Article

THE RUSSIA-UKRAINE CONFLICT: A PERSPECTIVE FROM INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND CANADIAN FOREIGN POLICY

Roberto Zepedaa, Jorge Virchezb
Author Information & Copyright

Received: 2024-03-08 Revised: 2024-03-21 ; Accepted: 2024-04-20

Published Online: 2024-08-22

Abstract

This paper explores the Russia-Ukraine conflict within the theoretical framework of international relations and Canadian foreign policy; it relies on a qualitative analysis, focusing on the geopolitical, historical, and economic dimensions. It begins by contextualizing the conflict against the background of NATO historical expansion into Eastern Europe following the Cold War, underscoring how this expansion has contributed to heightened tensions with Russia. The paper examines Russia's strategic concerns regarding NATO's enlargement and its implications for regional security dynamics, emphasizing efforts to reassert Russia's influence amidst perceived Western advance. Furthermore, the paper delves into Canada's response to the conflict, underlining its robust support for Ukraine through diplomatic, economic, and military aid initiatives. Canada's multifaceted assistance is analyzed, including its significant financial contributions and humanitarian aid efforts, which reflects a commitment to supporting Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity. Moreover, the paper explores the economic repercussions of the conflict on Canada, particularly in terms of commodity prices and trade impacts, despite relatively limited direct trade ties with Russia.

Keywords: Russia-Ukraine conflict, NATO enlargement, Canada-Ukraine relations, economic impacts, North American perspectives

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1. INTRODUCTION

Following the conclusion of World War II and amidst the growing tensions of the Cold War, the United States and its European allies established the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), a regional military alliance founded in 1949 that remains active to this day. Its primary objective is to guarantee the security and collective defense of its member states through military cooperation and solidarity in the face of external aggression. Initially, NATO was founded by 12 members; then, its membership increased to 14 in 1952; and then 16 in 1982; 19 in 1999; 29 in 2017; and 32 in 2024 (See table 1).

Table 1. NATO Membership
Year Member Countries Number of members
1949 Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg,
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, United Kingdom, United States.
12
1952 Greece, Turkey. 14
1955 West Germany 15
1982 Spain 16
1999 Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland 19
2004 Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia 26
2009 Albania, Croatia 28
2017 Montenegro 29
2020 North Macedonia 30
2023 Finland 31
2024 Sweden 32 

Source: prepared by the authors with information from NATO, 2024

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In the early post-Cold War period, the sixteen member states of NATO exhibited caution regarding the inclusion of new members. However, a consensus eventually emerged, leading to NATO's enlargement. This expansion, coupled with targeted efforts to enhance NATO's relationship with Russia, ultimately characterized the West's strategy for European security. The alliance admitted the Visegrád Group (Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic) in 1999, and the Vilnius Group (Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia) in 2004 (CSIS, 2017).

At the present time (2024), NATO is composed of 32 member countries, mostly from Western Europe and North America. Its headquarters are located in Brussels, Belgium. The core of NATO’s strength comes from Article 5 of its founding treaty—a commitment that an attack on one member country will be considered an attack on the entire alliance. For smaller, weaker countries that lack resources to mount a proper defense, joining an alliance can be the only realistic path to maintaining security and deterring potential foes (Council on Foreign Relations, 2024).

In response to NATO's creation, the then Soviet Union sought to establish a security buffer in Eastern Europe. As part of this strategy, a bloc of allied countries was formed through the Warsaw Pact, created in 1955, aimed at constituting a solid defensive barrier. Besides the USSR, this organization included Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany (GDR), Hungary, Poland, and Romania (US Department of State, 2024). 1 This alliance reconfigured the political and military dynamics in Europe, leading to a new Second post-war world order.

However, with the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the end of the Cold War, significant changes occurred on the international stage. During those years, then U.S. President George H.W. Bush endorsed an unwritten agreement with Russia, committing that NATO would not expand into Eastern Europe. This promise sought to maintain regional stability and avoid tensions with Russia (Savranskaya and Blanton, 2017).

Meanwhile, NATO expanded its cooperation with former communist bloc countries, significantly increasing its membership. Despite these agreements, NATO promoted a phase of expansion during the post-Cold War era, admitting new members, mainly countries previously associated with the Soviet Union (Risso, 2020). In the 1990s, Russia was experiencing an economic and political crisis under Boris Yeltsin's leadership and did not oppose this trend.

With the rise of Vladimir Putin in 2000, Russia attempted to regain its sphere of influence and reinforce its security area in the post-Soviet context (Mankoff, 2009). In particular, Russia firmly opposed the possibility of Ukraine, a neighboring country historically linked to Russia, becoming a NATO member.

Leading a strengthened Russia with a more prominent position on the international stage, Putin vehemently opposed NATO's expansion into Eastern Europe in the first decade of the 21st century; from his perspective, this enlargement posed a direct threat to Russia's interests and its sphere of influence. Despite Russia's expressed reservations, NATO continued its expansion process, including Eastern European countries (Sarotte, 2014). In this context, tensions between Russia and NATO, and consequently with the United States, intensified, creating an atmosphere of distrust and rivalry. In sum, these historical precedents have shaped a scenario of rivalry and distrust between both parties, with Russia seeking to protect its sphere of influence and NATO expanding its borders into Eastern Europe.

In this context, Russia's invasion of Ukraine took place first in Crimea in 2014 and more recently in February 2022 with the Russian military intervention in that country, mainly in the southeast region. NATO has been a key organization in promoting stability and security in Europe and the international order. However, it has also faced criticisms and challenges, tensions with Russia, and debates over military spending and the distribution of responsibilities among its members.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

It is important to highlight a historical context and the origins of the conflict in Ukraine, which can be traced back to recent history after World War II and the period known as the Cold War. During this time, the USSR had several allied countries on its border with Europe, which also served as a security safeguard zone. This world order resulted from international conferences at the end of World War II, leading to the creation of NATO in 1949 and its counterpart, the Warsaw Pact.

At the end of the Cold War, with the dissolution of the USSR, the world order was reorganized, bringing about the end of the Cold War and a significant shift in the global order. However, this new order lacked clear rules. Apparently, there was an unwritten agreement, in which US and European leaders promised that NATO would not expand. However, NATO's expansion into Eastern Europe began in the 1990s, as shown in map 1, despite warnings from foreign policy experts. For instance, former CIA Director William J. Burns warned about the provocative effect of NATO's expansion in 1995. When the Clinton administration took steps to include Poland, Hungary, and the former Czech Republic in NATO, critics described the decision as premature and unnecessarily provocative. In 1997, fifty foreign policy experts signed a letter to the Clinton administration stating that the current U.S.-led effort to expand NATO was a political error of historic proportions that would undermine European stability. Indeed, American diplomat George Kennan, known as the father of Cold War containment policy, opposed NATO's expansion in 1998 (Suny,2022).

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Map 1. NATO’s expansion since 1997 Source: BBC (2022).
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2.1 The end of the Cold War

After the demise of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and the end of the Cold War, the United States and the West adopted a new perspective in international relations with Russia. They no longer regarded Russia as a global power comparable to the defunct USSR in the post-World War II period. This change in the perception of Russia had significant implications in the geopolitical sphere (Mikhalev, 2022).

One of the most significant manifestations of this transformation was the expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) into Eastern Europe, a region historically considered within Moscow's sphere of influence. This expansion generated considerable concern and unrest in Russia, which saw its close neighbors joining a U.S.-led military alliance, despite previous promises not to expand NATO into Eastern Europe (Mearsheimer, 2014).

Russian President Vladimir Putin had expressed that the collapse of the Soviet Union was “the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century” (NBC, 2005). This statement reflected the loss of Russia's influence and power on the world stage. Since taking power in 2000, Putin has been determined to restore Russia's position as a global power. This ambition stemmed, in part, from what he perceived as a humiliation of Russia by the United States and its NATO allies, who had disregarded its relevance as a key player on the international stage following the dissolution of the USSR.

In a speech delivered in Munich in 2007, Russian President Vladimir Putin addressed various central themes reflecting Russia's position on the international stage. Firstly, Putin emphasized that the United States sought to impose its rules and will on other countries, but he pointed out that the unipolar model of world dominance was unfeasible and entirely unacceptable in the modern context. From Russia's perspective, this hegemonic approach could create imbalances and tensions in international relations, and it was necessary to promote a more equitable system based on mutual respect among nations (Fried and Volker, 2022).

2.2 The conflict between Russia and Ukraine

The conflict between Russia and Ukraine is a result of several years of diverse historical and geopolitical factors since both nations gained independence in 1992, following the dissolution of the USSR. Since then, their relations have been complex and tense.

As the most powerful state following the disintegration of the USSR, Russia has sought to exert dominance over Ukraine, both in its internal and foreign policy. For Russia, Ukraine is considered a crucial part of its historical and strategic sphere of influence, and maintaining control over its neighbor country has been a key priority in its geopolitical agenda (Dibb, 2014).

A crucial aspect of this dynamic has been Russia's firm opposition to Ukraine joining Western institutions and alliances, such as NATO and the European Union (EU). Since 2004, when the former Soviet republics of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania joined both NATO and the EU, the Russian government has made it clear that any similar integration efforts by other post-Soviet states would be strongly resisted, becoming a red line for Russia.

However, Ukraine has pursued an independent foreign policy, which includes its aspirations to integrate into the EU and NATO. This has created friction with Russia, as the latter views it as a direct threat to its sphere of influence and national security.

The expansion of NATO has been a constant concern for Russia, and prominent figures such as CIA Director William J. Burns have warned about the provocative effect of this expansion since the mid-1990s. The incorporation of former Warsaw Pact members, along with three former Soviet republics (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania) into NATO in 2004, has generated tensions and concerns in Russia (Suny, 2022).

Previously, the decision to include countries like Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic into NATO during President Bill Clinton's administration was seen as premature and provocative by diplomats such as George F. Kennan, who then warned about the risks of disrupting European stability due to this expansion (Suny, 2022).

Russia's concern about NATO's expansion on its borders has been reiterated on various occasions by different experts and diplomats, who have warned about the possible effects and consequences for regional and European stability.

On the other hand, Ukraine's historical context has been a relevant issue due to its past as part of the Russian Empire and the USSR. Particularly in the areas of Ukraine that are in dispute, there is a majority of Russian-speaking individuals who advocate for closer ties with Russia.

From a geopolitical perspective, the issue of Ukraine is significant for Russia for two fundamental reasons. First, there is the land border, and for Russia, it is of utmost importance to maintain it as an area not influenced or controlled by NATO. The presence of NATO on Russia's borders is seen as a direct threat to its security and national sovereignty.

Second, the maritime border, especially the Black Sea, plays a strategic role for Russia in both commercial and military terms. The Black Sea represents a key area that connects Russia with the global economy and provides a vital outlet to the Mediterranean Sea. In sum, historical factors, along with geopolitical issues related to land and maritime borders, have been fundamental in the relationship between the two countries.

In addition, the Black Sea is one of the most crucial areas for Russian interests. With the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula in 2014, Russia sought to regain control over military, economic, and political activities in the region. By positioning itself and effectively controlling the naval base in Sevastopol, Russia ensures a naval projection in all directions, leaving Turkey as its primary competitor—a nation that belongs to NATO but controls the southern part of this maritime territory. This geostrategic action limits the projection of Ukraine, Romania, Bulgaria, and Georgia. Russia aims to consolidate its position as the hegemonic nation in the northern part of this area (Montero, 2023).

On the other hand, the conflict between Russia and Ukraine heightens the geostrategic significance of the Arctic region concerning natural resources and commercial routes. For instance, it is anticipated that the Arctic holds vast reserves of oil and gas, which would be vital resources for global energy security and could impact crude oil prices and, consequently, global economies. In addition, potential transit routes through the Arctic could reduce the costs of commercial activity. Currently, climatic challenges have hindered exploration in the Arctic region. However, the war has generated increased interest among states to gain hegemonic bases in the region, extending beyond the mere extent of shared borders with the area. For Russia, the interest is strong due to its close relationship with the hydrocarbon market, which could grant it a strategic position in the energy sector. Similarly, U.S. commercial interests align with these objectives (Montero, 2023).

3. INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

3.1 Realism in international relations

Despite the fact that one of the main interests of international organizations and political relations between states is to guarantee human rights and prevent conflict, it must be considered that these actors, as rational entities, make decisions based on the pursuit of their interests. These interests are what will determine the path each of them takes and, at the same time, the consequences that their counterparts will face. One of the main attractions for developed nations is the geopolitical realm. This realm focuses on the relationship and impact of political decisions based on geography. For this reason, the President of Russia has made the decisions observed in recent times (Montero, 2023).

According to the premises of Realism in International Relations, those states sharing borders with more powerful neighbors, must consider the interests and actions of their stronger neighbors to safeguard their own security and stability. An example of this dynamic is evident in the relationship between the United States and Cuba. Even today, the United States continues to impose sanctions on Cuba due to the Soviet missile crisis in 1962, highlighting that great powers cannot tolerate their neighbors being used as platforms for adverse actions.

The conflict in Ukraine clearly illustrates how a country's decisions regarding its alliances can be interpreted as a threat to the security of a regional power, in this case, Russia. Although Russia expressed its concerns and asked the United States and its European allies to refrain from expanding NATO or the EU eastward, the response was a resounding rejection. Putin's security demands did not align with those of the West, ultimately leading to the current conflict between Russia and Ukraine.

Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, but military maneuvers had already been detected in preparation for the offensive since late 2021. Unfortunately, Ukraine lacked a backup plan in the face of Russian threats. Its military was not strong enough and lacked military allies who could counterbalance Russia's power. This vulnerability left Ukraine exposed to invasion, while Russia, aware of its military superiority, had been mobilizing since late 2021.

Despite this, Ukraine chose to ignore the threat, and Western powers did not take sufficient measures to counter Russia's power. The result was unfortunately predictable, with the armed conflict and Russian invasion of Ukraine, leading to a high human cost and a humanitarian crisis.

The importance of Realism in International Relations underscores the need to carefully consider regional power and security dynamics before making any foreign policy decisions for countries neighboring regional and global powers.

John Mearsheimer (2014; 2022), an expert in international relations, has argued for years that U.S. efforts to expand NATO eastward and establish friendly relations with Ukraine have increased the likelihood of war between nuclear powers, ignoring Putin's aggressive stance towards Ukraine. After Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014, Mearsheimer wrote that the U.S. and its European allies shared much of the responsibility for this crisis. When former Soviet republics Estonia and Lithuania joined NATO and the European Union, the Russian government made it clear that it would oppose integration efforts by the remaining post-Soviet states, drawing a red line.

The security dilemma arises when actions taken by one state to increase its security make other states feel less secure. For instance, when one state seeks an ally or buys more weapons, the neighboring state becomes alarmed, leading both countries to end up less secure than before. This perspective suggests that states bordering more powerful neighbors must consider the interests of the stronger neighbor. An example of this was the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, during which U.S. and Soviet leaders engaged in a tense political and military standoff.

Finally, one might ask whether the conflict between Russia and Ukraine signals the beginning of a new world order. Recently, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi met in Tunisia on March 30, 2022, declaring their intention to work towards creating a more democratic global order.

3.2 Liberalism in international relations

From Liberalism, as a theory of International Relations, liberals emphasize the role of international institutions and cooperation in resolving conflicts and promoting global peace and prosperity. Canada's foreign policy, within this approach, would be more focused on multilateralism and international cooperation, as evidenced by its commitment to the UN and other international organizations, and its promotion of human rights and democracy.

In the conflict between Russia and Ukraine, it has been observed that international law and organizations have demonstrated their limitations in containing the aggressive and opportunistic behavior of major powers. A clear example of this situation is the Russian invasion of Ukraine, where economic interdependence failed to deter Moscow from choosing this offensive, despite the enormous economic costs involved.

Soft power, which seeks to influence through persuasion and diplomacy (Nye, 2008) also proved inadequate to halt the Russian invasion, as it could not stop the advance of Russian tanks into Ukrainian territory. Even condemnation by the UN General Assembly, with a majority vote denouncing the invasion, will not have a significant impact on the course of events in this conflict.

Despite the failure of liberal tools, the role of institutions remains important, as evidenced by the rapid unified response from the West to Russian aggression. This immediate reaction stems from the fact that the both United States and Canada as well as its NATO allies share a set of political values that are now being clearly challenged due to the invasion of Ukraine.

It is crucial to recognize that without institutions like NATO, organizing an effective collective response would be difficult and complex. While international organizations cannot directly resolve conflicts between major powers, they do facilitate more efficient collective responses when states' interests are aligned and they seek to confront a situation of aggression or shared threat.

In sum, despite the failure of liberal postulates to prevent this conflict, liberal theories remain relevant in understanding how international organizations facilitate collective responses when states share common interests and values. The conflict in Ukraine has underscored the importance of maintaining robust institutions that enable coordinated action against international threats.

4. CANADIAN FOREIGN POLICY

Canadian foreign policy is characterized by a unique blend of modest power, relative security, and ambitious international engagement. Despite having an underfunded military, Canada benefits from geographical advantages and proximity to the United States, ensuring its core interests of security, prosperity, and sovereignty. This privileged position has not led to isolationism; instead, Canada maintains an outward-looking foreign policy focused on relationships with the United States, Europe, and international organizations (Mank, 2019; Ettinger, 2024).

Understanding Canada's foreign policy orientation is crucial for explaining its international behavior. Scholars suggest incorporating domestic influences, such as strategic culture and diasporic political interests, into the analysis to explain foreign policy making. Strategic culture reflects collectively shared meanings about the state's security, while diasporic interests highlight the interconnectedness of foreign and domestic politics. These factors, combined with national role conceptions, help explain Canada's foreign policy orientations and responses, such as its reaction to Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022 (Ettinger, 2024).

The conflict in Ukraine remains uncertain, and it is necessary for the international community to work together to seek peaceful solutions and prevent an escalation of the conflict. It is crucial to respect Ukraine's sovereignty but also to attend the legitimate concerns of all parties involved through dialogue and negotiation. Canada has an important role to play in this effort as a member of NATO, but also as a defender of human rights, and an advocate for peace and stability worldwide. Canada has to worked with its allies to address the crisis in Ukraine and uphold security and stability in Eastern Europe.

4.1 Canada-Ukraine bilateral relations

Diplomatic relations between Canada and Ukraine were established on December 2, 1991, and Canada was the first Western nation to recognize Ukraine's independence from the USSR. There have been high-level visits between governors and prime ministers of both countries. Canada's support for Ukraine is rooted in a long-standing bilateral relationship. This relationship has flourished over the decades, encompassing cooperation in security and defense, trade, and the promotion of democratic and economic reforms in Ukraine. The ties between the two nations are further strengthened by warm people-to-people connections and a vibrant Ukrainian-Canadian community, which numbers over 1.3 million people(Government of Canada 2024c).

Since the escalation of the conflict in 2022, Canada has committed more than $14 billion in multifaceted assistance to Ukraine. This comprehensive support includes financial aid, military assistance, development programs, humanitarian relief, and peace and stabilization initiatives. Such extensive aid underscores Canada's unwavering dedication to supporting Ukraine during its time of crisis (Government of Canada, 2024a).

Diplomatic representation plays a crucial role in maintaining and enhancing the bilateral relationship between Canada and Ukraine. Canada is represented in Ukraine by the Embassy of Canada to Ukraine, located in Kyiv. Conversely, Ukraine maintains its diplomatic presence in Canada through an embassy in Ottawa and consulates general in Toronto and Edmonton. These diplomatic missions facilitate ongoing cooperation and ensure that both nations can effectively address bilateral and international challenges.

In Canada, there are many similarities between Ukraine and the Canadian provinces of Manitoba, Saskatchewan, and Alberta; they have very fertile soil for agriculture. The first Ukrainian immigrants were farmers who came to work this Canadian land, resulting in four waves of immigration. Currently, there are 1.3 million people of Ukrainian descent in Canada. For example, Canada has had two Governors General of Ukrainian origin, as well as senators. The current Deputy Prime Minister of Canada, Chrystia Freeland as well as Minister of Finance, is also of Ukrainian descent. If Prime Minister Trudeau were unable to continue in office, the Deputy Prime Minister would become the Prime Minister. Canada has three lieutenant governors who represent the Queen in the provinces, and several provincial premiers of Ukrainian origin in Alberta, Saskatchewan, Manitoba, and Ontario. Personalities like Alex Trebek (TV), who is very famous in the United States, and Wayne D. Gretzky, a Canadian former professional ice hockey player, as well as a significant number of Ukrainian-origin hockey players. Among Canada's five astronauts, two are of Ukrainian descent (Virchez and Zepeda, 2022).

4.2 Canada's position in the Russia-Ukraine conflict

According to the government of Canada, Russia's unprovoked and unjustifiable aggression against Ukraine not only violates international law but also jeopardizes regional stability and endangers countless innocent lives. Furthermore, it undermines the core values and principles of the rules-based international order, which include the sovereignty and self- determination of nations. Canada remains resolute in its support for Ukraine's sovereignty, territorial integrity, and independence, advocating for a just and sustainable peace in the region (Government of Canada 2024b).

In response to the Russia and Ukraine conflict, Canada has implemented a range of measures to support Ukrainians both within and outside Canada. These measures comprise immigration policies designed to assist Ukrainians in relocating to Canada and facilitating the return of Canadian citizens and permanent residents from Ukraine. To aid Ukrainian newcomers, provincial and territorial resources have been mobilized, offering settlement and orientation services to ease their transition (Government of Canada 2024b).

A significant component of Canada's response includes opportunities for scientists fleeing Ukraine. The Canadian government has spearheaded a department-wide initiative to support Ukraine-based scientists by providing temporary employment opportunities. This effort reflects Canada's commitment to preserving scientific talent and fostering academic collaboration, even amidst conflict (Government of Canada 2024b).

In terms of broader support, Canada has extended economic, humanitarian, development assistance, and security and stabilization aid to address the multifaceted needs of those affected by the invasion. This support includes targeted sanctions against individuals and entities involved in the aggression, encompassing prohibitions, and import and export controls. Additionally, Canada has contributed military support to Ukraine by supplying equipment and training to bolster Ukraine's defense capabilities.

Politically, Canada remains steadfast in its support for Ukraine's sovereignty, territorial integrity, and independence. An integral part of this support is the International Coalition for the Return of Ukrainian Children, a joint Canada-Ukraine initiative aimed at repatriating children who have been illegally deported or forcibly transferred. Furthermore, the Canada- Ukraine Strategic Security Partnership (CUSSP) outlines a framework for enhanced bilateral engagement and cooperation in security matters.

Overall, Canada’s comprehensive response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine underscores its dedication to humanitarian aid, economic support, scientific collaboration, military assistance, and political solidarity. Through these multifaceted efforts, Canada aims to address both immediate needs and long-term stability for Ukraine and its people (Government of Canada 2024b).

4.3 The energy sector

Canada is an oil-producing country with certain advantages in the geopolitical context. According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), Russia ranks third globally in oil production, followed by the United States and Saudi Arabia. In 2021, approximately 34% of OECD Europe’s oil imports came from Russia. Additionally, Russian natural gas accounted for around 45% of the European Union's gas imports and nearly 40% of the bloc's total gas consumption (International Energy Agency, 2023).

On the other hand, Canada is the fourth-largest oil producer globally, producing approximately 5.2 million barrels per day in 2020, according to data from the U.S. Energy Information Administration. The oil sands in Alberta have been a significant resource in the country's oil production, placing it behind Russia, Saudi Arabia, and the United States in terms of oil output. (US Energy Information Administration, 2024).

By early 2023, Canada had not fully met its promise to increase oil production by 200,000 barrels per day after Russia initiated the war in Ukraine in February 2022. Despite increasing oil production in the second half of 2022, it failed to reach the goal set to help nations seeking to reduce their dependence on Russian supplies following the invasion of Ukraine (Tuttle, 2023).

Canada's Minister of Natural Resources, Jonathan Wilkinson, had promised to assist its "European friends" by increasing the global supply of crude oil following the Russian attack and the surge in oil prices to over US$100 per barrel. He committed to boosting oil production by 200,000 barrels per day and natural gas production by 100,000 barrels per day by the end of 2022, accelerating planned projects (Tuttle, 2023).

However, Canadian energy companies restricted their expenditures, an important offshore oil platform project in Newfoundland was delayed, and heavy oil production in Alberta's oil sands was affected by cold weather in December (Tuttle, 2023).

Although complete official data on natural gas production in 2022 have not been published, the overall target of an additional 300,000 barrels per day was achieved if gas is included. Canada met its committed production of approximately 300,000 additional barrels per day in 2022, of which approximately 200,000 barrels per day were exported. However, export capacity was limited by unforeseen events such as refinery cutbacks in the United States (Tuttle, 2023).

On the other hand, Graeme C. Clark, Canada's Ambassador to Mexico, has emphasized Canada's commitment as a steadfast ally in defending sovereignty and territorial integrity. Along with international partners and allies, including Mexico, Canada has strongly condemned Russia's illegal and atrocious actions in the context of the invasion of Ukraine and the ongoing humanitarian crisis (Clark, 2022).

Canada also has a significant Ukrainian-origin population, making it the third country with the largest Ukrainian population in the world, after Russia and Ukraine. Ukrainian Canadians represent nearly 4% of the country’s population, creating a close connection and significant interest in the situation in Ukraine. In this context, Canada has valued Mexico's role in international organizations such as the Security Council, the General Assembly, the OAS, and the Human Rights Council. Together with partners and allies worldwide, Canada and Mexico seek to end hostilities and protect democracy, territorial integrity, and Ukraine's sovereignty amid the ongoing crisis (Clark, 2022).

As a NATO member, Canada has provided aid to Ukraine following the Russian invasion. Canada has provided more than $5 billion in aid to Ukraine, including over $1 billion in equipment and military support. The federal government has also allocated nearly $290 million in direct financial assistance to Ukrainians arriving in Canada and established a $500 million Ukrainian Sovereignty Bond to allow Canadians to invest in Ukraine’s survival. While Canadians continue to support Ukraine, the Ukrainian Canadian Congress (UCC) urges the government to do more, including imposing more economic sanctions on Russia and those supporting the war and spreading misinformation (Government of Canada 2024a).

Since the current conflict between Russia and Ukraine began in February 2022, Canada has deployed efforts to support Ukraine, including providing financial, military, and humanitarian support, as well as expediting the entry of Ukrainians fleeing the war to apply for temporary residence in Canada. Canada has been a leader in economic support for Ukraine, and Canadians support more economic sanctions against Russia and the deployment of NATO forces in nations surrounding Ukraine compared to most other surveyed countries. While there is a discussion about the need for Canada to do more, including imposing more economic sanctions on Russia and expanding the Canada-Ukraine Authorization for Emergency Travel (CUAET) program, it is crucial that Canada and its Western allies continue to support Ukraine, as the consequences of failing to do so could be devastating and far-reaching for the entire planet (Government of Canada 2024a).

5. ECONOMIC IMPACTS

With regard to the economic impacts of the Russia – Ukraine conflict on the Canadian economy, the cash management group (2024) considers that “commodity prices are likely to have the most significant impact on Canada’s economy. The price of oil is widely expected to rise given Western sanctions against one of the World’s biggest energy producers” (Barrie, 2024 ). This group confirms that Canada and Russia actually have little direct trade so the impact on imports and exports could be relatively small. Russian Exports to Canada in 2021 totaled a little over $2 billion – a fraction of Canada’s trade when compared with most other nations (Barrie, 2024 ).

Canada's trade with Russia experienced a significant decline in the first ten months following Moscow's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, as Ottawa implemented extensive economic measures prohibiting the export of a wide range of goods, including forklifts and barbers' chairs. Despite these comprehensive restrictions, certain sectors have remained relatively unaffected, as businesses navigate an increasingly stringent array of restrictions and sanctions. According to data from Industry Canada, the total value of imports from Russia fell by 78 percent, decreasing from $1.9 billion during the March to December period in 2021 to $414 million in the corresponding period in 2022 (Robertson and Rabson, 2023).

In March 2024, Canada exported goods valued at C$4.6 million to Russia and imported goods worth C$4.69 million from Russia, resulting in a negative trade balance of C$94.7 thousand. Between March 2023 and March 2024, Canadian exports to Russia decreased by C$4.89 million (51.6%), from C$9.49 million to C$4.6 million. Similarly, imports from Russia declined by C$4.66 million (49.9%), from C$9.35 million to C$4.69 million (Observatory of Economic Complexity, 2024).

The main exports from Canada to Russia in March 2024 included products such as eggs, soil preparation machinery, machinery having individual functions, other inedible animal products, and packaged medicament. On the import side, the top products Canada received from Russia were aircraft parts, including unmanned craft, radioactive chemicals, ferroalloys, rubber tires and plywood. In March 2024, the majority of Canada's exports to Russia originated from Ontario, followed by Alberta, Saskatchewan, Quebec, and Nunavut. In contrast, the primary destinations for imports from Russia were Ontario, Quebec, British Columbia, Alberta, and Manitoba (Observatory of Economic Complexity, 2024).

The decrease in Canada's exports to Russia in March 2024 can be attributed mainly to a reduction in the export of machinery having individual functions, laboratory reagents, and X-ray equipment. Similarly, the decline in Canada's imports from Russia during the same period was primarily due to a decrease in the import of plywood, rubber tires, and synthetic rubber.

Table 2. Canada and Russia trade relations 2023-2024
Category March 2023 March 2024 Net Trade Balance
Exports to Russia C$9.49 million C$4.6 million -C$4.89 million (-51.6%)
Imports from Russia C$9.35 million C$4.69 million -C$4.66 million (-49.9%) 

Source: Observatory of Economic Complexity (OEC) (2024), “Canada Russia Trade”, March. MIT, Massachusetts

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6. CONCLUSION

This article has examined the geopolitical tensions and historical contexts leading to the ongoing conflict between Russia and Ukraine. It has underlined the intricate dynamics involving NATO's expansion into Eastern Europe, Russia's reactions to perceived threats to its sphere of influence, and the broader implications for international relations and global security. The origins of this conflict trace back to the dissolution of the USSR, NATO's subsequent enlargement, and Russia's evolving geopolitical ambitions under Vladimir Putin's leadership. These factors have shaped a complex landscape marked by competing interests, historical grievances, and strategic objectives on both sides.

Furthermore, we have emphasized the significant role of international organizations like NATO and Canada's proactive stance in supporting Ukraine. Canada's response, characterized by strong economic sanctions, military aid, and humanitarian support, underscores its commitment to upholding international law, sovereignty, and the rules-based order.

Economically, while Canada's direct trade impact with Russia is relatively small, the conflict has broader implications for global commodity prices and international trade dynamics. The article has pointed out how sanctions and geopolitical tensions can ripple through global markets, influencing economic stability and energy security.

Finally, the Russia-Ukraine conflict can be regarded as a critical juncture in contemporary international relations, challenging established norms and alliances while highlighting the enduring relevance of geopolitical realism. As the conflict continues to unfold, the global community faces ongoing challenges in navigating diplomatic solutions, humanitarian crises, and strategic security concerns in the European region and beyond.

Notes

1 For more information about the Warsaw Pact, see US Department of State (2024), “The Warsaw Treaty Organization, 1955”. Available at: https://history.state.gov/milestones/1953-1960/warsaw- treaty

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