics, HS-level product classification, and macroeconomic indicators, we provide a descriptive narrative that traces bilateral trade dynamics since the enactment of the CKFTA.

Bilateral Trade Growth and Asymmetry (2014–2023)

Following the implementation of the CKFTA in 2015, total bilateral trade between Korea and Canada has grown substantially. Korea’s exports to Canada nearly doubled from USD 4.2 billion in 2014 to USD 8.4 billion in 2023, registering a compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of approximately 7.8%. During the same period, Canada’s exports to Korea increased more modestly from USD 4.3 billion to USD 6.2 billion.

This asymmetrical growth reflects the divergent nature of each country’s export profile: Korea has focused on expanding its share of manufactured finished goods, while Canada’s export gains have concentrated in resource-based intermediate inputs. This complementary trade structure is further reinforced by the global push for decarbonization and electric vehicle (EV) production, in which Korea is a leading manufacturer and Canada is a key supplier of raw materials.

Download Original Figure

Figure 1. Korea–Canada Bilateral Trade Volume, 2014–2023 (USD billion)

Source: KITA (2024), Statistics Canada (2024)

Rise in Intermediate Goods in Canadian Exports

Intermediate goods now dominate Canada’s export basket to Korea. In 2014, these products accounted for approximately 55% of Canada’s total exports to Korea. By 2022, that share had risen to 72%, before slightly declining to 68% in 2023 due to commodity price normalization following the post-Ukraine war spike.

The key intermediate exports include bituminous coal (HS 2701), copper ore (HS 2603), nickel (HS 7502), iron ore (HS 2601), and potash (HS 3104). These raw materials feed directly into Korea’s downstream production in industries such as electric vehicles, rechargeable batteries, steel manufacturing, and petrochemicals. Notably, nickel exports from Canada to Korea have nearly doubled between 2017 and 2023, in response to Korea’s expanding EV battery industry.

Download Original Figure

Figure 2. Intermediate Goods Share in Korea’s Imports from Canada, 2014–2023 (%)

Source: UN Comtrade (2024)

Korea’s Export Shift Toward High-Tech Finished Goods

In contrast, Korea’s exports to Canada have shifted markedly in favor of high-value-added finished products. Automobiles now represent over 50% of Korea’s total exports to Canada. This structural shift reflects Korea’s comparative advantage in high-efficiency manufacturing and the increased integration of its firms into global supply chains for vehicles, electronics, and battery components.

Notably, many of these finished goods incorporate upstream intermediate inputs that originate from Canadian raw materials. This vertical integration of the supply chain—resource inputs from Canada embedded in Korea’s finished exports—underscores the strategic complementarity between the two economies.

Regression analysis (based on annual growth rates from 2015–2023) yields the following:
• Pearson correlation coefficient: r = 0.456
• OLS coefficient: 0.1605
• R-squared: 0.208, p = 0.217 (n = 9)

Download Original Figure

Figure 3. Correlation Between Intermediate Import Growth and Finished Export Growth

Though not statistically significant at the 5% level, results imply a moderate positive linkage between Korea’s import of Canadian intermediate goods and its finished goods export growth, particularly in automobiles and electronics.

Correlation Between Intermediate Imports and Finished Goods Exports

To explore the relationship between Korea’s imports of Canadian intermediate goods and its exports of finished goods to Canada, we analyzed annual growth rates from 2015 to 2023. The Pearson correlation coefficient between the two was r = 0.456, and an OLS regression yielded a coefficient of 0.1605 (R² = 0.208, p = 0.217). Although the results indicate a moderate positive association, the relationship is not statistically significant due to the small sample size and lack of control variables.

Given these limitations, we interpret the results as suggestive rather than conclusive. The observed pattern supports a narrative of supply chain interdependence but does not establish causality. Future research could incorporate quarterly or firm-level panel data for a more robust econometric evaluation.

Download Original Figure

Figure 4. Composition of Canada’s Intermediate Goods Exports to Korea (2023)

Source: UN Comtrade (2024), author’s estimate

Macroeconomic and Trade Context

From a macroeconomic perspective, the growing importance of intermediate goods in Korea–Canada trade mirrors broader global trends. Korea’s role as a technology-intensive export hub depends increasingly on secure access to strategic raw materials, while Canada’s Indo-Pacific Strategy explicitly identifies Korea as a priority partner in critical mineral cooperation.

Moreover, Korea’s reliance on Canadian inputs has become more prominent amid disruptions in global supply chains caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, geopolitical tensions, and climate policy shifts. These changes have elevated the strategic significance of bilateral trade not only in terms of volume but also in the resilience and structure of shared production networks.

Download Original Figure

Figure 5. Change in Korea’s Export Composition to Canada Before and After CKFTA

Source: KITA HS-level Data Aggregation (2024)

There is a moderate positive relationship between the two, suggesting that increases in Canada's resource-based exports (inputs) may partially enable Korea's finished goods export growth.

TiVA Perspective: Estimating Canadian Value in Korean Exports

Understanding the origin of value in international trade has become increasingly important in a global economy characterized by fragmented production networks and cross-border interdependencies. The Trade in Value Added (TiVA) framework, developed jointly by the OECD and the WTO, offers a robust methodology to decompose gross exports into domestic and foreign value-added components. This perspective is particularly relevant for analyzing Korea–Canada trade, where upstream resource inputs from Canada are embedded in Korea’s high-tech finished goods.

According to OECD TiVA indicators, roughly 20–25% of Korea’s total exports include foreign value-added content. While Canada represents a relatively modest portion of this foreign share, its contribution is concentrated in strategic sectors such as electric vehicle batteries (nickel, cobalt), automotive parts (aluminum, copper), and packaging materials (wood pulp).

By triangulating HS-level trade data from UN Comtrade with sectoral TiVA coefficients, we estimate that Canadian value-added accounts for approximately 2.3% of the foreign value embedded in Korea’s gross exports to Canada. Though numerically small, this value is disproportionately significant in sectors aligned with global decarbonization trends and high-efficiency manufacturing.

The descriptive nature of this estimate warrants cautious interpretation, as it reflects average sectoral relationships rather than firm-level production data. Nonetheless, the analysis reveals meaningful bilateral interlinkages that go beyond headline trade figures. For example, Korea’s expansion in battery and electronics exports is likely facilitated by a stable supply of Canadian mineral inputs, and this mutual dependency creates opportunities for long-term industrial collaboration.

From a policy standpoint, TiVA analysis offers a valuable lens to enhance supply chain transparency, inform procurement strategies, and align industrial planning. Institutionalizing joint TiVA data monitoring—through bilateral observatories or digital dashboards—would enable both governments to trace value creation across borders and respond strategically to disruptions.

As Korea and Canada deepen ties under CKFTA and broader platforms like CPTPP, a TiVA-based governance approach can serve as the backbone of resilient, inclusive, and future-oriented economic cooperation.

Structural Complementarities and Strategic Risks

The trade relationship between Korea and Canada exhibits a deepening structural complementarity, shaped by contrasting yet mutually reinforcing economic strengths. Korea’s comparative advantage lies in high-tech, value-added manufacturing—especially in automobiles, semiconductors, and rechargeable batteries—while Canada provides upstream resource-based inputs such as coal, copper, and nickel that are essential to these sectors. This alignment has created an interdependent supply chain in which Canadian raw materials are embedded in Korea’s export-oriented production systems.

Such specialization has been catalyzed by global trends toward decarbonization, electrification, and digitalization. For instance, Korea’s rapid expansion in electric vehicle (EV) battery production has increased its reliance on secure sources of nickel and cobalt, positioning Canada as a key strategic partner. Conversely, Canada benefits from access to Korea’s manufacturing ecosystem and technology platforms, which complement its resource endowments.

However, this structural interdependence also introduces risks. Korea’s growing dependency on imported critical minerals, including those from Canada, exposes it to supply shocks, price volatility, and geopolitical disruptions. The post-pandemic commodity surge and disruptions triggered by the war in Ukraine underscore the fragility of resource-based value chains. For Canada, the limited integration into downstream Korean supply chains may constrain the full realization of value-added benefits.

Geopolitical dynamics further complicate the bilateral landscape. As both countries navigate an increasingly multipolar world—with U.S.–China rivalry, tightening export controls, and climate-driven trade policies—securing trusted trade partnerships becomes a strategic imperative. Canada’s Indo-Pacific Strategy, launched in 2022, explicitly identifies Korea as a priority partner in building resilient, diversified economic ties beyond China. Korea, for its part, seeks stable access to critical inputs to maintain its export competitiveness amid global uncertainties.

These complementarities and vulnerabilities present both a rationale and an urgency for a more institutionalized economic partnership. A shift from transactional trade to strategic collaboration is necessary, one that is anchored in long-term agreements, joint investments, and co-development of supply chain infrastructure. Addressing the asymmetries in upstream–downstream integration and reducing mutual exposure to global disruptions should be at the center of future bilateral policy coordination.

Policy Recommendations and Conclusion

Building upon the analysis of trade structure and supply chain linkages, this section outlines policy strategies to deepen Korea–Canada economic cooperation in a more resilient, equitable, and forward-looking direction.

Institutionalizing Intermediate Goods Cooperation

To mitigate supply-side vulnerabilities, Korea and Canada should formalize long-term agreements focused on critical minerals and intermediate goods. This could include government-backed procurement contracts, bilateral mineral stockpiling arrangements, and co-investment in extraction and logistics infrastructure. Drawing inspiration from Japan’s mineral security frameworks, such mechanisms would anchor bilateral trust and reduce exposure to third-country shocks.

Enhancing TiVA-Based Trade Governance

Given the structural importance of embedded Canadian value in Korean exports, both governments should collaborate to develop a bilateral “Value Chain Dashboard” that integrates HS-level trade data with TiVA coefficients. Such a tool would increase transparency, enable better industrial policy alignment, and allow real-time tracking of value-added flows. This would benefit not only large firms but also SMEs seeking to navigate cross-border production networks.

Leveraging Multilateral Platforms like CPTPP

Korea and Canada are both members of the CPTPP and participants in global digital economy frameworks. These platforms should be used not only to harmonize tariff schedules but also to align standards on cross-border data governance, ESG compliance, and AI regulation. Collaborative leadership in these areas could position both countries as norm-setters in the Indo-Pacific.

Coordinated Innovation in Clean Technology

To build future-ready industries, both governments should promote co-financed R&D programs in sectors such as hydrogen energy, next-generation batteries, smart mining, and low-carbon logistics. Canada’s research infrastructure and natural resource base, combined with Korea’s digital and manufacturing capabilities, present natural complementarities for joint innovation.

Strategic Dialogue for Economic Security

The current geopolitical landscape calls for regularized high-level dialogue. A Korea–Canada Strategic Economic Dialogue (SED) mechanism, modeled on the U.S.–Japan Economic Policy Consultative Committee, could facilitate coordination on critical technologies, dual-use items, cybersecurity, and supply chain risk management.

Conclusion

Ten years after the CKFTA came into effect, Korea and Canada have developed a trade relationship marked by structural complementarity and growing interdependence. Korea’s export-driven manufacturing base increasingly relies on Canadian resource inputs, while Canada benefits from downstream integration into high-value Asian markets. This paper has shown that beyond aggregate trade volumes, the composition and embedded value of bilateral exchanges warrant strategic attention.

To transition from reactive trade facilitation to long-term partnership, both countries must institutionalize cooperation in intermediate goods, value-added data governance, and industrial innovation. Policy coordination across bilateral and multilateral channels will be essential to address shared vulnerabilities and seize emerging opportunities in green growth, digital transformation, and economic security. By anchoring the Korea–Canada partnership in forward-looking governance structures, both nations can enhance their resilience and influence in an increasingly fragmented global economy.

Introduction

For over two centuries, Canada and the United States have maintained a largely peaceful bilateral relationship, anchored in deep economic integration, shared democratic values, and extensive security cooperation. However, the return of Donald J. Trump to the presidency of the United States in 2025 marked an important division in this historical continuity. Reviving the unilateralist tenor of his earlier administration, Trump reintroduced aggressive protectionist measures, rhetorical provocations, and overt challenges to Canadian sovereignty. These developments were crucial in the federal elections taking place in late April 2025 (originally scheduled to take place in October 2025) one of the most atypical electoral contests in Canada’s modern history..

The Canada 2025 election unfolded in an environment of exceptional geopolitical and economic tension, characterized by intensified cross-border trade disputes, threats of annexation rhetoric from the U.S. executive, and rising domestic polarization. In this context, Canada’s electoral dynamics became deeply influenced by external factors, revealing both the vulnerabilities of the country’s political institutions and the resilience of its democratic norms. Mark Carney, a technocratic figure with extensive experience in global financial governance, assumed the leadership of the Liberal Party following the resignation of Prime Minister Justin Trudeau. Within days of his appointment, Carney called anticipated elections to secure a mandate capable of confronting what he termed an “American betrayal” of Canadian sovereignty.

This article examines the Canadian federal election in 2025, exploring the connection between external pressures, particularly those emanating from the Trump administration, and internal structural challenges such as electoral fragmentation, and rising voter discontent. It situates the electoral outcome within the broader historical pattern of alternating Liberal and Conservative governance since the 1980s, while highlighting the ways in which the 2025 contest departed from established norms due to its timing and relevance of nationalist discourse.

The election resulted in a narrow minority victory for the Liberal Party, which secured 169 seats—three short of an absolute majority—against a resurgent but ultimately unsuccessful Conservative opposition led by Pierre Poilievre. The vote was marked not only by razor-thin margins in multiple ridings, but also by the electoral collapse of the New Democratic Party and the regional resilience of the Bloc Québécois party. Underlying these shifts was a growing public perception of the need for political continuity in the face of external threats, amplified by strategic voting among progressives and heightened media salience of the “Trump factor.”.

Beyond the domestic sphere, the election has signaled a recalibration of Canada’s foreign policy and trade orientation. The Carney government has articulated a vision for reduced economic dependence on the United States and a pivot toward Europe, Asia, and Latin America. Simultaneously, Canada’s trade patterns have begun to reflect this strategic shift, with exports increasingly diversified in response to American tariffs. The broader implications of these developments extend beyond bilateral relations, raising critical questions about the stability of North American integration, the durability of liberal-democratic institutions, and the future of Canadian sovereignty in a complex international order.

Introduction

As global security threats become increasingly multifaceted—spanning traditional and non-traditional domains—there is a growing imperative for comprehensive, adaptive, and collaborative defense strategies. Middle powers such as South Korea and Canada, endowed with advanced capabilities, democratic governance, and global responsibilities, are uniquely positioned to help maintain regional stability and uphold a rules-based international order. While their respective Indo-Pacific engagements have evolved largely in parallel, recent developments—including the 2024 Korea–Canada Foreign and Defense Ministers’ (2+2) meeting—signal an emerging opportunity for deeper strategic alignment

Despite the absence of formal alliance ties or geographic proximity, South Korea and Canada are expanding cooperation in maritime domain awareness, cyber defense, emerging technologies, and defense industrial collaboration. These developments raise a core question in the study of international security: How can two geographically distant middle powers institutionalize strategic cooperation in the absence of direct threats or shared regional identity? This question becomes more urgent amid the rising uncertainty of the Indo-Pacific, where regional architectures are increasingly shaped by great-power rivalry, minilateral alignments, and competitive norm-setting

This article addresses that question by situating Korea–Canada security cooperation within the broader literature on middle-power diplomacy, bilateral institutionalism, and norm entrepreneurship. While existing research on Indo-Pacific middle powers has largely focused on Southeast Asia or US-aligned states, this study examines a comparatively underexplored dyad—South Korea and Canada—to assess how functional cooperation can evolve into a more durable institutional partnership. In doing so, it contributes to the growing body of scholarship that analyzes how middle powers manage structural uncertainty through multilateral and bilateral initiatives that blend strategic pragmatism with normative aspiration (Cooper, Higgott, and Nossal, 1993; Acharya, 2014; Goh, 2013)

To address this question, the article adopts a multidimensional framework grounded in a realist–constructivist perspective. It hypothesizes that functionally driven security cooperation between geographically distant middle powers can be institutionalized—even in the absence of formal alliances or shared regional identity—when supported by norm entrepreneurship, strategic complementarity, and a shared middle-power identity. Drawing on process tracing and discourse analysis of official documents issued between 2022 and 2024, the study identifies four key areas of convergence: maritime security and Indo-Pacific strategy alignment; multilateral interoperability; cooperation in emerging domains such as cyber, space, and cognitive warfare; and defense industrial collaboration, including submarine and MRO programs. The findings support this hypothesis and suggest that Korea–Canada cooperation offers a scalable model for norm-driven middle-power alignment in the Indo-Pacific. The sections that follow elaborate the analytical framework, present empirical findings, and propose policy strategies for institutionalizing bilateral security cooperation

Literature Review

The concept of “middle power” has long occupied a central place in international relations scholarship, especially in discussions about states that lack great-power capabilities but exert significant influence through diplomacy, multilateralism, and norm-setting. Cooper, Higgott, and Nossal, 1993 characterize middle powers as countries that "rely on multilateral solutions to international problems, possess a degree of diplomatic initiative, and act as mediators or bridge-builders in the international system." Their work laid the foundation for understanding middle powers as norm entrepreneurs rather than purely material actors. Jordaan (2003) later expanded this framework by distinguishing between "traditional" and "emerging" middle powers, with the latter defined not solely by capabilities but also by foreign policy behavior shaped by developmental experiences, identity, and multilateral commitment

In recent years, a renewed scholarly focus has emerged around the role of middle powers in the Indo-Pacific, particularly in light of intensifying great-power rivalry. South Korea’s middle-power strategy has been more consistently articulated in relation to its geopolitical vulnerabilities and alliance management. Lee and Moon (2019) analyze South Korea’s hedging behavior as a deliberate attempt to balance U.S. alliance expectations with regional autonomy. Their study illustrates how Seoul's middle-power identity is functionally employed to expand diplomatic room for maneuver while maintaining security guarantees. Related analyses by institutions such as the Asan Institute and Chatham House indicate a growing interest in how Korea pursues "strategic autonomy" within multilateral frameworks while deepening selective bilateral and trilateral security ties

Notably absent in much of this literature, however, is a systematic examination of the bilateral security convergence between South Korea and Canada. Existing studies have tended to treat these countries' Indo-Pacific engagements in isolation, with limited analysis of their potential synergy as like-minded middle powers. This article seeks to bridge that gap by analyzing how Seoul and Ottawa can institutionalize multidimensional security cooperation—spanning traditional and emerging domains—through a structured framework informed by IR theory, especially middle-power diplomacy, norm diffusion, and strategic alignment in contested regions

Analytical Framework

This study adopts a qualitative case study approach to explore how South Korea and Canada, as two middle powers, are converging strategically in the Indo-Pacific. The analysis is guided by the theoretical lens of middle-power diplomacy, a concept that characterizes states with moderate material capabilities but disproportionate normative and institutional influence in international affairs. Middle powers, such as South Korea and Canada, are neither regional hegemons nor great powers, yet they play critical roles in shaping global governance, building coalitions, and reinforcing multilateral institutions. Rather than exerting dominance, they are often recognized for their ability to mediate, bridge, and institutionalize cooperation, especially in complex and contested regions like the Indo-Pacific (Cooper, Higgott, and Nossal, 1993;Jordaan (2003) )

Middle powers are typically defined not just by their material capacity but by the behavioral logic of their foreign policies, including a commitment to rules-based order, preference for multilateral institutions, and the use of diplomacy over coercion. As Jordaan (2003) notes, middle powers often play the role of "moral actors" and "bridge-builders" in international relations, operating within an ethical and institutional framework to mediate great-power rivalry

A central aspect of this framework is norm entrepreneurship—the ability of middle powers to lead in the creation, diffusion, or defense of international norms (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998). In the context of Korea–Canada security cooperation, norm entrepreneurship is evident in their shared emphasis on the rules-based international order, multilateralism, and inclusive approaches to emerging threats such as cyberattacks, disinformation, and climate-related security risks. Their engagement is not merely reactive; it is structured and forward-looking, seeking to fill strategic voids left by major power rivalry and institutional fragmentation

To capture the full range of security challenges and cooperative modalities, this study also draws on the concept of comprehensive security, which expands the analytical scope beyond traditional military alliances. Comprehensive security encompasses both conventional and non-conventional domains, including maritime security, technological innovation, cognitive warfare, space resilience, and defense industrial ecosystems. This perspective is essential to understanding how South Korea and Canada—as middle powers—can collaborate across sectors to build resilience and strategic depth, without overextending their political or military capital

In an era where multilateralism is increasingly strained, smaller groupings—such as the Quad or trilateral partnerships involving middle powers—are seen as pragmatic venues for targeted cooperation in defense, intelligence, and emerging technologies. Korea and Canada’s engagement through multilateral exercises like RIMPAC and initiatives under NATO-Asia cooperation frameworks exemplifies this trend

Methodologically, this study employs process tracing and discourse analysis of official documents, strategic white papers, ministerial speeches, and policy briefings released by both governments between 2022 and 2024. Rather than testing a hypothesis in a positivist sense, it adopts an inductive, theory-informed approach to evaluate the plausibility of a strategic convergence model between two geographically distant middle powers

This study hypothesizes that functionally driven, multidimensional security cooperation between South Korea and Canada can be institutionalized in the absence of formal alliances or geographic proximity—particularly when grounded in norm entrepreneurship, strategic complementarity, and shared middle-power identity

In doing so, the article addresses two central research questions:
1. How can South Korea and Canada construct a scalable and institutionalized framework for strategic security cooperation in the Indo-Pacific?
2. What are the strategic opportunities and operational constraints involved in pursuing multidimensional, norm-driven middle-power alignment?

This study hypothesizes that functionally driven, multidimensional security cooperation between geographically distant middle powers—such as South Korea and Canada—can be institutionalized in the absence of formal alliances or geographic proximity, particularly when grounded in norm entrepreneurship, strategic complementarity, and shared middle-power identity. The analysis applies a theoretically informed framework that integrates realist and constructivist perspectives to evaluate both strategic convergence and operational feasibility

In theoretical terms, this article applies a synthesized realist–constructivist lens to examine Korea–Canada security cooperation. From a realist perspective, the strategic convergence of the two countries can be seen as a rational response to the intensification of systemic uncertainty in the Indo-Pacific, including great-power rivalry, maritime insecurity, and technological competition. These developments increase both the incentives and the urgency for middle powers to build functional and scalable strategic partnerships, especially in key areas such as maritime security, interoperability, and defense-industrial cooperation. At the same time, constructivist insights help explain the ideational enablers of such cooperation. South Korea and Canada’s shared liberal-democratic identity, institutional culture, and commitment to multilateralism serve as normative foundations for bilateral alignment, even in the absence of formal alliance obligations. By integrating these two perspectives, this study captures the material incentives and normative commitments that enable geographically distant middle powers to institutionalize security cooperation across multiple domains

Strategic Pillar 1: Maritime Security and Indo-Pacific Strategy Alignment

The Indo-Pacific region is home to approximately 65% of the global population and accounts for more than 60% of the world's GDP. Additionally, over half of global maritime transportation passes through this region, making it a critical hub in terms of economic, diplomatic, and security considerations. The Korean Peninsula is one of the key factors influencing peace and stability in the region. In recognition of this, the Government of the Republic of Korea announced its Indo-Pacific Strategy in 2022, centered on the core values of “freedom,” “peace,” and “prosperity,” and declared its commitment to contributing to comprehensive regional security cooperation.

South Korea places particular emphasis on maritime security cooperation. In order to ensure peace and freedom of navigation in major sea lanes, such as the South China Sea, Korea is strengthening cooperation with relevant countries. It is also upholding international norms by adhering to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and faithfully implementing the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP). Furthermore, Korea is focusing on enhancing Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA), a concept first introduced by the White House in 2005, which refers to a comprehensive understanding and approach to all areas that may affect maritime domains, including safety, security, economy, society, and the environment

The Korean government is benchmarking the Singapore Information Fusion Center (IFC), which facilitates the rapid sharing of information among multinational naval liaison officers, to develop a Korea-specific MDA model. This effort will require participation not only from the Navy, but also from various relevant entities including the Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Korea Coast Guard, shipping companies, and port authorities, as part of a broader public-private cooperation network

Meanwhile, Canada has also established its own Indo-Pacific Strategy and is steadily expanding its engagement in regional security and defense. As part of this strategy, Canada is conducting Operation Horizon, a major military initiative that deploys its Army, Navy, Air Force, and Special Operations Forces to the region. The objective is to promote peace and stability and establish a rules-based international order. As part of this effort, the Royal Canadian Navy annually deploys three vessels to the Indo-Pacific to enhance robust military cooperation with allied and partner nations

Canada is also actively participating in Operation NEON, which supports the enforcement of United Nations Security Council sanctions against North Korea. Since 2018, Canada has regularly deployed ships, aircraft, and personnel to monitor North Korea’s maritime sanctions evasion efforts. This operation not only helps deter illicit activities but also signals the international community's continued commitment to upholding UN resolutions.

At the 2024 Korea–Canada Foreign and Defense (2+2) Ministerial Meeting, the two countries launched the “Korea–Canada Indo-Pacific Dialogue” and agreed to identify various synergy projects, reaffirming their strong mutual interest and commitment to the region.

Building on this context, the present report proposes the following cooperation measures.

First, South Korea and Canada should establish a system for information sharing to enhance MDA capabilities in the Indo-Pacific. Both countries are implementing Indo-Pacific strategies aimed at bolstering their economic, social, diplomatic, and security capacities, which aligns closely with the rationale for developing an MDA framework. In particular, conflicts in the South China Sea could significantly impact fields such as the economy, logistics, energy, and data. Moreover, issues like illegal fishing and marine pollution have the potential to cause global environmental crises. To effectively address such challenges, it is essential to produce reliable information and share it rapidly

As an initial step, both countries could establish a routine information-sharing mechanism between academic, business, and governmental actors in fields such as economics, trade, energy, and the environment. This would contribute to mutual trust-building. However, such first-tier cooperation has limitations in addressing more complex security challenges like maritime disasters, piracy suppression, and sanctions evasion at sea. Therefore, it is necessary to move to a second-tier collaboration involving the sharing of data collected via civilian and military satellites, in order to further strengthen maritime safety and security capabilities. This stage would involve sharing sensitive security information, such as intelligence on human trafficking at sea and illegal shipments by North Korea, and would be highly compatible with Canada’s existing Operation NEON

Looking ahead, a third-tier model could involve expanding bilateral information-sharing frameworks to include key Indo-Pacific democratic countries such as the United States, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand. Since South Korea and Canada already share information individually with these countries, evolving toward a multilateral cooperative structure is a highly feasible option

Multilateral cooperation—especially among South Korea, the United States, Japan, and Canada—can further enhance maritime deterrence and crisis response. A robust maritime security and logistics system is needed to respond rapidly to North Korean provocations and regional instability. In such a framework, Japan is expected to secure the Maritime Prepositioning Ship Squadrons (MPS) near Okinawa, while Canada contributes by safeguarding routes in the North Pacific. South Korea and Japan could engage in mine-clearing operations, while Canada leverages its expertise from multinational mine-clearance exercises

To institutionalize this, Korea and Canada could co-lead a Multinational Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) Task Force with support from the U.S. and Japan. This force would enable real-time data sharing between Canada’s LCSS and Korea’s KAMD systems and allow Canadian frigates to conduct regular patrols in East Asian waters. These combined efforts would enhance surveillance and maintain maritime dominance during peace and contingencies

Another important initiative is the formation of a joint consultative body to explore potential sites for cooperative ports either in South Korea or in a third country. The Ministry of National Defense of Korea is currently conducting preliminary research on establishing such ports to expand MDA capabilities in the Indo-Pacific. Canada, for its part, has growing needs for accessible cooperative ports as it seeks to enhance its trade and economic presence in the region. Considering these shared interests, it would be appropriate to propose joint meetings and the signing of Memorandums of Understanding (MOUs) on this topic at the 2026 Korea–Canada Foreign and Security (2+2) Ministerial Meeting

If Korea and Canada were to jointly explore candidate sites for cooperative ports in India or ASEAN countries, they could present the initiative as one with non-military purposes—such as promoting academic exchange, environmental protection, maritime norm-building, and improving the human rights of women and minorities in the Indo-Pacific. This would help garner broader international support. During the search for cooperative port sites, consideration should also be given to how these ports might facilitate future maritime security cooperation with key regional partners such as the U.S., Japan, and Australia, and potentially serve as a deterrence mechanism in the event of contingencies on the Korean Peninsula or in the Taiwan Strait

While maritime security forms the front line of Korea–Canada strategic alignment, deeper interoperability must be supported by broader military frameworks, beginning with NATO and NORAD

Strategic Pillar 2: Multilateral Military and Intelligence Interoperability

International politics and global relations are becoming increasingly complex, and there is growing recognition that enhancing a country’s military capabilities alone is no longer sufficient to ensure national security. In this context, the importance of bilateral and multilateral military cooperation is more emphasized than ever. South Korea, based on its military alliance with the United States, has been strengthening security cooperation with key partner countries as part of its efforts to respond to growing instability in international security

North Korea remains the most serious security threat to South Korea. Past experiences clearly demonstrate that mere dialogue is insufficient to bring about meaningful changes in North Korea's behavior. Moreover, given the ongoing support—both direct and indirect—provided to North Korea by China, Russia, and Iran, securing deterrence through enhanced regional military cooperation has become an essential component of South Korea’s national security strategy

In this context, the South Korean government formalized the enhancement of trilateral security cooperation with the United States and Japan at the Camp David Summit in August 2023. It has also been deepening its defense and security partnership with Australia, thereby expanding both bilateral and trilateral frameworks for cooperation. Furthermore, South Korea continues to actively participate in multilateral military initiatives, such as the Rim of the Pacific Exercise (RIMPAC), the world’s largest multinational maritime exercise, in alignment with its commitment to working alongside like-minded democratic nations.

In addition, South Korea has been actively strengthening cooperation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), aiming to fulfill its responsibilities as a democratic country amidst global instability. This cooperation has taken on heightened urgency following North Korea’s dispatch of troops to support Russia. NATO, for its part, has also recognized the need to expand collaboration with Asia-Pacific nations. In October 2024, NATO officially invited the so-called Indo-Pacific Four (IP4)—South Korea, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand—to its Defense Ministers’ Meeting for the first time. Earlier, in July 2024, the IP4 heads of state held a summit during the NATO Leaders’ Meeting, reaffirming their shared awareness of international security challenges and pledging cooperation to uphold a rules-based international order.

Canada, for its part, has traditionally maintained strong military alliances with the United Kingdom, the United States, and other partners, and continues to actively engage in multilateral military cooperation. As a core NATO member, Canada has contributed significantly to collective defense efforts, investing USD 107 million in the NATO Innovation Fund. It has also deployed troops to Latvia and is providing military training programs to the Ukrainian armed forces as part of ongoing NATO operations

In terms of intelligence sharing, Canada is a member of the Five Eyes alliance, along with the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand. While intelligence alliances differ in nature from military partnerships, the provision of intelligence is a critical element of modern military operations. For this reason, Five Eyes can be regarded as a quasi-military framework. Recently, Five Eyes launched a new security advisory initiative—Secure Innovation—to enhance cooperation in emerging technologies, further broadening the scope of allied collaboration

Canada has also revised its Indo-Pacific Strategy to strengthen military cooperation with key regional countries, and its bilateral and multilateral defense engagements are expected to continue expanding

Accordingly, this report proposes the following areas for Korea–Canada defense cooperation:

First, there is a need for more concrete discussions on military support mechanisms linked to NATO cooperation. North Korea’s deployment of forces to support Russia has made it even more urgent for South Korea to enhance its contributions to NATO. However, direct deployment of South Korean troops could heighten military tensions and provoke diplomatic friction with neighboring countries. As such, indirect military support through NATO member Canada offers a more realistic alternative

One possible approach is for South Korea and Canada to establish a cooperative mechanism for joint production and export of military systems—tentatively titled the Korea–Canada Military Support (KOCAMS) framework. Since NATO prioritizes procurement from member states and adheres to standards set by the NATO Standardization Office (NSO), supporting NATO military logistics through standardized items developed with Canada could help South Korean defense products enter the NATO supply chain more smoothly, without the political burden associated with direct troop involvement. The KOCAMS framework could also serve as a foundation for ongoing defense industrial cooperation between the two countries

Second, Canada’s participation in U.S.–ROK combined exercises could serve as a channel for deepening military cooperation. Due to domestic political sensitivities and regional diplomatic considerations—especially with regard to China—a direct bilateral military exercise between South Korea and Canada on the Korean Peninsula may face practical limitations. Therefore, a more feasible alternative would be to increase Canada’s involvement in U.S.–ROK joint exercises, leveraging its status as a United Nations Command (UNC) member state

Recent policy trends indicate a growing presence of UNC member state forces during these joint exercises. Canada could expand the deployment of its command personnel and troops to participate in operational training with the South Korean military. This cooperation could go beyond ground-based maneuver training to include naval assets currently engaged in Operation NEON in the Indo-Pacific, thereby diversifying the scope of Korea–Canada military collaboration

If political circumstances in South Korea lead to a reduction in U.S.–ROK joint exercises in the future, the two countries could continue their cooperation through command post exercises (CPX), maintaining strategic military coordination between the two command structures in preparation for potential contingencies on the Korean Peninsula

Furthermore, trilateral cooperation under the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) framework can be expanded to enhance early warning and missile defense capabilities. NORAD, which has traditionally focused on North America’s airspace, must adapt to include Indo-Pacific threats. This includes developing an Integrated Early Warning System (IEWS) that incorporates data from Korean and Japanese radar systems. While such a shift would require recalibrating NORAD’s regional mandate, integrating Korean and Japanese early warning data could be piloted through trilateral military innovation hubs. A Pacific Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) protocol could also enable joint interception operations with the United States

Canadian participation in joint BMD training, including the deployment of Halifax-class frigates and CF-18 fighters, would support interoperability and real-time response. Canada could also leverage its experience with the Aegis Combat System and simulated ICBM response scenarios to align with U.S.–ROK operations

In support of this strategy, Canada’s RADARSAT satellites and Korea’s Green Pine and KAMD assets could be linked through a sensor fusion platform to create a multi-layered, AI-assisted missile tracking and threat forecasting network. This would also reinforce Five Eyes cooperation, allowing Korea to gradually integrate via Canadian facilitation

To ensure sustainment and logistics capacity, Korea and Canada should co-establish a Joint Logistics Support Hub in Busan or Ulsan, offering ship and submarine maintenance for NATO-compatible fleets. Canada would contribute expertise in lifecycle management and Arctic design, while Korea would supply infrastructure and skilled labor. The facility could serve as a hub for allied forces in the Indo-Pacific

Finally, a Korea–U.S.–Canada Trilateral Innovation Hub could develop advanced technologies such as AI-based missile detection systems, autonomous maritime robotics, and strategic supply chain platforms for rare earth elements. The Hub would support secure cyber collaboration and offensive-defense capabilities, further institutionalizing deterrence mechanisms against North Korea

While conventional deterrence and allied military interoperability form the backbone of Korea–Canada strategic coordination, evolving security landscapes demand expanded attention to non-traditional domains. As cyberspace, outer space, and cognitive warfare emerge as decisive arenas of competition, Korea and Canada must deepen their cooperation in these technologically complex and norm-defining fields. Strategic alignment in these areas will be essential for preserving resilience, democratic integrity, and long-term operational relevance

Strategic Pillar 3: Emerging Security Domains (Cyber, Space, Cognitive Warfare)

At the recent Korea–Canada Foreign and Defense Ministers’ (2+2) Meeting, the two countries held in-depth discussions on building a cooperative framework and joint response system to address non-traditional security threats. While traditional security has largely been centered around conventional weapons and asymmetric forces, the modern and future security environment increasingly involves complex, non-physical threats such as cyberattacks, cognitive warfare, space-based challenges, artificial intelligence, climate change, and pandemics. These challenges are collectively referred to as “non-traditional security” or “emerging security” threats

Although South Korea has lagged somewhat behind the United States and NATO in institutionalizing and strategizing its response to emerging security issues, it has shown notable progress in key areas such as cyber defense and the space industry. For example, Korea has consistently participated in Locked Shields, the world’s largest real-time cyber defense exercise organized by the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE). Since 2021, Korea has taken part in the exercise for four consecutive years, significantly enhancing its cyber defense capabilities.

In 2024, the Presidential Office’s National Security Office announced Korea’s National Cybersecurity Strategy, which outlines the country’s vision to become a global pivotal state that upholds freedom, human rights, and the rule of law in cyberspace. The strategy consists of five key pillars: (1) strengthening proactive cyber defense; (2) building a global cooperation framework; (3) improving resilience of critical infrastructure; (4) securing a technological edge in new domains; and (5) reinforcing the cybersecurity foundation

As a non-permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, Korea has hosted open debates on cybersecurity to raise international awareness and has taken a leading role in shaping global norms in this area. In May 2024, Korea officially launched its Aerospace Administration to accelerate developments in space exploration, transport, science, security, and industry. Recently, Korea successfully launched a military satellite and now operates a total of three military satellites. It has particularly focused on small and micro-satellite technologies. These systems significantly enhance the country’s surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities, serving as a strategic asset for Korea’s emergence as a space security power

Since 2021, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has also hosted the World Emerging Security Forum (WESForum), inviting stakeholders from governments, international organizations, academia, and industry to strengthen Korea’s capabilities in addressing emerging threats.

Canada, too, has developed a distinct strategy to address emerging security challenges separate from traditional defense paradigms. Its cybersecurity efforts are based on three main pillars: (1) security and resilience, (2) cyber innovation, and (3) international leadership and cooperation. The Canadian Centre for Cyber Security (CCCS) leads national efforts to counter cyber threats from hostile actors and criminal groups. Canada has explicitly named China, Russia, and Iran as key adversarial states, citing their cyber espionage, intellectual property theft, and supply chain disruptions as serious threats to Canada and its allies’ critical infrastructure.

Canada emphasizes public-private collaboration to strengthen its cyber defenses and works closely with companies like BlackBerry Limited. Moreover, Canada has included cybersecurity initiatives in its Indo-Pacific Strategy, pledging funding and deeper engagement with regional partners—a point of significant relevance to Korea

In the space domain, Canada’s Canadarm technology has earned global recognition, including from NASA. Developed under the leadership of the Canadian Space Agency (CSA), Canadarm is a robotic arm used in satellite and space station operations. First acclaimed for servicing the Hubble Space Telescope, it is now an essential part of the International Space Station (ISS) and will soon be used in NASA’s Lunar Gateway project. Although Canada lacks a domestic launch site, its strengths in space robotics and engineering underscore its status as a leading spacefaring nation. The Canadian Space Strategy, released in 2019, also emphasizes the importance of space security, including goals to enhance space situational awareness and develop surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities. It further declares Canada’s ambition to shape international norms in the space domain

Based on these developments, this report proposes the following areas for Korea–Canada cooperation in emerging security domains:

First, the two countries should institutionalize a Bilateral Cyber Policy Dialogue to share intelligence on cyber threats, facilitate military officer exchanges, and conduct small-scale joint cyber exercises. Given the rapid pace of development in cyber threats, it is crucial to promote exchange programs for junior and mid-level cyber officers to build long-term trust and strategic alignment. Unlike large-scale U.S.–ROK cyber drills, a more feasible approach may involve small joint task teams from each country conducting tactical cyber operations together. In addition, Canada’s military-civilian tech ecosystem complements Korea’s own capabilities, making it valuable to launch a technical cooperation initiative to assess current capabilities and chart mutual advancement. This cooperation could eventually serve as a foundation for broader Korea–North America cybersecurity partnerships

Second, greater diplomatic cooperation is needed to address cognitive warfare. Countries like Russia and China are actively engaging in psychological and perceptual manipulation using false information, cyber operations, social media disinformation, and media control. To counter these tactics, Korea and Canada should establish a diplomatic-level framework for sharing real-time information and analysis. Embassies in each country could objectively monitor local political, social, and cultural dynamics to assess whether domestic trends are being influenced by adversarial disinformation. This could be supported by regular meetings between relevant agencies, and the creation of dedicated hotlines for strategic communication. Given Canada’s intelligence-sharing network with the U.S. and Commonwealth partners, such a mechanism would greatly enhance Korea’s cognitive warfare response capabilities

Third, space security cooperation must become a formal part of the bilateral agenda. As the battlespace extends into space, both countries should explore joint military satellite operations, shared reconnaissance data, and collaborative space defense research. Publicizing shared satellite data through joint statements or multilateral forums can demonstrate responsible use of space technologies and contribute to setting international norms. In the long term, Korea and Canada could play a pivotal role in shaping future space law and governance, especially as space exploration missions expand to the Moon and other planets

Future high-level Korea–Canada meetings should continue to refine these emerging security agendas and pursue a comprehensive strategic partnership across technological, diplomatic, and defense domains

Yet even the most advanced coordination in cyber, space, and cognitive security cannot be sustained without a resilient industrial and technological base. To ensure long-term strategic autonomy and joint force readiness, South Korea and Canada must expand their collaboration into defense manufacturing, lifecycle sustainment, and joint innovation. The development of interoperable platforms and MRO ecosystems will serve as a vital enabler of the multidomain cooperation outlined in previous sections

Strategic Pillar 4: Defense Industry, Submarine, and MRO Cooperation

The evolving international security environment has underscored the critical role of defense industrial capacity, particularly in the wake of the Russia–Ukraine war. This conflict has rekindled global awareness of the importance of self-reliant military production and has prompted NATO countries to increase defense investments. This momentum has accelerated innovation across the defense sector and opened strategic windows for like-minded countries such as South Korea and Canada to strengthen bilateral defense industry partnerships

In the twenty-first century, the defense industry is not merely a military enterprise—it also serves as a driver of economic growth and technological innovation. Modern defense ecosystems foster national resilience by advancing dual-use technologies, stimulating job creation, and supporting sustainable industrial bases. For middle powers like South Korea and Canada, a robust defense sector is instrumental in achieving both operational independence and influence within multilateral security frameworks

South Korea has designated its defense industry as a strategic pillar of its national growth agenda. Supported by sustained public-private collaboration, the country has rapidly expanded its global footprint, supplying advanced systems such as the K2 main battle tank, K9 self-propelled howitzer, and FA-50 light combat aircraft to a growing list of international customers. With strong indigenous capabilities in naval, aerospace, and MRO (maintenance, repair, and operations), Korea has emerged as a defense-industrial hub capable of serving the Indo-Pacific and beyond

Canada, for its part, is undergoing a significant recalibration of its defense strategy. As a founding NATO member with increasing responsibilities in the Indo-Pacific and Arctic, Canada is modernizing its defense platforms and broadening its procurement horizons. Ottawa has demonstrated particular interest in technologies suited to extreme environments—including Arctic-capable submarines, maritime surveillance systems, and next-generation cybersecurity tools. These needs align closely with Korea’s comparative advantages, presenting a strong case for bilateral industrial cooperation

The most concrete opportunity for collaboration is Canada’s ongoing Canadian Patrol Submarine Project (CPSP), a large-scale effort to replace its aging Victoria-class submarines with a fleet of eight to twelve Arctic-optimized vessels. With an estimated value of KRW 60 trillion, the CPSP is not only a flagship procurement initiative but also a platform for shaping Canada’s future naval posture. South Korean shipbuilders Hanwha Ocean and HD Hyundai Heavy Industries have both proposed customized designs based on the Dosan Ahn Chang-ho–class and Jangbogo-III Batch II models. These platforms offer proven modularity and can be adapted to Canadian Arctic conditions, including sub-zero propulsion optimization, ice-reinforced hulls, and extended lithium-ion endurance

Beyond submarine design, co-production in Canadian shipyards—such as Halifax or SeaSpan—offers economic and political advantages. Local assembly would not only ensure technology transfer and job creation but also increase domestic buy-in and long-term sustainment flexibility. Although Canada has faced delays and constraints in past naval procurement projects, co-production with Korea offers a potential means of overcoming these bottlenecks through complementary specialization. Drawing lessons from the successful Sweden–Singapore Archer-class cooperation, a Korea–Canada co-design framework would demonstrate adaptive capability-sharing between advanced shipbuilders

Sustainment and lifecycle support must also be planned from the outset. With its globally recognized MRO expertise, Korea can assist Canada in building a maintenance ecosystem that incorporates predictive diagnostics, modular part supply, and real-time digital monitoring. As shown in the Germany–Norway 212CD program, co-developing MRO infrastructure ensures operational efficiency and lowers total lifecycle costs. Korean technical teams can work alongside Canadian engineers to establish localized supply chains and support systems, reducing long-term dependency on foreign contractors

Operational synergy is another area ripe for deepening. Arctic and maritime readiness can be enhanced through joint training programs focused on endurance, stealth, and maneuverability in extreme environments. Korea and Canada could participate in bilateral submarine exercises or co-deploy in multilateral platforms such as RIMPAC and Western Pacific ASW drills. These engagements could evolve into a dedicated Korea–Canada Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) Task Force designed to respond to emerging undersea threats in both the Arctic and Northeast Asia

Sustained cooperation also requires investments in core technology and personnel development. Korea’s Naval Submarine School and Canada’s Royal Canadian Navy training institutions can establish cross-training modules and personnel exchange programs. Joint R&D, particularly in AI navigation, acoustic optimization, and next-generation sonar systems, can be conducted through collaborative grants and dual-lab frameworks. Oceanography research centers and naval engineering institutes in both countries could partner on long-range projects aimed at stealth propulsion and automation

Finally, the CPSP should be seen not only as a defense-industrial initiative but also as a strategic lever for expanding broader defense diplomacy and economic cooperation. Submarine technology is closely tied to emerging sectors such as rare-earth mineral refinement, clean maritime energy, and intelligent sensor networks. Korea and Canada could jointly invest in value-added segments of the supply chain—particularly in rare-earth elements critical to naval platforms and electronic warfare systems. Startups in AI, quantum security, and naval battery systems could be supported through binational innovation funds and NATO-aligned commercialization programs

In short, the CPSP has the potential to serve as the cornerstone of a broader Korea–Canada defense innovation ecosystem. Through this submarine-focused partnership, both countries can combine their strengths in technology, production, training, and sustainability to generate long-term strategic dividends. If executed with foresight and institutional backing, this collaboration could play a transformative role in anchoring a new axis of maritime security architecture across the Indo-Pacific and Arctic domains

Risk and Constraints: Strategic Challenges in Institutionalizing Korea-Canada Security Cooperation

Despite the growing convergence in values and strategic interests between South Korea and Canada, the path toward deepening and institutionalizing their security cooperation is not without obstacles. These challenges span the geopolitical, institutional, and operational domains and include the potential backlash from rival powers, regional diplomatic sensitivities, legal and intelligence-sharing barriers, domestic political uncertainties, technical interoperability issues, and the overarching risk of strategic overextension

One of the foremost risks lies in the geopolitical responses of major powers, particularly China and Russia. As Korea and Canada expand cooperation in areas such as Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA), real-time intelligence sharing, and joint port initiatives—especially in ASEAN regions—China may interpret these efforts as part of a U.S.-led containment strategy in the Indo-Pacific. This perception could prompt China to exert economic pressure, as it did during the THAAD deployment in South Korea, or engage in cyber and informational retaliation targeting critical infrastructure. Russia, meanwhile, may perceive Korea’s increasing engagement with NATO, particularly through Canadian frameworks like KOCAMS and NORAD, as a strategic encroachment. This could result in Moscow ramping up diplomatic and military support for North Korea or escalating friction in the Arctic—where both Canada and Russia hold strategic interests

Diplomatic frictions within the region may also complicate multilateral cooperation. Historical tensions between South Korea and Japan, particularly over sensitive issues such as forced labor and “comfort women,” continue to generate political volatility. These unresolved legacies risk undermining trilateral coordination with Canada, especially during joint exercises or information-sharing efforts. In addition, Canada's potential role as a neutral intermediary may be constrained by its limited historical involvement in Northeast Asian affairs. In Southeast Asia, the Korea–Canada proposal for cooperative ports or surveillance initiatives may face skepticism from ASEAN states committed to strategic neutrality. If such projects are perceived as tools for military balancing, they could provoke backlash or diminish regional trust

Legal and institutional gaps present another major hurdle. The absence of a bilateral Military and Defense Classified Information Protection Agreement (MDIPA) restricts high-level intelligence sharing and hinders joint R&D initiatives in critical areas such as submarine design, cyber infrastructure, and space-based surveillance. Furthermore, Canada’s membership in the Five Eyes alliance gives it privileged access to intelligence networks that South Korea cannot yet participate in directly. As a result, real-time coordination during high-tempo operations—such as missile launches or cyberattacks—could be slowed by reliance on indirect channels. These asymmetries may impede the development of mutual trust in sensitive domains like cyber defense and joint command structures

Domestic political and budgetary variables further complicate long-term cooperation. Canada’s defense modernization efforts have historically been hampered by political polarization, procurement delays, and fiscal constraints. Key projects like the Canadian Patrol Submarine Project (CPSP) have faced criticism for their scale, costs, and transparency. Similarly, the establishment of a Korea–Canada MRO hub in regions like British Columbia or Halifax could face intergovernmental challenges at the provincial-federal level. On the Korean side, electoral cycles frequently reshape the country’s foreign policy priorities. A progressive administration may favor détente with China or North Korea, while a conservative government may push for deeper NATO alignment and military-industrial exports. These shifts risk politicizing Korea–Canada cooperation or interrupting momentum across different policy domains

Operational feasibility also poses limitations, particularly regarding interoperability and cybersecurity architecture. While Korea and Canada participate in joint multilateral exercises like RIMPAC, they lack a shared command doctrine or integrated operational framework. Technological differences, particularly in naval and ISR (intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance) systems, could complicate coordination during crisis scenarios or command post exercises (CPX). In cybersecurity, the structural divide is also clear: Korea’s centralized, military-led approach—anchored by the Presidential Office—differs significantly from Canada’s decentralized, public-private model led by the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security (CCCS). These differences make joint tactical response teams more difficult to form and could hinder fast reaction to hybrid threats or gray-zone operations

Finally, there is a broader strategic risk of overextension. The current blueprint for Korea–Canada cooperation spans an ambitious array of domains—from cyber and AI to submarine production, space law, maritime patrol, and port diplomacy. Without clear sequencing or prioritization, there is a danger of resource fragmentation and bureaucratic fatigue. In the absence of early, visible deliverables, political support may weaken, and cooperation could devolve into a checklist of loosely connected initiatives rather than a strategic framework grounded in institutional durability

To manage these risks, a phased and deliberate implementation strategy is essential. First, early-stage cooperation should prioritize high-impact but low-friction areas such as cyber dialogues, satellite surveillance, and officer exchange programs. Second, legal and institutional foundations must be solidified through the prompt negotiation of a MDIPA and the establishment of a bilateral security coordination office. Third, Track 1.5 and Track 2 diplomacy—featuring think tanks, retired officials, and academic actors—can help depoliticize regional tensions and expand consensus around cooperation with Japan and ASEAN states. Track 1.5 diplomacy—anchored in academic, industry, and civil society exchanges—could serve as a platform for trust-building and norm diffusion, particularly on sensitive issues like cyber sovereignty, information ethics, and space law. Lastly, joint public diplomacy initiatives such as white papers and press briefings can frame Korea–Canada projects around shared values and non-military benefits, such as environmental sustainability and inclusive development. These measures can safeguard strategic alignment while sustaining momentum across different political cycles and threat landscapes

Conclusion

As global security threats become increasingly multifaceted—spanning traditional and non-traditional domains—there is a growing need for comprehensive, adaptive, and collaborative defense strategies. This report has demonstrated that South Korea and Canada, as middle powers with shared democratic values and global responsibilities, are well-positioned to build a robust, multidimensional security partnership. Since the 2024 Korea–Canada Foreign and Defense Ministers’ (2+2) meeting, their cooperation has expanded beyond conventional military engagement to include cyber defense, emerging technologies, space security, and strategic defense industry collaboration

In the Indo-Pacific, both countries are investing in enhanced maritime domain awareness (MDA) and joint port infrastructure, underscoring their shared interest in preserving freedom of navigation and regional stability. Through bilateral and multilateral military exercises—including integration with U.S. and Japanese defense frameworks—they are also building the operational interoperability needed to deter North Korea and respond to regional contingencies

Beyond traditional security cooperation, the two countries are making significant strides in emerging domains. South Korea’s advances in cyber and space technology, when paired with Canada’s capabilities in AI, cybersecurity infrastructure, and space robotics, create a powerful synergy for addressing the challenges of the digital and extraterrestrial battlefield. Likewise, joint submarine development efforts under Canada’s Patrol Submarine Project offer a model for industrial and strategic defense cooperation that strengthens both national defense and economic resilience

In theoretical terms, this study integrates both realist and constructivist interpretations of international security. From a realist perspective, South Korea and Canada’s alignment can be seen as a rational response to shifting power balances and growing systemic uncertainty in the Indo-Pacific. However, their emphasis on multilateral cooperation, rule-based order, and norm entrepreneurship aligns with constructivist frameworks that prioritize ideational factors, institutional identity, and shared values (Wendt, 1999; Acharya, 2014). By operating in this dual mode, the Korea–Canada partnership embodies the complex agency of middle powers—balancing strategic pragmatism with normative commitment in an era of contested order

These developments reinforce the broader case for institutionalizing Korea–Canada cooperation across five dimensions: strategic integration, technological advancement, operational readiness, information sharing, and defense diplomacy. By implementing structured frameworks—such as joint R&D agreements, coordinated training programs, and secure information-sharing platforms—South Korea and Canada can build a security partnership that is both durable and future-proof

Ultimately, this partnership has implications that extend well beyond bilateral interests. It contributes meaningfully to the maintenance of a rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific, supports NATO’s evolving engagement with the Asia-Pacific region, and provides a template for middle-power cooperation in addressing global threats. Through sustained commitment, strategic alignment, and innovation-driven cooperation, South Korea and Canada can solidify their roles as pivotal contributors to regional and global security. In doing so, Korea–Canada cooperation offers a scalable model of middle-power alignment that complements, rather than duplicates, existing U.S.-led frameworks. It also illustrates how middle powers can coordinate beyond the orbit of great-power rivalry, offering a complementary—but independently grounded—approach to regional order-building

Taken together, the findings of this study support the hypothesis that functionally driven, multidimensional security cooperation between geographically distant middle powers can be institutionalized—even in the absence of formal alliances or geographic proximity—when grounded in shared values, strategic complementarity, and norm entrepreneurship

The Korea–Canada case demonstrates how two middle powers, operating under different regional security pressures, can converge across a wide spectrum of defense domains, from maritime security and interoperability to cyber-space resilience and industrial co-production. Rather than being constrained by geographic separation or divergent alliance structures, both countries have leveraged institutional creativity, normative alignment, and strategic complementarities to forge a robust and scalable framework for cooperation

In theoretical terms, this outcome reinforces constructivist insights on the role of identity and norms in enabling cooperation, while also validating realist concerns about the functional imperatives of power balancing and strategic adaptation. The Korea–Canada partnership thus exemplifies a dual-logic approach to middle-power agency—where interest-driven alignment and ideational commitments are not mutually exclusive but mutually reinforcing

Future studies could assess the generalizability of this model by examining whether similar convergence can occur among other middle-power dyads—such as Japan–Germany, Australia–Norway, or France–South Korea—under comparable structural and normative conditions

Introduction

Protracted armed conflict, persecution of ordinary citizens, large-scale violence, and violation of human rights are the primary drivers of forced migration in any country. In Afghanistan, forced migration has been a persistent issue since the Soviet Union's invasion in 1979 to support the new communist government, which was grappling with anti-communist insurgencies in the country (Britannica, 2024).

Forced migration remains a critical issue in Afghanistan, especially after the Taliban regained power in 2021, leading to mass displacement due to political persecution, economic collapse, and severe restrictions on fundamental rights (Britannica, 2024). After the Soviet Union attacked Afghanistan, significant resistance from Afghan factions ensued, resulting in Moscow responding with bombings and mine attacks in the countryside, forcing hundreds of thousands of Afghans to flee the country. By 1982, nearly 2.8 million Afghans had fled the country to seek asylum in Pakistan and another 1.5 million in Iran (Britannica, 2024). The Soviet intervention in the governance of Afghanistan was opposed by Pakistan, the United States, and Saudi Arabia ( Johnson, 2004). The United States provided support to Afghan rebel groups through financial aid and weapons supply, mainly via Operation Cyclone, one of the longest covert operations conducted by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) of the USA (Coll, 2004).

By the late 1980s, Soviet forces were facing a gorilla war with hit-and-run groups of Afghan rebels who would use their knowledge of local terrain for attacks before escaping for shelter in Pakistan. Due to the internal political and economic conditions in the Soviet Union and the burden of maintaining control in Afghanistan, Soviet forces withdrew in 1989 (Rubinstein, 1988), and the mujahideen captured a large part of the country. However, they could not turn local victories into national ones (Kumar and Pant, 2014). Despite attempts at negotiation with the communist government led by the then President Najibullah to prevent conflict and promote peace, the United Nations' peace processes failed to resolve disputes between Islamic factions and the Najibullah government. Subsequently, the government collapsed due to internal divisions and a lack of support from previous allies, allowing various mujahideen factions to seize control of Afghanistan ( Johnson, 2004 ). Not all mujahideen leaders participated in the new government. Eventually, Burhanuddin Rabbani established an Islamic government and invited other parties to collaborate, but Gulbuddin Hekmatyar declined to join the government and instead fought against Rabbani's administration, exacerbating the power struggle which led to a civil war that displaced many Afghans in search of safety. Nearly one million people were displaced by 1992, seeking shelter in other parts of the country or refuge in Pakistan ( Johnson, 2004). In 1996, the Taliban, a fundamentalist Islamic group, captured Kabul and established the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. “[T]he US supported the Taliban politically through its allies Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, essentially because Washington viewed the Taliban as anti-Iranian, anti-Shia and pro-Western” (Ahmad, 2008 cited in Kumar and Pant, 2014, p. 124).

In 2001, the United States of America experienced the deadliest terror attack masterminded by Osama Bin Laden. The country initiated an operation to capture or kill Bin Laden, the leader of the al-Qaeda network who was sheltered by Taliban in Afghanistan (Malkasian, 2023). The al-Qaeda network was based in Afghanistan and supported by the Taliban at the ideological and organizational levels (Hassan, 2022). With the aim of removing the Taliban from power and establishing a pro-US government, the US invaded Afghanistan in 2001 and killed nearly 5000 Afghan civilians in a joint attack by the US and NATO forces (Khan, 2012). With the US military intervention, Afghanistan once again faced numerous challenges, notably the conflict between NATO troops and Taliban groups (Council on Foreign Affairs, 2025, 2025), resulting in the loss of lives and homes and the displacement of millions (Khan, 2012). Despite efforts to address the conflict, the humanitarian crisis persisted (Kumar and Pant, 2014) and was compounded by the Taliban's return to power on August 15, 2021 (Abbas, 2023).

Consistent power struggles have led to the displacement of over 8 million Afghans due to conflict, violence, and poverty, with at least 3.2 million internally displaced within Afghanistan (UNHCR, 2023a). Notably, Afghan refugees rank as the third-largest displaced population globally, with the majority seeking refuge and support in Pakistan and Iran. Women and children make up over 70 per cent of those in need of support (UNHCR, 2023a). The root causes of forced migration from Afghanistan are diverse, notably war and conflict, human rights abuses, and individual and generalized persecution (Khan, 2012).

The present study endeavours to analyse conflict in Afghanistan and forced emigration, exploring potential resolution strategies, including dispute resolution between hostile groups and enhanced peacebuilding. This research paper aims to answer the following questions:

1. How Soviet and U.S. invasions of Afghanistan contributed to patterns of forced migration in the region?
2. What was the role of Canada in war in Afghanistan?
3. What are the challenges and implications of forced migration in Afghanistan since the Taliban takeover?
4. What are the potential solutions, including international mediation efforts and peace-building initiatives, that could promote stability and mitigate forced migration?

This study seeks to contribute to a greater understanding of the impact of four decades of conflict in Afghanistan on forced migration, focusing on identifying durable solutions.

Causes and Consequences of Prevailing Conflict in Afghanistan

Afghanistan has experienced a protracted conflict, including external invasion and civil war, over the last four decades. This prolonged conflict has had stern negative impacts on many different dimensions of the social and economic fabric. Consequently, these largely internal conflicts heightened ethnic differences, reinforced traditional tribalism at the expense of national unity, and led to forced migration of millions of Afghans.

Before the beginning of the Taliban invasion of Afghanistan the country suffered several political upheavals, coups, and invasions, which led to the gradual disorganization and weakening of the central government and its security forces. A coup led by Mohamed Daoud Khan in 1973 ended the 30-year stable reign of King Mohamed Zahir, consequently establishing the Republic of Afghanistan (Kakar, 1978). This coup shortly fell to another coup led by the communist party backed by Soviet leaders (Britannica, 2024). The Soviets invaded Afghanistan in 1979 in an attempt to not only re-stabilize the weak communist government but also to prevent other foreign actors like Pakistan and Iran from taking advantage of Afghanistan's weakened and disorganized situation (Rubin, 1995). However, the Soviets severely underestimated the will of the Islamic groups, which rose and rejected any uninvited foreign invaders. Shortly after the Soviet invasion, isolated mujahideen guerrilla groups began to attack elements of the Soviet forces successfully and, after each battle, faded back into the mountains (Jalali & Grau, 1998). The Soviets countered by ruthlessly attacking civilians and bombing whole towns and villages (Grau,1998). This naturally led to millions of people fleeing to Pakistan and Iran (Rashid, 2000).

With the aid of more sophisticated weapons, military intelligence, and financing from the US, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia, the mujahideen were winning more and more battles (Grau, 1998). “Finally, in 1989, the Soviets, with 15,000 killed and 35,000 wounded, decided to withdraw their army back to Russia” (Bezhan, 2019: 3). With the Soviets gone, the mujahideen leaders with their respective military became the de facto leaders of Afghanistan (Rubin, 1995). It was a positive and hopeful time for peace and prosperity for the Afghan people. But although the mujahideen were individually great guerrilla leaders, they were inexperienced and too fragmented to lead a national government successfully. As a result, all the pre-war internal conflicts rose again, engulfing the country once more in a state of continuous civil war. It was this weakened and disorganized political situation that allowed the Taliban to take over the country in 1996 (Magnus, 1997).

The United States launched its military intervention in Afghanistan on October 7, 2001, in response to the September 11 terrorist attacks. The primary objectives were to dismantle the al-Qaeda network, which orchestrated the attacks, and to remove the Taliban regime, which provided al-Qaeda with sanctuary and operational support (CFR, 2025). While the intervention initially aimed to enhance security, it also contributed to prolonged instability, widespread human suffering, and large-scale displacement (Vine et al., 2020). In just five months "some 3,200 Afghans lost their life due to starvation, exposure, illness, and injury as a result of war and strikes between 7 October 2001 and January 2002" (Khan, 2012: 215).

Role of Canada in Afghan War

In 2001, Canada joined the United States in its fight against al-Qaeda and the Taliban regime, deploying forces to Afghanistan, where they remained until 2014. Initially, Canadian troops focused on patrolling and supporting the newly established interim government. Over time, however, they became integral to counterinsurgency operations, particularly in Kandahar, where they fought against Taliban insurgents (Azzi & Foot, 2021). While Canadian forces successfully prevented Taliban advances in key areas, insurgents repeatedly regrouped with external support. Azzi and Foot (2021) argue that Pakistan’s military and intelligence services provided training, funding, and safe havens for Taliban fighters, allowing them to sustain their insurgency.

Throughout its 13-year military mission, Canada was not only engaged in combat operations, particularly in Kandahar but also played a key role in Afghanistan’s reconstruction and governance. Even as its forces actively fought insurgents, Canada provided economic assistance, development aid, and advisory support to the new Afghan administration led by President Hamid Karzai. Canadian officials collaborated with international partners to strengthen government institutions, improve security forces, and promote economic stability.

By 2011, Canada transitioned from combat operations to a training-focused mission, assisting the Afghan army and police forces before fully withdrawing in 2014 (Veterans Affairs Canada, n.d.). Despite its military departure, Canada remained committed to Afghanistan’s reconstruction, contributing approximately $2.2 billion between 2001 and 2014 to social and economic development, including healthcare and education programs (Azzi & Foot, 2021).

The prolonged conflict in Afghanistan severely impacted various aspects of society. Psychologically, many young and educated Afghans lost hope for a stable future, struggling to envision progress or positive change. “The war had harmed more than 50% of the population through death, injury, and displacement” (Khan, 2012, p. 217). The conflict also devastated the social environment and agricultural sector, hindering Afghanistan’s path to sustainable economic development. Researchers note that traditional economic growth was further disrupted by landmines and unexploded ordnance left behind by the Soviets. These hazards not only posed a threat to Afghan civilians but also led to the deaths of several Canadian soldiers (Veterans Affairs Canada, n.d.). “Although mine-clearing has been underway for over a decade, there are still an estimated 10 million mines scattered throughout the country, a deterrent to traditional economic growth and repatriation of thousands of refugees” (Khan, 2012, p. 219).

Over the past two decades, conflicts in Afghanistan have not only resulted in direct violence, such as civilian casualties caused by both Taliban and U.S. forces but have also intensified systemic harm and social inequalities (UN, 2020). This has led to unequal access to economic, social, cultural, and political opportunities, forcing many to leave the country. As a result of structural violence and restrictive social laws imposed by the Taliban, many women and young girls are deprived of basic human rights. Due to lack of access to shelter, food, education, and employment, many Afghans are often driven into forced migration.

The Impact of Armed Conflicts on Forced Migration

The protracted conflict in Afghanistan has been a matter of concern for several decades, leading to human rights abuses, poor economic conditions, weak states, and forced migration. The persistent conflict has roots in the history of political instability, ethnic divisions, religious violence, and a weak governance structure. The causes of conflict are complex and multifaceted, aligning with different elements such as political, economic, social, and cultural factors, as well as external influences, including military intervention by major international powers and their geopolitical interests. Consequently, the conflict has negatively impacted many social aspects, such as a significant increase in human sufferings and loss of lives and property across the country. It has also affected the region, regional relations and the international community

Despite Afghanistan's geopolitical location and strategic position between South and Central Asia, it has become a battleground for regional and global powers competing for influence over resources. Since the emergence of the Taliban in the 1990s, the political situation has become more complicated as they imposed radical ideology and provided a haven for terrorist groups such as Al-Qaeda. This has resulted in Afghanistan becoming a battlefield between terrorist networks and international powers such as the U.S. and its allies. Due to persistent wars, human rights abuses, and persecution in conflict areas, people have lost hope of staying safe in their cities and villages. The continued state of uncertainty, protracted war, poverty, and a fragile state have led to large-scale forced migration. Furthermore, the resulting conflict-induced humanitarian crisis is another reason for millions of Afghans being displaced within their own country and to the neighbouring countries.

Historically, forced migration and displacement have been associated with the Soviet Union's occupation of Afghanistan, civil war, and political instability after the collapse of the last communist government in 1992. The Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan and the subsequent war with resistance groups resulted in massive forced migration. For example, during the 1980s, the mujahideen opposition forces grew rapidly; this increased the intensity of the conflict and forced millions to flee the country. “By 1986, the number of Afghan refugees had reached nearly five million, mostly in Pakistan and Iran” (World Refugee Survey 1986, cited in Ruiz, 2002: 8). Additionally, forced migration in the aftermath of Soviet invasion of Afghanistan resulted in an estimated 1.5 million Afghan deaths (Ruiz, 2002).

According to some estimates, by the end of 2021, 4.3 million people had been internally displaced within Afghanistan (IOM, 2024). After the Taliban's takeover of Afghanistan on August 15, 2021, forced migration and displacements were widely reported across different parts of the country. Research shows that forced migration after the Taliban's return to power has involved different ethnicities in Afghanistan. For example, “in central Afghanistan, Taliban authorities forced Hazara residents to leave 15 villages in September 2021” (Atal, 2021:2). At least 2,800 Hazara residents were forced to move to other districts, leaving behind their belongings and crops (Human Rights Watch, 2021). Similarly, Badakhshani Tajiks were compelled to leave the Bagh-e Shirkat area allocated for internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Kunduz province (Atal, 2021). According to Afghan researchers and experts, since the Taliban took power, they also forced Pashtun people in some areas to leave their homes and villages because they cooperated with the previous government. "Reports have emerged from Kandahar, a province with a majority of Pashtun inhabitants and the Taliban’s first leader Mullah Omar’s stronghold, where 3,000 families, mostly public servants affiliated to the previous government, were asked to leave the area" (Atal, 2021: 4).

Apart from internal displacement, pathetic human rights conditions, ethnic violence, loss of livelihood, and persistent conflict forced millions of Afghans to move to other countries. According to the International Organization for Migration (IOM), by mid-2020, nearly 5.9 million Afghans lived in different countries; including 74% in Asia and 11 percent in Europe. New conflicts after the Taliban takeover forced more Afghans to seek refuge in other countries. Since 2021, 1.6 million Afghans fled to the neighbouring countries (UNHCR, 2024). By 2023, 3.4 million refugees from Afghanistan were living in Iran and another 2.1 million in Pakistan (UNHCR, 2023b).

A small proportion of refugees moved to Western countries. In 2021, 125,600 Afghans applied for asylum in other countries (UNHCR, 2022), including a large number in Canada. Consequently, the number of Afghan refugees in Canada who were granted permanent resident status increased from 2,060 in 2015 to 8,570 in 2021 (Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada, 2022). Between August 2021 and October 2023, Canada welcomed at least 40,000 vulnerable Afghans (Immigration, Refugee and Citizenship Canada, 2023). However, asylum seekers are not always welcome in the western countries; sometimes, they are deported to a third country. A recent report criticized the new policy of the British government, where Afghan asylum seekers were deported to Rwanda (Blackwell, 2024).

Overall, forced migration significantly impacts both the people who have left their homes and the countries that host them. Those forced to migrate often face challenges such as limited access to essential services, inadequate housing, and increased vulnerability to exploitation and abuse. On the other hand, host countries may experience social, economic, and political strains as they struggle to provide for the needs of the displaced population. The impact of conflict, particularly on the increasing death and displacement of civilians, emphasizes that there is a need to stop the war in Afghanistan and work toward peace talks with the Taliban and opposition parties.

International Mediation and Prospect for Conflict Resolution in Afghanistan

Upon examining the history of displacement and refugees in Afghanistan, it becomes clear that forced migration is a pervasive problem in the country, mainly stemming from prolonged conflict and political instability. Displacement of individuals and groups from their homes and subsequent migration is a complex issue with significant socioeconomic and political implications. Political instability and conflict in the country have resulted in widespread violence, human rights violations, and displacement of people from their homes. This displacement has increased poverty, social dislocation, and reduced access to crucial services. The issue of forced migration is a matter of concern not only for Afghanistan but also for the international community, and addressing it will require a coordinated and sustained approach.

To tackle the issue of forced migration and devise long-lasting solutions, it is imperative to implement peace efforts facilitated by the United Nations to settle the conflict between the Taliban and the opposition parties who governed the country from 2001 to August 15, 2021. Over the past three years since the Taliban regained power, they have not engaged in direct communication with other parties to discuss and resolve their differences. As a result, achieving a political settlement that could establish an inclusive government without the collaboration of the international community is quite challenging. The possibility of peace negotiations between the two sides seems bleak, and finding a political solution in Afghanistan without intervention from international powers appears improbable. Therefore, it is imperative for these powers, particularly the United Nations, to play a vital role in resolving conflicts and achieving peace in Afghanistan. To address the root causes of forced migration, it is essential to provide focused, sustained, and often long-term assistance to promote stability, development, and better governance (CSIS, 2018). To achieve this objective, the involvement of the international community is crucial.

Evidences show that armed conflict in various countries is one of the primary reasons for forced migration. The ongoing conflicts in countries such as Syria, Afghanistan, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Central African Republic, Myanmar, Eritrea, Venezuela, and Colombia, have displaced approximately 20 million people from their homes (CSIS, 2018). The economic instability arising from conflict and politically fragile states are other reasons for forced migration in these countries. Therefore, resolving disputes and providing financial support for faster development to prevent forced migration is crucial. In the Afghan context, third-party intermediaries, such as the UN, can play a pivotal role in conflict resolution by using a novel approach that addresses differences between rival groups. This approach involves the third-party helping disputants to find a mutually agreeable solution without possessing authoritative decision-making power (Bercovitch, 2011). Mediation is an effective conflict management tool for complicated, intense, and prolonged disputes. The conflict in Afghanistan necessitates third-party mediation to achieve a political solution among rival groups. Stable security and accountable governance are prerequisites for reducing forced migration. Therefore, it is crucial to resolve conflicts and strengthen peace-building efforts. Good governance and security cannot be established without resolving differences between rival parties. Achieving peace in Afghanistan is essential for stable security, durable economic development, and a favourable political environment.

Peacebuilding as a Durable Solution for Mitigation of Forced Migration

A careful analysis of the four-decade-long conflict in Afghanistan reveals that the primary causes of forced migration include war, conflict, persecution, violence, and human rights abuses. Since the Soviet war, a significant number of people have been forced to leave Afghanistan and seek refuge in other countries. Additionally, the civil war, the US intervention, and Taliban rule have all contributed to internal displacement and forced emigration. Conflict in Afghanistan generates forced migration and forced migration leads to further conflict. Unfortunately, throughout history, we have witnessed numerous instances of war, conflict, human rights abuses, persecutions, and environmental disasters. However, “the current scale of forced migration and displacement worldwide is unprecedented” (Zetter, 2018: 34). It is important to note that conflict and war not only directly cause displacement but also lead to economic hardships, mistrust of government, political instability, and weakened states, thereby exacerbating migration. Forced migration and displacement have become pressing issues across the globe, particularly in conflict-affected regions. Afghanistan has been grappling with long-standing instability, oppression, and large-scale forced displacement resulting from internal power struggles. To address these issues and promote human rights without discrimination, it is necessary to implement durable solutions that ensure stability and peace. The United Nations can play a vital role in peace-building efforts to resolve conflicts between hostile groups and establish political stability.

In the aftermath of the Taliban's recent takeover of Afghanistan, the lack of recognition of political rivals and the absence of dialogue towards establishing an inclusive government have raised concerns within the international community. The Taliban's failure to resolve power struggles with opposition groups has led to uncertainty surrounding the future of Afghanistan. The Taliban must address these issues and establish an inclusive government that accommodates all ethnicities. While the international community has called for such action, the Taliban has yet to comply. Furthermore, the Afghan people have expressed their support for democracy, understanding the significance of political stability and peaceful living. They believe that power conflicts can only be resolved through free elections, an updated constitution emphasizing the division of presidential and parliamentary powers, and the rule of law. Ultimately, achieving a peaceful resolution would create a positive environment for the future of Afghanistan, reduce violence, and prevent forced migration. All parties must work together to ensure a prosperous future for Afghanistan.

Conclusion

Afghanistan has endured four decades of prolonged conflict, political instability, and religious extremism, leading to persistent and widespread forced migration. From the Soviet Union's invasion in 1979 to the recent return of the Taliban to power, violence, persecution, and human rights abuses have driven forced migration from Afghanistan to various countries worldwide. Historical analysis reveals that conflict and political instability have become significant drivers of forced migration, exacerbating ethnic tensions and weakening central government functions. Following the Soviet Union's withdrawal in 1988, the Islamic parties that had fought against the Soviet occupation for nine years had an opportunity to resolve their disputes with the last communist government and reach a political settlement. However, despite the United Nations peace efforts, rival groups could not compromise to achieve peace and improve stability. Furthermore, after the fall of the communist government and the victory of the mujahideen factions, Afghanistan briefly experienced both peace and stability, prompting many migrants who fled during the Soviet occupation to return. However, due to power struggles between Islamic parties and intervention from neighbouring countries, particularly Pakistan's involvement in Afghanistan's internal affairs and support for some mujahideen groups against the government led by Rabbani, the second President of Afghanistan during the post-communist regime period, internal war and forced migration persisted.

Examining four decades of history reveals that forced migration in Afghanistan is the result of prolonged conflict, violence, persecution, and poor economic conditions. Therefore, preventing forced migration depends on specific factors such as a stable government, socio-economic development, respect for human rights, gender equality, and the empowerment of civil society. For positive social and economic changes, the country must reduce violence and prioritize education and work, thus bringing a transition from negative experiences to constructive ones for the sustainable achievement of peace. Achieving these objectives requires resolving conflicts between the Taliban de facto government and opposition parties. Otherwise, without attaining peace and stability, it can be challenging to reduce internal displacement and forced migration from Afghanistan to other countries. Addressing the issues in Afghanistan and finding solutions to improve peace-building and stability necessitates intervention from the UN and other international organizations.

Resilience, subjectivity and mental health in a Canadian indigenous reserve is the result of research, published in 2015, carried out by Alfonso Marquina Márquez and Jorge Virchez. It is a work presented in six interesting chapters that are easy to read given the intellectual clarity of the theoretical position they propose: to see human experiences as the result of a social construction of identity using cultural systems created from agency.

It is based on the analysis of narratives and spaces and ritual actions of healing that individuals carry out with the intention of recovering from addictions and, at the same time, (re)constructing the lost culture, snatched away by Western Canadian society, according to the Anishinaabe/Cree narratives themselves. Thus, although narratives are written as therapeutic resources for individual salvation, they also represent concrete modes of creativity aimed at the reconstruction of identity and the cultural system from the dominated. It is necessary to mention that in order to protect the inhabitants of the indigenous communities, the names of the individuals as well as the places in the book were changed. The perspective comes from the Algonquian residents of an First Nation reserve in northern Ontario who are mostly descended from Cree- and Ojibwe-speaking peoples who inhabited the lowlands of the Kenogami, Kabinakagami, Nagagami, Pagwachuan and Shekak rivers in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

The story told in the narratives is articulated with memory, essential components for the construction of healing spaces to return to being anishinaabe/cree. Returning to being is constituted as a matter of individual decision to build tradition and strive to maintain the symbolic and cognitive characteristics of this being in reconstruction. Hence, it is a reflexive and modern phenomenon that is understood as part of secondary socialization, the authors say.

The analysis of the narratives is exposed in a drama composed of three stages: captivity (characterized by colonization in which culture was taken away to such a degree that parental skills were lost, forgetting who they were, highlighting this act of separation that caused them to be interned in the Residential School); that of alienation (characterized by individual decadence, addictions, violence and the loss of one's roots with the people of origin, a kind of being loose or living in moral marginality); that of redemption (whose qualities project responsibility, but above all the recovery of spirituality, the reconstruction of belonging and the use of ritual practices and objects for therapeutic recovery, identity reconstruction and the salvation of the Anishinaabe/Cree cultural system).

It is of great theoretical interest to think about the identity reconstruction of the Anishinaabe/Cree, if we consider that these are actions carried out from secondary socialization, that is, by individuals who have already internalized cultural forms (deteriorated by colonial relations in this case). Thus, constructing a coherent narrative and recovering ritual spaces and times of an imagined way of being, forces us to ask about the uses of time and space in situations of cultural reconstruction. That is, is it a matter of combining the time of the individual biography with a series of healing rituals that incorporate ceremonial spaces in accordance with the time of the life trajectory? Would we be in the presence of reconstructive actions that slow down the accelerated time of modernity as a resource for mental health and the recovery of the sense of community? These are some of the questions that emerge from the reading of this book when the explanation of decadence is assigned to the disruption with the environment, the family and the spiritual world that colonization engendered, translatable as an experience of disarticulation of individual life with collective life. This readjustment between cultural space and time suggests that individuals who have entered into therapeutics achieve a certain congruence insofar as the word (the narrative) and the practice (the ritual action) contribute to the (re)construction of tradition.

The contextual framework in which these case studies occur is the strong presence of the Healing Movement that has called for the recovery of the Red Road, that is, the spiritual path; underlining the disruption that emerged with European colonization as the cause from which reconstructive reflexivity must begin. The importance of this movement is that it explains mental illness as a consequence of the dissociation of the individual from his cultural system that includes the spiritual, the natural and the human.

A theoretical question highlighted by the book is to observe whether it is possible to (re)construct identity without the existence of a cultural system. If narratives, practices and ritual objects are considered as mediating components of mentalities as ordering discourses of reality from agency, it is possible to do so as a bricoleur with creative capacity for the reconstruction and cultural reinvention of identity. If culture and identity are constructed from agency, as the theoretical hypothesis of this book suggests, individuals are not immersed in cultural codes that order their behavior, but rather codes are a permanent construction of creative individuals who act in a situation in which their cultural system has almost disappeared. Starting from this theoretical position gives power to individual agency to the extent that it shows the possibility of collective emancipation through the creation of culture as a human force to build identity. In this sense, I think that the authors describe the emergence of "a militant imaginary" that directs efforts for the collective (re)construction of identity and individual salvation from addiction, through the assembly, in the form of a bricoleur, of its cultural system.

One more element that is suggested from this reading refers to healing from the built culture. That is, it leads us to think that the (re)construction of (collective) tradition heals individuals. The maxim found in this creative action is its "configuring quality" that is based precisely on the idea that culture heals. This idea brings out a fear of the spiritual guides (the Elders), because they are reflective beings about the power links between their culture and modern Canada, they know that traditional medical knowledge can be appropriated by modernity and thus turned into a commodity. Undoubtedly, this zeal for its own is the result of experience with modern society which, for its development, requires borrowings from other cultures.

In this sense, a question that recurrently haunts the authors refers to the type of culture that the subjects of their research are constructing both individually and collectively, that is, whether it is something authentically indigenous or is the result of creative borrowings as a result of dialogue between cultures. They affirm that it is not exactly an indigenous culture but modern subjects trying to reconstruct both the individual and the collective self. The question leads to the consideration that it is a universe of social construction of subjectivities through the appropriation and construction of cultural resources, which leads to controlling the relations of confrontation with modern Canadian society, as an input of its history and memory. Without this oppressive relationship (expressed in the narratives of captivity and alienation) the narrative of redemption and, with it, the cultural (re)construction, could not be carried out. Here the following reflection is appropriate: infants who are already socialized in the new Anishinaabe/Cree culture (however minority it may be today), as a result of this reconstructive salvation or "imaginative militancy", will internalize their new circumstance that will define their life trajectories not in a soteriological sense but more explicable by the cognitive and symbolic internalization of cultural identity (this is its "configuring genesis"). which makes it imperative to continue the research, but now in a universe of cultural transmission (symbols and cognitions) to the new generations socialized primarily in this new cultural environment.

Undoubtedly, many of the therapeutic actions described by the authors are borrowed from Western culture (such as circle talks, for example), but there are several components that distinguish it: open ritualized spaces (forest, trees, rivers, lakes, day and night stays in the tundra) and the narrative awareness that addictions are not the result of an internal cause attributable to the individual (mechanism on which circle talks rest). but rather they are the product of the dissociation that the West caused, that is, something external: dissociation between time and space, one reads between the lines. Hence, the case study suggests that the social production of culture has a configuring effect on social relations that generate new individual selves and new cultures that, although today they are an expression of the effort of agency, can become, if they manage to crystallize as collective cognitive frameworks or structures of meaning, will delineate the new generations. In this sense, the work raises new questions: is the liberation from addiction that therapy makes in individuals proportional to the emancipation from oppression that modern Canadian society exerts on these peoples? Although the authors do not delve into it, the text provides clues to support this hypothesis.

The reading of this text continuously peppers relevant questions to understand the social production of identity in a context of devastation of the cultural system. The questions asked by the authors "unleash" new ideas, but above all one is left with curiosity about the culture of the new generations that will already be socialized in this new cultural framework. The book suggests the mental, political, and cultural processes for social (re)construction. Hence, it seems to me that it is an important contribution to the studies of cognitive anthropology and the development of constructivism.

1. INTRODUCTION

This case commentary will set out a summary of the Alberta Court of Appeal (ABCA) decision regarding the Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act (GGPPA; Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act, 2018). I will argue that the ABCA came to the incorrect decision because the Court ignored the input of First Nation governments. On appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC), the GGPPA reference represents an opportunity for the Court to incorporate elements of s.35, as entrenched in the Constitution Act, 1982 (Constitution Act, 1982) into the national concern branch of the Peace Order and Good Government (POGG) power.

After careful analysis of the provincial powers enumerated in , s. 91, 92, and 92A, the Pith and Substance or “Matter” of the GGPPA, and the federal government’s ability to use the national concern branch of POGG, the ABCA decided that the Act was a “trojan horse” and should be struck down and found unconstitutional (Marion & Carlson, 2020). I will make my argument that in order for the SCC to make a proper decision regarding the reference of the GGPPA, the SCC should not “narrowly” define what heads of power this Act will fall under. The Court should take this opportunity to address Reconciliation and honour First Nations treaty rights. I will also argue that SCC should consider and incorporate s. 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982 (Constitution Act, 1982) either by reframing or amending the national concern branch of POGG by adding First Nations Laws under s. 35; and by doing so, the Act can be found to be “intra vires”. If the GGPPA would be found to be intra vires, “constitutional” parliament would be able to protect the nation as a whole, including First Nations Peoples against the National and International Crisis we face today and in the future of the greenhouse gas emissions (GHG).

This paper investigates the Alberta Court of Appeal's ruling on the GGPPA concerning First Nations' rights and constitutional law. It highlights the significance of the case in exploring the division of powers between federal and provincial governments in Canada, emphasizing the importance of federalism and the interpretation of the POGG clause for legal studies. The paper also addresses the gap in considering Indigenous rights in national legislation and constitutional discussions, especially with the constitutional recognition of s. 35 rights and Indigenous sovereignty.

The urgency of addressing climate change, with the GGPPA at the forefront of Canada's environmental policies and the global commitment reflected in the Paris Agreement, underscores the vital role of Indigenous peoples as environmental stewards. This necessitates integrating their rights and knowledge into environmental legislation, advocating for an interdisciplinary approach that combines legal studies, environmental science, Indigenous studies, and public policy. This research aims to provide actionable insights for lawmakers, policymakers, and legal professionals, potentially influencing future legislation and court decisions.

The development of this topic followed thorough research on the GGPPA, its legal challenges, and Indigenous rights in environmental governance, enriched by consultations with First Nations, legal experts, and scholars. The focus on this subject aims to promote inclusive dialogue on aligning environmental goals with Indigenous rights within Canada's constitutional framework.

2. METHODOLOGY

The methodology employed in this case commentary on the Alberta Court of Appeal's decision regarding the GGPPA and its subsequent appeal to the SCC is comprehensive and multi-faceted, incorporating legal analysis, comparative review, and Indigenous perspectives integration. This section outlines the steps and approaches taken to construct the argument and analysis presented in the paper.

The author begins by establishing the legal framework governing the issue, focusing on the GGPPA's legislative background, its constitutional challenge in the Alberta Court of Appeal, and the implications for appeal to the SCC. This involves a detailed examination of relevant sections of the Constitution Act, 1982, particularly s. 35, and their interaction with the national concern branch of the POGG power. The analysis is grounded in statutory interpretation and judicial precedents to delineate the boundaries of federal and provincial powers concerning environmental regulation and First Nations' rights.

A comprehensive review of case law, including previous decisions by the Alberta Court of Appeal and relevant SCC rulings, provides a historical and jurisprudential context for the commentary. This involves a critical examination of how courts have interpreted and applied the principles of federalism, the national concern doctrine, and the recognition of First Nations' rights in the context of environmental legislation and governance.

Central to the methodology is the integration of Indigenous perspectives and legal rights, particularly as they relate to environmental protection and governance. The author analyzes submissions and arguments made by First Nations groups as interveners in the case, focusing on how their rights and interests could be affected by the GGPPA and its constitutional evaluation. This part of the methodology emphasizes the need for reconciling Indigenous sovereignty with national environmental objectives, drawing on principles of the honour of the Crown and treaty rights.

The paper employs a comparative legal analysis to assess the Alberta Court of Appeal's decision against international norms and treaties, such as the Paris Agreement, and the legal frameworks of other jurisdictions facing similar constitutional challenges regarding environmental regulation. This approach highlights the global context of climate change legislation and the role of national legal systems in addressing international commitments.

Lastly, the methodology includes a persuasive element, advocating for a specific interpretation of the law that aligns with environmental sustainability, respect for Indigenous rights, and constitutional coherence. The author argues for an innovative approach to the application of the POGG power that includes First Nations' laws and treaty rights as integral to addressing national concerns, particularly in the context of climate change. By combining these methodological approaches, the paper aims to offer a well-rounded analysis of the GGPPA's constitutional challenge, emphasizing the importance of First Nations' perspectives in the interpretation of national powers and the pursuit of environmental justice.

3. RESULTS: CASE SUMMARY

The long-awaited decision was handed down by Alberta’s highest Court on February 24, 2020, in regard to the controversial GGPPA that was passed by parliament in June of 2018 (Marion & Carlson, 2020). A 4:1 majority decision delivered by the Honourable Chief Justice Fraser found that parts one and two of the GGPPA are unconstitutional (Reference re Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act, 2020, para. 342). Part one of the Act provides for a fuel charge that applies to 22 listed fuels and part two imposes a standard for the provinces to pay a federal carbon tax if GHG emissions minimum exceed the annual limit set by the regulations. The federal government refers to this as a “backstop” approach to ensure the provinces comply with working towards reducing GHG (Reference re Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act, 2020, para. 35). The GGPPA also ensures Canada can meet international GHG obligations as per the Paris Agreement (Tansowny, 2020).

4. CONCLUSION

I propose that the ABCA erred in their decision regarding the GGPPA, being that the Act is ultra-vires the federal government’s power. Although the court correctly assessed, ss. 91 and 92A and also s. 109, they were incorrect on other parts of their analysis, specifically the pith and substance of the Act and more importantly not feeling the need to address the importance of s. 35 of the Constitution of 1982. Alberta submits that the GGPPA is unconstitutional in its entirety and has taken the position that the federal government is intruding and imposing the GGPPA onto provinces by the way of POGG. Alberta suggests that the intrusion on provinces undermines the basic structure of the Canadian constitutional system (Constitution Act, 1982).The ABCA concludes that although there are several linked issues, such as how to ensure provinces are able to develop their own resources and how to mitigate GHG emissions in the end they say that, “All of this raises an overarching issue – how to resolve social, economic and environmental issues in this country in a way that maintains public trust and confidence in our democratic federal state and the Rule of Law” (Reference re Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act, 2020, para. 345). In my view, this was a clear power struggle. The ABCA clearly stated that in their conclusion, “We would add this. While we have given our opinion on the validity of this Act, we cannot participate in the frank conversation across differences that is clearly called for in this country. It is apparent from the way in which this Reference unfolded and the submissions and evidence presented that a substantial disconnect exists between meeting environmental objectives by reducing GHG emissions, on the one hand, and preserving provincial economies and the ability to fund new technologies and clean energy, on the other” (Reference re Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act, 2020, para. 344). The ABCA neglecting to even make one mention of the Indigenous interveners when Alberta’ arguments were about the division of powers and the right to protect their economic interests in the land and its resources was an error of law.Canada and the provinces have established robust economics from centuries of pollution and the emissions of GHG. These economies have largely excluded First Nations. In essence, Canada and the provinces have effectively used up all the carbon space in the atmosphere. First Nations are just the beginning to develop their economics and industries, but there is no more room for any further carbon releases” (Assembly of First Nations, 2020, para. 53). I agree with AFN when they say that through cooperative federalism, Canada, the provinces and First Nations can each address climate change. This would be consistent with the special relationship between First Nations and both levels of government and certainly can be done, but I feel that first the governments have to stop overlooking First Nations, and consult them. Additionally, “[t]here are constitutional tools as interjurisdictional immunity, paramountcy, conflict of laws, double aspect, ancillary power and incidental effects rules that are available to address any conflicts in jurisdiction” (Assembly of First Nations, 2020, para. 55).Just like the ABCA quoted “[…] No one government is better or has more power than the other. The federal and provincial governments are co-equals, each level of government being supreme within its sphere.” The federal government is not the parent; and the provincial governments are not its children, if they were to take it one step further and incorporate s. 35 into this analysis, we would see that the courts have a unique opportunity to make meaningful reconciliation with First Nations Peoples of Canada, honour Treaty obligations, and use s. 35 to add to the national concern branch of POGG.Lastly, although the ABCA doesn’t recognize First Nations people in their conclusion, Alberta did by using the argument that the GGPPA be found ultra-vires due to the division of powers and clearly SCC has said multiple times in multiple cases and jurisprudence that Aboriginal Peoples are by law relevant to the conversation of the division of powers because both provincial and federal governments have a duty to honour the Crown.

1. INTRODUCTION

The Sudbury region is renowned for its vast nickel reserves (50 million tonnes), which are among the most significant mineral deposits in the world. In addition to nickel, the region boasts several deposits with high concentrations of copper. Discovered in 1880, these ore deposits are distributed within a 150 km radius of the elliptical Sudbury Basin (Winterhalder, 1996). Beginning in 1886, mining operations gradually established themselves as the region's principal industry, overtaking logging. A first open-cast smelter was founded in 1888, soon followed by many others. Their environmental impact was catastrophic, creating 10,000 hectares of barren land.

Until the 1950s, Sudbury was recognized as the world capital of nickel. However, environmental concerns were largely ignored during this period (Boerchers et al., 2016). Awareness of environmental problems emerged only in the 1970s, leading to the enactment of stricter environmental standards (Lauterbach et al., 1995). More recently, the adoption of sustainable development principles has driven the creation of major intervention programs and management strategies, making it imperative to address environmental degradation (Peters, 1995).

The region embarked on a large-scale environmental requalification project, seeking to balance economic development with higher environmental standards. For example, the City Council’s Advisory Panel on Regreening (VETAC) was established in 1973. Its mandate is to work towards the recovery of self-sustaining, indigenous terrestrial and aquatic ecosystems in Greater Sudbury through the City’s Regreening Program. VETAC also provides opportunities for community participation, encouraging environmental improvement efforts at home, in neighborhoods, and on public lands (VETAC, 2024).

Primarily, efforts were focused on mitigating sulfur dioxide emissions and industrial pollution. To reduce sulfur emissions, the construction of the Superstack was undertaken. Built by Inco Limited (later acquired by Vale) at an estimated cost of $25 million, the Superstack stands at a height of 381 meters, making it the second-tallest freestanding chimney in the world (Ogilvie, 2003). In addition, reforestation and regeneration efforts were launched, significantly contributing to the requalification of the landscape (Lautenbach, 1995).

2. ECONOMIC INTERESTSVERSUS ENVIRONMENTALPROTECTION

The relationship between economic growth and environmental protection is one of the most pressing issues in modern economics. Currently, economic growth often occurs under conditions of significant environmental stress (Figueroa, 2013). Energy consumption can drive economic growth by enhancing productivity but simultaneously exacerbate environmental damage through increased pollutant emissions (Tiba & Omri, 2017). On one hand, countries strive to boost economic growth to improve the living standards of their populations, while on the other hand, environmental challenges become more complex due to the excessive use of natural resources (Ghafoor-Awan, 2013).

Fortunately, over the past few decades, advancements in technology driven by research and development (R&D) have facilitated reductions in environmental pollution (Groth & Ricci, 2011). The 1992 Rio de Janeiro Summit brought new ideas and optimism, reinforcing and reaffirming the principles outlined in the Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, adopted in Stockholm on June 16, 1972. The Rio Summit resulted in the adoption of several significant environmental treaties, which encouraged industries to innovate and invest in R&D to address environmental concerns. These efforts led to substantial improvements in technology management and a consequent reduction in pollution(United Nations, 1993).

The Kyoto Protocol of 1997 marked another pivotal step, aiming to reduce the emission of greenhouse gases contributing to global warming (Basseti, 2022). Another key agreement, the Paris Agreement of 2016, focuses on helping countries adapt to the effects of climate change and mobilizing adequate financial resources for mitigation and adaptation efforts (Falkner, 2016).

2.3. Sudbury Basin

The Sudbury Basin is a significant geological structure located in Northern Canada (Waldon et al., 2020). According to Davis (2008), this basin was formed by the impact of an asteroid approximately 1.8 billion years ago during the Paleoproterozoic era (Fig. 1).

Figure 1. Sudbury basin

Download Original Figure

Source: Drafted by Leo Larivière, Department of Geography, 2017

The Sudbury Basin is economically significant because it contains magma filled with minerals essential to industry, such as nickel, copper, gold, and platinum group metals. This magma was produced during the meteorite impact that occurred 1.8 billion years ago. These magmatic deposits formed as metals combined with sulfur in molten rock. As Ian Burron states, this "trillion-dollar mining district was forged in the fiery impact of a planet-killing asteroid" (Burron, 2022).

By 2020, the Sudbury Basin had become the richest mining district in North America and ranked among the top ten globally, elevating the city of Greater Sudbury into a major mining industry hub. To date, the mines of Sudbury have produced over $250 billion worth of metals, including 8 million tonnes of copper and nickel, 3,200 tonnes of silver, 300 tonnes of platinum, and 100 tonnes of gold. It is estimated that the Sudbury Basin’s ore reserves could sustain mining operations for another 100 years (Burron, 2022).

2.5. Soil degradation

Soil degradation, including erosion of outcrops, can be attributed to extensive logging and the proximity of smelters (Fig. 2). Analysis of the various impacts of mining activities on natural landscapes highlights degradation in terms of discoloration and denudation.

Figure 2. Sudbury basin and major site of roasting and smelting activities

Download Original Figure

Source: Adapted from Struik, 1973.

The dark coloration of many outcrops in Sudbury inevitably draws attention when walking through the area. Over the past century, these outcrops have been exposed to sulfurous fumes, accumulations of industrial dust containing high levels of metals (copper, nickel, aluminum, cobalt, etc.), intense heat from forest fires, and harsh weather conditions. The combination of these factors, along with the physicochemical reactions of exposed surfaces, explains this discoloration (Étongué-Mayer, Raoul et al., 1999).

Thin and fragile, the soils of the region have suffered extensively from erosion. The soils covering the bedrock and the organic soils in depressions, which previously supported vegetation, were particularly affected by fumes from open-air smelters and conventional foundries (Winterhalder, 1995). Logging practices, especially clearcutting, and the destruction of ground litter by fires left the soil vulnerable to heavy rains and runoff, significantly accelerating erosion.

In areas where glacial sediments were relatively thick, the materials displayed some stability despite the effects of freezing and thawing. However, slopes were particularly susceptible to runoff water, which caused deep cuts in certain areas. Material from these slopes was displaced through sliding or creeping. Debris eroded from the slopes gradually accumulated in the bottoms of drained or undrained valleys and, in some cases, filled stream and river beds (Étongué-Mayer, Raoul et al., 1999).

3. INTERVENTIONS AND MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES

When the International Nickel Company (INCO) proposed the construction of an immense 381-meter chimney in 1969, the relationship between air pollution and ecosystem improvement raised limited controversy among scientists. While this measure would ensure wider dispersion of polluting emissions, it was recognized that the local retention of pollutants would decrease, potentially leading to a resurgence of plant activity and the return of terrestrial, avian, and aquatic fauna. However, the fundamental solution lay in reducing emissions at their source (Étongué-Mayer and Virchez, 1999).

The main sources of emissions were identified as the smelters operated by INCO and Falconbridge, which collectively emitted around 20% of the sulfur dioxide produced in Canada (Potvin and Negusanti, 1995). Initial measurements of air quality and efforts to control industrial sulfur dioxide emissions were conducted between 1969 and 1970, during which the Ontario government introduced modest measures to address air quality. These regulations partially mitigated environmental degradation by imposing stricter air quality standards on INCO and Falconbridge.

Nevertheless, these industries largely ignored concerns over sulfur dioxide emissions and acid rain. Observers noted that the indifferent attitude of company executives was a significant part of the problem. In response, the provincial government's incremental approach laid the groundwork for a comprehensive restoration program for degraded ecosystems. This initiative gained support from communities, industries, and other levels of government, forming a partnership led by researchers from Laurentian University.

The concept of long-range transboundary air pollution emerged in the 1970s when scientists linked ecological damage to acidifying pollutants transported long distances by prevailing winds (Environment and Climate Change Canada, 2024). After establishing a scientific database on soil properties, environmental constraints, and the economic consequences of rehabilitation in the Sudbury region, the scientific committee responsible for redevelopment began testing their chosen methodology (Lautenbach, 1995).

The City Council’s Advisory Panel on Regreening (VETAC) was established in 1973 with a mandate to restore self-sustaining, indigenous terrestrial and aquatic ecosystems in Greater Sudbury through the City’s Regreening Program. VETAC also provided opportunities for community involvement in environmental improvement at home, in neighborhoods, and on public lands (Monet, 2024).

To address poor soil conditions—characterized by high acidity, the absence of organic matter, and sensitivity to temperature variations—it was deemed necessary to reestablish plant cover (Winterhalder, 1996). Trials conducted at Coniston in 1974 involved soil treatment with limestone, fertilizer application, and plantings (Beckett, 1995). While various species were considered for reforestation, pine (Pinus) was identified as the most adaptable to the harsh conditions.

Improved site conditions led to modest success in plant reestablishment. Additionally, voluntary colonization by plant species from surrounding forests, including wildflowers and shrubs, contributed to the formation of specific ecosystems (Kellaway et al., 2022). Although high soil toxicity continued to hinder root system growth, progress was evident.

Following the evaluation of the Coniston trials, researchers developed a five-point strategy for rehabilitating barren land:

• Artificial phosphorus inputs and liming (10 tonnes/hectare) to reduce soil acidity.
• Fertilizer application (6-24-24 – N-P-K).
• Seeding of treated land with legumes (Canada bluegrass, Kentucky bluegrass, timothy, willowherb skullcap, and hybrid clover), using cutting techniques adapted to topography.
• Maintaining natural regrowth.
• Reforestation with conifers and deciduous trees (one to three years after liming).

Despite these efforts, recent analyses show that mine waste—particularly the dispersion of metal-laden dust in air and soil—continues to pose challenges in the region (Shorthouse and Bagatto, 1995).

The current state of the Sudbury region reflects not only the success of the extensive rehabilitation program initiated in 1978 but also the incorporation of environmental criteria into strategies for addressing regional challenges. Sudbury's image has transformed with the proliferation of green spaces, often thriving even on the steepest slopes. Various studies highlight the region's environmental improvements: Anand et al. (2005) explored diversity relationships among taxonomic groups in recovering and restored forests; Munford et al. (2024) examined the effects of large-scale restoration on understory plant communities in an industrial landscape; Snider (2024) analyzed total phosphorus concentrations in the Whitson River watershed; Kellaway et al. (2022) investigated soil liming; and Levasseur et al. (2023) documented improvements in tree growth and ecosystem carbon accumulation.

Key measures for environmental remediation are ad follows:

1. Reduction of SO₂ Emissions. A crucial first step involved reducing sulfur dioxide emissions. This was achieved by constructing a 381-meter "Superstack," completed on August 21, 1970, which allowed for a 90% reduction in SO₂ emissions by dispersing pollutants over a wider area.
2. Soil Liming. To counteract soil acidity, calcitic or dolomitic limestone (10 tons per hectare) was applied to increase the pH of the barren lands.
3. Fertilizer Application. Fertilizers were introduced at a rate of 400 kg/ha using a formula of 6N-24P-24K to promote nutrient availability in the soil.
4. Grassing of Barren Lands. Five grass species were sown to stabilize the soil and encourage plant cover:
   • Agrostis gigantea (20%)
   • Festuca rubra (10%)
   • Phleum pratense (20%)
   • Poa compressa (15%)
   • Poa pratensis (15%)
5. Legume Seeding. Two types of legumes were included in the mix to enhance soil fertility through nitrogen fixation:
   • Lotus corniculatus (10%)
   • Trifolium hybridum (10%)
6. Tree and Shrub Planting. A variety of tree and shrub species were introduced to establish a self-sustaining forest ecosystem:
   • Pinus banksiana
   • Pinus resinosa
   • Pinus strobus
   • Picea glauca
   • Larix laricina
   • Quercus borealis
   • Robinia pseudoacacia

This summary of land reclamation treatments used on barren lands was adapted from Table 8.1 in Chapter 8 of Municipal Land Restoration by Lautenbach (1995).

4. CONCLUSION

From the onset of the mining industry in the early 1900s until the 1960s, the Sudbury area underwent a dramatic transformation from a vibrant, vegetation-rich landscape to a barren "moonscape" characterized by severe erosion and a lack of vegetation. From an economic perspective, the mining industry brought significant benefits, driving the prosperity of Sudbury and establishing it as the largest integrated mining complex in the world. The industry generated approximately $4 billion in annual exports and supported more than 300 mining supply firms, employing over 14,000 people.

However, this economic success came at a high environmental cost. It wasn't until the 1960s that genuine interest in environmental restoration emerged. The establishment of Laurentian University played a pivotal role, with its scientists collaborating closely with technical experts from INCO (later Vale) and Falconbridge (later Glencore). This partnership led to the construction of the 381-meter "Superstack" at an approximate cost of $25 million, owned by INCO, to disperse sulfur gases and other smelting by-products away from Sudbury. This innovation reduced sulfur emissions by 90%, paving the way for scientists to explore techniques to mitigate soil acidity and enable the reestablishment of vegetation.

Thus began the city’s Regreening Program. Since its inception in 1978, more than 3,500 hectares of land have been treated with lime and grassed, and over 10 million trees have been planted in efforts to rehabilitate Sudbury’s landscape and watersheds. By 2020, the Superstack was decommissioned, marking the success of the clean atmospheric emissions reduction project.

Equally critical to this transformation was the enactment of environmental legislation by the Provincial Government and the collaborative contributions of all three levels of government—Federal, Provincial, and Municipal. These efforts significantly supported the positive transformation of Sudbury's environment.

Finally, the contributions of committed citizens cannot be overstated. Their active participation and dedication were essential to the success of Sudbury’s regreening efforts. Without their involvement, the remarkable environmental recovery of the region would not have been possible.