Challenges of International Labor Programs: The Case of Mexican Agricultural Workers in Canada

Introduction

In a globalized world, the right to work has been established across multiple domains. Labor integration has evolved not only within nation-states but also through an increasing number of agreements between countries, creating employment frameworks with specific characteristics. These international arrangements now often involve coordinated actions across different levels of government. Historically, labor programs facilitating the employment of migrant workers were introduced, particularly during wartime periods. However, labor relations and governmental action are neither static nor mechanical. Over time, nation-states, labor organizations, and other social actors have reshaped labor dynamics.

In the era of global neoliberal globalization, state involvement has been intermittent. Public policies reflect not only a government’s obligations to its citizens but also how it engages with and manages international agreements and programs aimed at partially addressing issues like unemployment. In Mexico’s case, this is evident in the historical agreements facilitating the employment of Mexican workers abroad. The most well-known is the Bracero Program with the United States, and the still-active Seasonal Agricultural Workers Program (SAWP) with Canada. The latter has increasingly been criticized for marginalizing the role of federal and provincial governments while granting employers greater control over the program.

This article aims to describe the dynamics of the Seasonal Agricultural Workers Program (SAWP), known in Mexico as the Programa de Trabajadores Agrícolas Temporales México-Canadá (PTAT). This article questions whether Mexico's migration trends toward the U.S.—exacerbated by punitive and enforcement-driven immigration policies—might revitalize or expand other regulated labor pathways such as that with Canada. It also explores the emergence of alternative frameworks such as the Low-Skilled Workers Program (LSWP), which undermine subnational involvement and introduce deregulation that negatively affects labor conditions.

Methodologically, the analysis adopts a subnational perspective, emphasizing local actors engaged in the bilateral dynamics between Mexico and Canada. The chapter examines the objectives of these programs, identifying differences and their implications. Although the SAWP was initiated in 1974 as a binational cooperation model, the discussion is temporally limited to developments during the first two decades of the 21st century. A notable feature of the program is its ongoing assessment mechanism aimed at ensuring improved labor conditions for migrant workers and promoting a safe, temporary, orderly, controlled, and legal migration flow.

The Dynamics of the Seasonal Agricultural Workers Program (SAWP)

The Mexico-Canada Seasonal Agricultural Workers Program (SAWP) commemorated its 50th anniversary in 2024. Launched in 1974, it is recognized as a successful binational model for orderly and rights-based labor migration, providing Mexican agricultural workers with decent employment opportunities in Canada. Over its history, the program has benefited more than 522,000 workers, with a record number of contracts (145,028) issued during the previous administration of President Andrés Manuel López Obrador (December 2018 – September 2024) (SRE, 2024).

In 2024 alone, nearly 26,000 Mexican workers registered to work in Canada, backed by comprehensive support from Mexico’s Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare (STPS) and consular services. At a commemorative event in Mexico City, government officials (including Labor Secretary and Canada's Ambassador to Mexico) praised the workers' contributions to food security and economic development in both countries. Veteran workers with over 20 years in the program were recognized for their dedication (SRE, 2024).

SAWP has also expanded beyond agriculture to sectors like food processing, construction, and tourism, and has generated significant remittances—over 388 million Canadian dollars in 2023 alone. As part of a broader Mexico-Canada relationship, SAWP exemplifies what can be achieved through regulated migration agreements. Authorities reaffirmed their commitment to improving labor conditions and ensuring workers' rights as the program continues to grow and diversify (SRE, 2024).

By the 20th century, Mexico had firmly established itself as a country of emigrants. More recently, in the second decade of the 21st century, Mexico not only continues to send labor migrants abroad, but also receives migrants and serves as a transit country for millions of others facing hazardous journeys. Thus, international migration is a complex and dynamic process that has generated subnational ties between places of origin and destination. Here, "subnational" refers to entities within nation-states that create and manage agreements with external actors.

According to Zepeda, 2019), various subnational actors—both governmental and non-governmental—shape public policy beyond national borders, becoming key hubs of governance. These actions aim to promote decentralized cooperation in crucial areas such as education, training, science and technology, and the sharing of experience. These efforts include civil society groups, NGOs, transnational corporations, among others, who become important stakeholders in regional governance (Zepeda, 2019).

In parts of Mexico, migration strategies involve parallel actions by governments and hometown associations, forming geopolitical enclaves that establish bilateral relationships. These are driven not only by geographic proximity or migration traditions but also by international programs linking countries, regions, states, and provinces. This is particularly evident in the case of Mexican workers in Canada.

Unlike the U.S. Bracero Program (1942–1964), the Canadian program was formalized through a Memorandum of Understanding integrating Mexico into the SAWP.

It is important to remark that consulates of Mexico in Canada are not responsible for securing employment; this is the role of Mexico’s National Employment Service (SNE by its Spanish initials), under the Secretariat of Labor and Social Welfare (STyPS by its Spanish initials), through its state offices. The consulates are, however, tasked with ensuring that workers’ human and labor rights are upheld from arrival in Canada to their return. Provincial and federal labor laws in Canada protect these rights, and workers receive provincial health insurance. The maximum stay is eight months.

According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (SRE), SAWP requirements include: being a farmworker or currently employed in agriculture; age between 22 and 45; education between third grade of primary and third grade of secondary school; and being married or in a common-law union (single individuals with dependents may also qualify).

The program is specifically targeted at rural Mexican workers. Like the Bracero Program, it responds to labor supply and demand. The SAWP has contributed to a steady rise in remittances, thereby improving workers' living conditions. However, the introduction of the LSWP in 2002 raised concerns due to its adverse effects on labor conditions and its implications for subnational governance.

Mexican agricultural migration to Canada is highly regulated. This regulation aims to prevent imbalances in labor supply and demand while also discouraging mass, generational reproduction of migration patterns as seen in the U.S. In addition to Mexico, Canada has extended the program to include countries such as Barbados, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago—nations with English-language compatibility that once formed the majority of temporary agricultural workers in Canada.

Despite the program’s 50-year history and having mobilized over half a million Mexican workers, its viability began to be questioned in the early 21st century due to Canada’s progressive withdrawal from regulatory mechanisms. Since 2010, more than 10,000 Mexican workers have traveled to Canada annually under this program. They work on farms under bilateral agreements regulated by both Mexican and Canadian governments. In the first half of 2015 alone, the SNE facilitated the placement of 21,499 workers. This number rose to 26,039 in 2023 and 27,000 in 2024. Key destination provinces include Ontario, British Columbia, Quebec, Alberta, and more recently, Nova Scotia and Saskatchewan. Most workers come from the State of Mexico, Tlaxcala, Veracruz, and Puebla, with recent additions from Michoacán and Morelos (UPM, 2022).

The SAWP consolidation is not only the result of institutional mechanisms but also due to the structural crisis of Mexican agriculture, which has led to a lack of opportunities, low profitability, and declining competitiveness—factors reflected in deteriorating labor conditions. From an institutional perspective, the program is often viewed as a successful model of international labor mobility that meets Canada’s agricultural labor needs. Nonetheless, it is important to consider how the program also accommodates the interests of Canadian employers, focusing on flexibility—an aspect some studies link to the dominant role of provincial business groups.

Regions supplying this labor may benefit, as temporary migration facilitates remittances and institutional relationships that help mitigate the risks of labor migration. In 2015 alone, 21,499 Mexican agricultural workers in Canada reported sending back CAD 225,052,091 in remittances. Female participation has also increased: in 2018, of 25,331 Mexican agricultural workers, 751 were women; in 2019, 774 of the 26,399 workers were female (STyPS, 2016; SRE, 2020). According to the Migration Policy Unit, from 2015 to 2022, a total of 194,431 seasonal workers participated in the program, 97% male (188,955) and 3% female (5,476) (UPM, 2024).

This temporary program reflects joint policy interactions, albeit less developed and coordinated than U.S. programs like the now- extinct 3x1 Program involving governments and businesses. In the Canadian case, federal and provincial participation generates subnational effects. This allows for a novel consideration of subnational units as key actors in labor migration policy, along with influencing factors such as human rights and transit policies (Sánchez, 2017).

To understand the continuity and consolidation of the SAWP, it is essential to recognize the role of subnational units. These programs are institutional agreements managing labor mobility flows through intergovernmental mechanisms, administered by both federal and state authorities in Mexico and Canada—with Canadian employers playing an essential role.

The Canadian business sector, as a powerful actor, provides program operability. Employers are required to offer housing that meets provincial standards, as well as meals, airfare, and health insurance. However, some studies indicate that employers recoup much of their upfront costs through wage deductions, highlighting the risk of regulated yet abusive practices. This underscores the importance of the employment contract.

As Escobar (2020) argues, contracts recognized by labor laws between employer and employee serve as a cornerstone of formal labor relations. These agreements establish the legal recognition of rights and obligations, allowing workers to construct employment trajectories that ideally lead to a fair and dignified conclusion of working life.

The Need for Bilaterally Regulated Labor Relations

Within the labor program between Mexico and Canada, it is essential to implement continuous evaluations, given the exponential increase in regulated migration and the formalization of programs linked to subnational units that aim to safeguard workers’ integrity. This is particularly the case in states such as Tlaxcala and Puebla, where subnational units have become significant as labor suppliers. In coordination with governmental institutional mechanisms, they generate synergies that may produce local benefits, albeit often at the cost of deteriorating labor conditions.

As noted in the works of Binford, Carrasco, and Arana (2004), and Becerril (2003), Mexican workers from central states—especially Tlaxcala and Puebla—face vulnerable conditions marked by extreme labor exploitation: wages and earnings below the minimum wage, no payment for overtime, and no consideration of seniority, as newly arrived workers earn the same as those with more experience. Consequently, the only way for these workers to increase their weekly income is by working more hours. Workers' narratives reveal that more than a third did not receive even a single day of rest, in violation of the program’s contractual regulations. This echoes the Jamaican case denounced by the Migrant Workers Alliance for Change (2002), which described practices tantamount to systemic slavery.

Becerril’s 2003 study (cited in Sánchez, 2017:8), focusing on Mexican workers in Leamington, Ontario—known as Canada’s “tomato capital”—argues that Mexican transnational agricultural labor in Canada reflects broader processes of productive restructuring and new organizational forms in the workplace. These spaces are also marked by a strict gendered and ethnic division of labor, which leads to discrimination in task assignments, positions, and work schedules, thereby fostering labor segmentation and segregation. Furthermore, there is an underutilization of labor, particularly concerning women strawberry workers, who, despite possessing qualifications, continuous training, and experience, receive no formal recognition from Canadian employers. This results in negative impacts on their earnings.

This reinforces Molinet’s argument (in Sánchez, 2017) that subnational units—particularly in the destinations—experience asymmetries and conflicts in employer-worker relations. These dynamics reveal varying degrees of control or governance that should, in principle, be formally upheld through the administrative representations of workers’ places of origin, grounded in a framework of bilateral relations.

Flexibility and Deregulation: Obstacles in Labor Trajectories

In 2002, the Canadian government implemented the Low Skilled Workers Program (LSWP), also known as the Low-Skilled Foreign Workers Program (LSFWP) or the Low Skilled Pilot Program (LSPP). Unlike the more historically established labor program, the LSWP is characterized by flexibility based on the worker’s country of origin, which predefines their potential skills. This approach reflects a neoliberal logic, given the absence of direct Canadian government involvement in agreements between employers and workers. As a result, not only is employer control amplified, but deregulation also deepens the workers’ vulnerability in terms of labor rights and conditions.

The primary objective of this program is to recruit low-skilled labor from underdeveloped countries at low wages, offering alternative recruitment or subcontracting arrangements—without intermediaries—for various niches in the agricultural sector. As previously noted, the establishment of bilateral contracts with diplomatic oversight offers dual-layer protection for migrant workers. Without such protections, the market—via employers—can distort or undermine labor rights and obligations. Non-consensual changes to regulations enable the implementation of subcontracting or outsourcing schemes.

Unlike other programs, LSWP workers typically remain in Canada for one to two years. However, this program features minimal government supervision and regulatory oversight of working conditions—unlike the SAWP, where consular structures play an active role in labor monitoring. Additionally, Canadian employers and intermediaries from both countries receive little support from Canadian institutions in their dealings with public and private entities. This scenario exemplifies the erosion of subnational dynamism. It reveals the weakening of subnational structures in both origin and destination communities, as legal and institutional mechanisms for mediation and conflict resolution between employers and workers are absent (Muñoz, 2011).

It is necessary that both the Mexican and Canadian governments—at all administrative levels—act not merely as administrators of the program, but as guarantors of the labor and human rights of enrolled workers. This would enhance not only the bilateral relationship between nation-states and their subnational entities but also reflect a multilateral commitment to the protection of migrants as citizens beyond national borders.

Despite the Canadian government’s 2007 announcement of improved compliance measures to protect temporary foreign workers, ongoing verification of employer compliance with labor conditions for low-skilled workers is imperative. Sanctions must be imposed on employers who violate contracts and exploit workers. These exploitative conditions have raised serious concerns about the need for regulatory frameworks that legitimize the program. Since 2009, the Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration has recommended that the Canadian government: establish a consultative board for temporary foreign workers, issue sector-specific work permits, impose employer fees to support unemployed foreign workers, create a pathway to permanent residency based on minimum employment periods, and enhance protections for temporary foreign workers (Fudge & MacPhail, 2009).

Tertiary Labor and the Erosion of Labor Rights

It is not an exaggeration to associate this program with the broader phenomenon of labor tertiarization. This connection stems from the reality that global production systems have also transformed agricultural production, integrating it into transnational corporate structures dependent on labor as a key input. AsEscobar (2020) points out, the new phase of capitalism has created value chains that span various parts of the world. In this context, migrant labor is indispensable, and employers frequently use deregulated mechanisms that undermine labor relations and their associated responsibilities. This creates a façade of legality that facilitates the evasion of employer obligations under the guise of collective contracting, ultimately worsening labor conditions.

This situation underscores the need for joint government intervention. If the program is to be truly understood within the framework of subnational units, governments at all levels must engage in political negotiation and programmatic governance. Subnational units should be recognized as public policy actors rooted in specific localities.

The Low Skilled Workers Program (LSWP) and the Disempowerment of Labor

Under this program, labor relations have become individualized and detached from governmental frameworks, facilitating direct employer-worker relationships governed by market logic. Employer companies have modified their relationships with federal and provincial governments, as well as labor organizations, in a push to modernize administrative and work structures. These companies now define job requirements autonomously, reshaping the relationship between skilled and unskilled labor. This has intensified income inequality and deepened the disadvantages faced by uncertified workers (Zapata, 2001).

Previously, the strength of subnational units in the decision-making process provided some level of protection and shared benefits. Under the current model, there is a notable lack of job security. The erosion of labor representation has affected not only work distribution and wage demands but also the presence of effective governmental oversight over employment contracts and labor conditions.

As discussed earlier, regulating migration through subcontracting schemes with high labor flexibility—as in some cases involving U.S. H2B visas—creates triangular intercompany relationships that relieve employers of legal responsibilities toward workers (Sánchez, 2017). This structure has led to numerous reports of labor violations, undermining the intended goals of these programs.

To address these challenges, it is necessary to implement international labor governance policies managed by subnational governmental actors, NGOs, and labor organizations to ensure institutional legitimacy and labor security. As Calvento (2014) argues, this creates opportunities in the global context and positions Canadian labor markets as tools for bilateral local development.

Although the 2007 Statement of Objectives called for improvements in temporary worker programs and the protection of labor rights, the Labor Mobility Working Group has failed to prioritize these issues, focusing instead on expanding segmented labor market opportunities.

The subnational dynamic that has existed for decades between the governments of Mexico and Canada, alongside other actors, has historically provided a degree of regulation over both labor practices and employer behavior, offering a measure of protection for Mexican workers. The absence of diplomatic-level government intervention risks undermining these programs, which, despite their limitations, have partially addressed regional problems in workers’ communities of origin—through remittances—and helped meet labor demands among Canadian employers.

Conclusions

For decades, the temporary labor program for Mexican workers in Canada operated in an orderly manner and included elements that significantly enhanced workers’ labor security. However, the emergence of alternative programs is characterized not only by a deregulatory approach to labor migration flows but also by a tendency to undermine optimal working conditions.

There is a clear discrepancy between the political discourse and the actual practice regarding labor rights, particularly due to the restrictive nature of work permits. The requirements for job placement may limit workers’ labor rights under the guise of protective measures. As Tigau (2015) points out, recruitment practices—especially within the framework of subnational unit cooperation—often allow regional strategies in destination localities to benefit from the labor force while excluding other dimensions of migrant workers’ trajectories. Similarly, we concur with Kurczyn and Pastrana’s (2016) position that employment contracts must acknowledge and account for the inequalities among the actors involved. In other words, labor contracts should be framed in equitable terms that reduce workers’ disadvantages within employment relationships, while also ensuring that the Canadian employer’s demands are met in a fair and ethical manner.

It is important to recognize the relevance of labor programs based on the competitive advantages of the participating countries. However, the need to adapt to new organizational and multilateral regulatory frameworks may establish optimal conditions for competitiveness and productivity in regional labor markets. Success and sustainability should not be assessed solely on the basis of workers’ wages. Therefore, it is necessary to implement conditions that reflect labor guarantees and produce a dual benefit in both the places of origin and destination. When designed from the perspective of subnational units and regulated by the state and other stakeholders in a coordinated manner, such programs allow for local operational autonomy while minimizing labor risks. It must be remembered that migratory dynamics generate sustainable ways of living and working. Migration is not solely about income; rather, it involves creating synergies for regional development with mutual benefits.

Thus, any bilateral, trilateral, or multilateral labor program will remain vulnerable in its operation unless institutional mechanisms are in place to ensure mutual oversight between governments and agencies in the interest of protecting workers. Moreover, employment contracts that fail to guarantee optimal working conditions and respect for labor rights must be rendered invalid. One possible challenge would be to establish a mechanism similar to the Rapid Response Labor Mechanism (RRLM), which has been applied under the, but specifically designed for labor programs. Such a mechanism would ensure optimal workplace conditions and facilitate the consolidation of trilateral labor programs in North America.