Institutionalizing Middle-Power Security Cooperation: Strategic Convergence Between South Korea and Canada in the Indo-Pacific

Introduction

As global security threats become increasingly multifaceted—spanning traditional and non-traditional domains—there is a growing imperative for comprehensive, adaptive, and collaborative defense strategies. Middle powers such as South Korea and Canada, endowed with advanced capabilities, democratic governance, and global responsibilities, are uniquely positioned to help maintain regional stability and uphold a rules-based international order. While their respective Indo-Pacific engagements have evolved largely in parallel, recent developments—including the 2024 Korea–Canada Foreign and Defense Ministers’ (2+2) meeting—signal an emerging opportunity for deeper strategic alignment

Despite the absence of formal alliance ties or geographic proximity, South Korea and Canada are expanding cooperation in maritime domain awareness, cyber defense, emerging technologies, and defense industrial collaboration. These developments raise a core question in the study of international security: How can two geographically distant middle powers institutionalize strategic cooperation in the absence of direct threats or shared regional identity? This question becomes more urgent amid the rising uncertainty of the Indo-Pacific, where regional architectures are increasingly shaped by great-power rivalry, minilateral alignments, and competitive norm-setting

This article addresses that question by situating Korea–Canada security cooperation within the broader literature on middle-power diplomacy, bilateral institutionalism, and norm entrepreneurship. While existing research on Indo-Pacific middle powers has largely focused on Southeast Asia or US-aligned states, this study examines a comparatively underexplored dyad—South Korea and Canada—to assess how functional cooperation can evolve into a more durable institutional partnership. In doing so, it contributes to the growing body of scholarship that analyzes how middle powers manage structural uncertainty through multilateral and bilateral initiatives that blend strategic pragmatism with normative aspiration (Cooper, Higgott, and Nossal, 1993; Acharya, 2014; Goh, 2013)

To address this question, the article adopts a multidimensional framework grounded in a realist–constructivist perspective. It hypothesizes that functionally driven security cooperation between geographically distant middle powers can be institutionalized—even in the absence of formal alliances or shared regional identity—when supported by norm entrepreneurship, strategic complementarity, and a shared middle-power identity. Drawing on process tracing and discourse analysis of official documents issued between 2022 and 2024, the study identifies four key areas of convergence: maritime security and Indo-Pacific strategy alignment; multilateral interoperability; cooperation in emerging domains such as cyber, space, and cognitive warfare; and defense industrial collaboration, including submarine and MRO programs. The findings support this hypothesis and suggest that Korea–Canada cooperation offers a scalable model for norm-driven middle-power alignment in the Indo-Pacific. The sections that follow elaborate the analytical framework, present empirical findings, and propose policy strategies for institutionalizing bilateral security cooperation

Literature Review

The concept of “middle power” has long occupied a central place in international relations scholarship, especially in discussions about states that lack great-power capabilities but exert significant influence through diplomacy, multilateralism, and norm-setting. Cooper, Higgott, and Nossal, 1993 characterize middle powers as countries that "rely on multilateral solutions to international problems, possess a degree of diplomatic initiative, and act as mediators or bridge-builders in the international system." Their work laid the foundation for understanding middle powers as norm entrepreneurs rather than purely material actors. Jordaan (2003) later expanded this framework by distinguishing between "traditional" and "emerging" middle powers, with the latter defined not solely by capabilities but also by foreign policy behavior shaped by developmental experiences, identity, and multilateral commitment

In recent years, a renewed scholarly focus has emerged around the role of middle powers in the Indo-Pacific, particularly in light of intensifying great-power rivalry. South Korea’s middle-power strategy has been more consistently articulated in relation to its geopolitical vulnerabilities and alliance management. Lee and Moon (2019) analyze South Korea’s hedging behavior as a deliberate attempt to balance U.S. alliance expectations with regional autonomy. Their study illustrates how Seoul's middle-power identity is functionally employed to expand diplomatic room for maneuver while maintaining security guarantees. Related analyses by institutions such as the Asan Institute and Chatham House indicate a growing interest in how Korea pursues "strategic autonomy" within multilateral frameworks while deepening selective bilateral and trilateral security ties

Notably absent in much of this literature, however, is a systematic examination of the bilateral security convergence between South Korea and Canada. Existing studies have tended to treat these countries' Indo-Pacific engagements in isolation, with limited analysis of their potential synergy as like-minded middle powers. This article seeks to bridge that gap by analyzing how Seoul and Ottawa can institutionalize multidimensional security cooperation—spanning traditional and emerging domains—through a structured framework informed by IR theory, especially middle-power diplomacy, norm diffusion, and strategic alignment in contested regions

Analytical Framework

This study adopts a qualitative case study approach to explore how South Korea and Canada, as two middle powers, are converging strategically in the Indo-Pacific. The analysis is guided by the theoretical lens of middle-power diplomacy, a concept that characterizes states with moderate material capabilities but disproportionate normative and institutional influence in international affairs. Middle powers, such as South Korea and Canada, are neither regional hegemons nor great powers, yet they play critical roles in shaping global governance, building coalitions, and reinforcing multilateral institutions. Rather than exerting dominance, they are often recognized for their ability to mediate, bridge, and institutionalize cooperation, especially in complex and contested regions like the Indo-Pacific (Cooper, Higgott, and Nossal, 1993;Jordaan (2003) )

Middle powers are typically defined not just by their material capacity but by the behavioral logic of their foreign policies, including a commitment to rules-based order, preference for multilateral institutions, and the use of diplomacy over coercion. As Jordaan (2003) notes, middle powers often play the role of "moral actors" and "bridge-builders" in international relations, operating within an ethical and institutional framework to mediate great-power rivalry

A central aspect of this framework is norm entrepreneurship—the ability of middle powers to lead in the creation, diffusion, or defense of international norms (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998). In the context of Korea–Canada security cooperation, norm entrepreneurship is evident in their shared emphasis on the rules-based international order, multilateralism, and inclusive approaches to emerging threats such as cyberattacks, disinformation, and climate-related security risks. Their engagement is not merely reactive; it is structured and forward-looking, seeking to fill strategic voids left by major power rivalry and institutional fragmentation

To capture the full range of security challenges and cooperative modalities, this study also draws on the concept of comprehensive security, which expands the analytical scope beyond traditional military alliances. Comprehensive security encompasses both conventional and non-conventional domains, including maritime security, technological innovation, cognitive warfare, space resilience, and defense industrial ecosystems. This perspective is essential to understanding how South Korea and Canada—as middle powers—can collaborate across sectors to build resilience and strategic depth, without overextending their political or military capital

In an era where multilateralism is increasingly strained, smaller groupings—such as the Quad or trilateral partnerships involving middle powers—are seen as pragmatic venues for targeted cooperation in defense, intelligence, and emerging technologies. Korea and Canada’s engagement through multilateral exercises like RIMPAC and initiatives under NATO-Asia cooperation frameworks exemplifies this trend

Methodologically, this study employs process tracing and discourse analysis of official documents, strategic white papers, ministerial speeches, and policy briefings released by both governments between 2022 and 2024. Rather than testing a hypothesis in a positivist sense, it adopts an inductive, theory-informed approach to evaluate the plausibility of a strategic convergence model between two geographically distant middle powers

This study hypothesizes that functionally driven, multidimensional security cooperation between South Korea and Canada can be institutionalized in the absence of formal alliances or geographic proximity—particularly when grounded in norm entrepreneurship, strategic complementarity, and shared middle-power identity

In doing so, the article addresses two central research questions:
1. How can South Korea and Canada construct a scalable and institutionalized framework for strategic security cooperation in the Indo-Pacific?
2. What are the strategic opportunities and operational constraints involved in pursuing multidimensional, norm-driven middle-power alignment?

This study hypothesizes that functionally driven, multidimensional security cooperation between geographically distant middle powers—such as South Korea and Canada—can be institutionalized in the absence of formal alliances or geographic proximity, particularly when grounded in norm entrepreneurship, strategic complementarity, and shared middle-power identity. The analysis applies a theoretically informed framework that integrates realist and constructivist perspectives to evaluate both strategic convergence and operational feasibility

In theoretical terms, this article applies a synthesized realist–constructivist lens to examine Korea–Canada security cooperation. From a realist perspective, the strategic convergence of the two countries can be seen as a rational response to the intensification of systemic uncertainty in the Indo-Pacific, including great-power rivalry, maritime insecurity, and technological competition. These developments increase both the incentives and the urgency for middle powers to build functional and scalable strategic partnerships, especially in key areas such as maritime security, interoperability, and defense-industrial cooperation. At the same time, constructivist insights help explain the ideational enablers of such cooperation. South Korea and Canada’s shared liberal-democratic identity, institutional culture, and commitment to multilateralism serve as normative foundations for bilateral alignment, even in the absence of formal alliance obligations. By integrating these two perspectives, this study captures the material incentives and normative commitments that enable geographically distant middle powers to institutionalize security cooperation across multiple domains

Strategic Pillar 1: Maritime Security and Indo-Pacific Strategy Alignment

The Indo-Pacific region is home to approximately 65% of the global population and accounts for more than 60% of the world's GDP. Additionally, over half of global maritime transportation passes through this region, making it a critical hub in terms of economic, diplomatic, and security considerations. The Korean Peninsula is one of the key factors influencing peace and stability in the region. In recognition of this, the Government of the Republic of Korea announced its Indo-Pacific Strategy in 2022, centered on the core values of “freedom,” “peace,” and “prosperity,” and declared its commitment to contributing to comprehensive regional security cooperation.

South Korea places particular emphasis on maritime security cooperation. In order to ensure peace and freedom of navigation in major sea lanes, such as the South China Sea, Korea is strengthening cooperation with relevant countries. It is also upholding international norms by adhering to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and faithfully implementing the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP). Furthermore, Korea is focusing on enhancing Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA), a concept first introduced by the White House in 2005, which refers to a comprehensive understanding and approach to all areas that may affect maritime domains, including safety, security, economy, society, and the environment

The Korean government is benchmarking the Singapore Information Fusion Center (IFC), which facilitates the rapid sharing of information among multinational naval liaison officers, to develop a Korea-specific MDA model. This effort will require participation not only from the Navy, but also from various relevant entities including the Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Korea Coast Guard, shipping companies, and port authorities, as part of a broader public-private cooperation network

Meanwhile, Canada has also established its own Indo-Pacific Strategy and is steadily expanding its engagement in regional security and defense. As part of this strategy, Canada is conducting Operation Horizon, a major military initiative that deploys its Army, Navy, Air Force, and Special Operations Forces to the region. The objective is to promote peace and stability and establish a rules-based international order. As part of this effort, the Royal Canadian Navy annually deploys three vessels to the Indo-Pacific to enhance robust military cooperation with allied and partner nations

Canada is also actively participating in Operation NEON, which supports the enforcement of United Nations Security Council sanctions against North Korea. Since 2018, Canada has regularly deployed ships, aircraft, and personnel to monitor North Korea’s maritime sanctions evasion efforts. This operation not only helps deter illicit activities but also signals the international community's continued commitment to upholding UN resolutions.

At the 2024 Korea–Canada Foreign and Defense (2+2) Ministerial Meeting, the two countries launched the “Korea–Canada Indo-Pacific Dialogue” and agreed to identify various synergy projects, reaffirming their strong mutual interest and commitment to the region.

Building on this context, the present report proposes the following cooperation measures.

First, South Korea and Canada should establish a system for information sharing to enhance MDA capabilities in the Indo-Pacific. Both countries are implementing Indo-Pacific strategies aimed at bolstering their economic, social, diplomatic, and security capacities, which aligns closely with the rationale for developing an MDA framework. In particular, conflicts in the South China Sea could significantly impact fields such as the economy, logistics, energy, and data. Moreover, issues like illegal fishing and marine pollution have the potential to cause global environmental crises. To effectively address such challenges, it is essential to produce reliable information and share it rapidly

As an initial step, both countries could establish a routine information-sharing mechanism between academic, business, and governmental actors in fields such as economics, trade, energy, and the environment. This would contribute to mutual trust-building. However, such first-tier cooperation has limitations in addressing more complex security challenges like maritime disasters, piracy suppression, and sanctions evasion at sea. Therefore, it is necessary to move to a second-tier collaboration involving the sharing of data collected via civilian and military satellites, in order to further strengthen maritime safety and security capabilities. This stage would involve sharing sensitive security information, such as intelligence on human trafficking at sea and illegal shipments by North Korea, and would be highly compatible with Canada’s existing Operation NEON

Looking ahead, a third-tier model could involve expanding bilateral information-sharing frameworks to include key Indo-Pacific democratic countries such as the United States, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand. Since South Korea and Canada already share information individually with these countries, evolving toward a multilateral cooperative structure is a highly feasible option

Multilateral cooperation—especially among South Korea, the United States, Japan, and Canada—can further enhance maritime deterrence and crisis response. A robust maritime security and logistics system is needed to respond rapidly to North Korean provocations and regional instability. In such a framework, Japan is expected to secure the Maritime Prepositioning Ship Squadrons (MPS) near Okinawa, while Canada contributes by safeguarding routes in the North Pacific. South Korea and Japan could engage in mine-clearing operations, while Canada leverages its expertise from multinational mine-clearance exercises

To institutionalize this, Korea and Canada could co-lead a Multinational Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) Task Force with support from the U.S. and Japan. This force would enable real-time data sharing between Canada’s LCSS and Korea’s KAMD systems and allow Canadian frigates to conduct regular patrols in East Asian waters. These combined efforts would enhance surveillance and maintain maritime dominance during peace and contingencies

Another important initiative is the formation of a joint consultative body to explore potential sites for cooperative ports either in South Korea or in a third country. The Ministry of National Defense of Korea is currently conducting preliminary research on establishing such ports to expand MDA capabilities in the Indo-Pacific. Canada, for its part, has growing needs for accessible cooperative ports as it seeks to enhance its trade and economic presence in the region. Considering these shared interests, it would be appropriate to propose joint meetings and the signing of Memorandums of Understanding (MOUs) on this topic at the 2026 Korea–Canada Foreign and Security (2+2) Ministerial Meeting

If Korea and Canada were to jointly explore candidate sites for cooperative ports in India or ASEAN countries, they could present the initiative as one with non-military purposes—such as promoting academic exchange, environmental protection, maritime norm-building, and improving the human rights of women and minorities in the Indo-Pacific. This would help garner broader international support. During the search for cooperative port sites, consideration should also be given to how these ports might facilitate future maritime security cooperation with key regional partners such as the U.S., Japan, and Australia, and potentially serve as a deterrence mechanism in the event of contingencies on the Korean Peninsula or in the Taiwan Strait

While maritime security forms the front line of Korea–Canada strategic alignment, deeper interoperability must be supported by broader military frameworks, beginning with NATO and NORAD

Strategic Pillar 2: Multilateral Military and Intelligence Interoperability

International politics and global relations are becoming increasingly complex, and there is growing recognition that enhancing a country’s military capabilities alone is no longer sufficient to ensure national security. In this context, the importance of bilateral and multilateral military cooperation is more emphasized than ever. South Korea, based on its military alliance with the United States, has been strengthening security cooperation with key partner countries as part of its efforts to respond to growing instability in international security

North Korea remains the most serious security threat to South Korea. Past experiences clearly demonstrate that mere dialogue is insufficient to bring about meaningful changes in North Korea's behavior. Moreover, given the ongoing support—both direct and indirect—provided to North Korea by China, Russia, and Iran, securing deterrence through enhanced regional military cooperation has become an essential component of South Korea’s national security strategy

In this context, the South Korean government formalized the enhancement of trilateral security cooperation with the United States and Japan at the Camp David Summit in August 2023. It has also been deepening its defense and security partnership with Australia, thereby expanding both bilateral and trilateral frameworks for cooperation. Furthermore, South Korea continues to actively participate in multilateral military initiatives, such as the Rim of the Pacific Exercise (RIMPAC), the world’s largest multinational maritime exercise, in alignment with its commitment to working alongside like-minded democratic nations.

In addition, South Korea has been actively strengthening cooperation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), aiming to fulfill its responsibilities as a democratic country amidst global instability. This cooperation has taken on heightened urgency following North Korea’s dispatch of troops to support Russia. NATO, for its part, has also recognized the need to expand collaboration with Asia-Pacific nations. In October 2024, NATO officially invited the so-called Indo-Pacific Four (IP4)—South Korea, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand—to its Defense Ministers’ Meeting for the first time. Earlier, in July 2024, the IP4 heads of state held a summit during the NATO Leaders’ Meeting, reaffirming their shared awareness of international security challenges and pledging cooperation to uphold a rules-based international order.

Canada, for its part, has traditionally maintained strong military alliances with the United Kingdom, the United States, and other partners, and continues to actively engage in multilateral military cooperation. As a core NATO member, Canada has contributed significantly to collective defense efforts, investing USD 107 million in the NATO Innovation Fund. It has also deployed troops to Latvia and is providing military training programs to the Ukrainian armed forces as part of ongoing NATO operations

In terms of intelligence sharing, Canada is a member of the Five Eyes alliance, along with the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand. While intelligence alliances differ in nature from military partnerships, the provision of intelligence is a critical element of modern military operations. For this reason, Five Eyes can be regarded as a quasi-military framework. Recently, Five Eyes launched a new security advisory initiative—Secure Innovation—to enhance cooperation in emerging technologies, further broadening the scope of allied collaboration

Canada has also revised its Indo-Pacific Strategy to strengthen military cooperation with key regional countries, and its bilateral and multilateral defense engagements are expected to continue expanding

Accordingly, this report proposes the following areas for Korea–Canada defense cooperation:

First, there is a need for more concrete discussions on military support mechanisms linked to NATO cooperation. North Korea’s deployment of forces to support Russia has made it even more urgent for South Korea to enhance its contributions to NATO. However, direct deployment of South Korean troops could heighten military tensions and provoke diplomatic friction with neighboring countries. As such, indirect military support through NATO member Canada offers a more realistic alternative

One possible approach is for South Korea and Canada to establish a cooperative mechanism for joint production and export of military systems—tentatively titled the Korea–Canada Military Support (KOCAMS) framework. Since NATO prioritizes procurement from member states and adheres to standards set by the NATO Standardization Office (NSO), supporting NATO military logistics through standardized items developed with Canada could help South Korean defense products enter the NATO supply chain more smoothly, without the political burden associated with direct troop involvement. The KOCAMS framework could also serve as a foundation for ongoing defense industrial cooperation between the two countries

Second, Canada’s participation in U.S.–ROK combined exercises could serve as a channel for deepening military cooperation. Due to domestic political sensitivities and regional diplomatic considerations—especially with regard to China—a direct bilateral military exercise between South Korea and Canada on the Korean Peninsula may face practical limitations. Therefore, a more feasible alternative would be to increase Canada’s involvement in U.S.–ROK joint exercises, leveraging its status as a United Nations Command (UNC) member state

Recent policy trends indicate a growing presence of UNC member state forces during these joint exercises. Canada could expand the deployment of its command personnel and troops to participate in operational training with the South Korean military. This cooperation could go beyond ground-based maneuver training to include naval assets currently engaged in Operation NEON in the Indo-Pacific, thereby diversifying the scope of Korea–Canada military collaboration

If political circumstances in South Korea lead to a reduction in U.S.–ROK joint exercises in the future, the two countries could continue their cooperation through command post exercises (CPX), maintaining strategic military coordination between the two command structures in preparation for potential contingencies on the Korean Peninsula

Furthermore, trilateral cooperation under the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) framework can be expanded to enhance early warning and missile defense capabilities. NORAD, which has traditionally focused on North America’s airspace, must adapt to include Indo-Pacific threats. This includes developing an Integrated Early Warning System (IEWS) that incorporates data from Korean and Japanese radar systems. While such a shift would require recalibrating NORAD’s regional mandate, integrating Korean and Japanese early warning data could be piloted through trilateral military innovation hubs. A Pacific Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) protocol could also enable joint interception operations with the United States

Canadian participation in joint BMD training, including the deployment of Halifax-class frigates and CF-18 fighters, would support interoperability and real-time response. Canada could also leverage its experience with the Aegis Combat System and simulated ICBM response scenarios to align with U.S.–ROK operations

In support of this strategy, Canada’s RADARSAT satellites and Korea’s Green Pine and KAMD assets could be linked through a sensor fusion platform to create a multi-layered, AI-assisted missile tracking and threat forecasting network. This would also reinforce Five Eyes cooperation, allowing Korea to gradually integrate via Canadian facilitation

To ensure sustainment and logistics capacity, Korea and Canada should co-establish a Joint Logistics Support Hub in Busan or Ulsan, offering ship and submarine maintenance for NATO-compatible fleets. Canada would contribute expertise in lifecycle management and Arctic design, while Korea would supply infrastructure and skilled labor. The facility could serve as a hub for allied forces in the Indo-Pacific

Finally, a Korea–U.S.–Canada Trilateral Innovation Hub could develop advanced technologies such as AI-based missile detection systems, autonomous maritime robotics, and strategic supply chain platforms for rare earth elements. The Hub would support secure cyber collaboration and offensive-defense capabilities, further institutionalizing deterrence mechanisms against North Korea

While conventional deterrence and allied military interoperability form the backbone of Korea–Canada strategic coordination, evolving security landscapes demand expanded attention to non-traditional domains. As cyberspace, outer space, and cognitive warfare emerge as decisive arenas of competition, Korea and Canada must deepen their cooperation in these technologically complex and norm-defining fields. Strategic alignment in these areas will be essential for preserving resilience, democratic integrity, and long-term operational relevance

Strategic Pillar 3: Emerging Security Domains (Cyber, Space, Cognitive Warfare)

At the recent Korea–Canada Foreign and Defense Ministers’ (2+2) Meeting, the two countries held in-depth discussions on building a cooperative framework and joint response system to address non-traditional security threats. While traditional security has largely been centered around conventional weapons and asymmetric forces, the modern and future security environment increasingly involves complex, non-physical threats such as cyberattacks, cognitive warfare, space-based challenges, artificial intelligence, climate change, and pandemics. These challenges are collectively referred to as “non-traditional security” or “emerging security” threats

Although South Korea has lagged somewhat behind the United States and NATO in institutionalizing and strategizing its response to emerging security issues, it has shown notable progress in key areas such as cyber defense and the space industry. For example, Korea has consistently participated in Locked Shields, the world’s largest real-time cyber defense exercise organized by the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE). Since 2021, Korea has taken part in the exercise for four consecutive years, significantly enhancing its cyber defense capabilities.

In 2024, the Presidential Office’s National Security Office announced Korea’s National Cybersecurity Strategy, which outlines the country’s vision to become a global pivotal state that upholds freedom, human rights, and the rule of law in cyberspace. The strategy consists of five key pillars: (1) strengthening proactive cyber defense; (2) building a global cooperation framework; (3) improving resilience of critical infrastructure; (4) securing a technological edge in new domains; and (5) reinforcing the cybersecurity foundation

As a non-permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, Korea has hosted open debates on cybersecurity to raise international awareness and has taken a leading role in shaping global norms in this area. In May 2024, Korea officially launched its Aerospace Administration to accelerate developments in space exploration, transport, science, security, and industry. Recently, Korea successfully launched a military satellite and now operates a total of three military satellites. It has particularly focused on small and micro-satellite technologies. These systems significantly enhance the country’s surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities, serving as a strategic asset for Korea’s emergence as a space security power

Since 2021, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has also hosted the World Emerging Security Forum (WESForum), inviting stakeholders from governments, international organizations, academia, and industry to strengthen Korea’s capabilities in addressing emerging threats.

Canada, too, has developed a distinct strategy to address emerging security challenges separate from traditional defense paradigms. Its cybersecurity efforts are based on three main pillars: (1) security and resilience, (2) cyber innovation, and (3) international leadership and cooperation. The Canadian Centre for Cyber Security (CCCS) leads national efforts to counter cyber threats from hostile actors and criminal groups. Canada has explicitly named China, Russia, and Iran as key adversarial states, citing their cyber espionage, intellectual property theft, and supply chain disruptions as serious threats to Canada and its allies’ critical infrastructure.

Canada emphasizes public-private collaboration to strengthen its cyber defenses and works closely with companies like BlackBerry Limited. Moreover, Canada has included cybersecurity initiatives in its Indo-Pacific Strategy, pledging funding and deeper engagement with regional partners—a point of significant relevance to Korea

In the space domain, Canada’s Canadarm technology has earned global recognition, including from NASA. Developed under the leadership of the Canadian Space Agency (CSA), Canadarm is a robotic arm used in satellite and space station operations. First acclaimed for servicing the Hubble Space Telescope, it is now an essential part of the International Space Station (ISS) and will soon be used in NASA’s Lunar Gateway project. Although Canada lacks a domestic launch site, its strengths in space robotics and engineering underscore its status as a leading spacefaring nation. The Canadian Space Strategy, released in 2019, also emphasizes the importance of space security, including goals to enhance space situational awareness and develop surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities. It further declares Canada’s ambition to shape international norms in the space domain

Based on these developments, this report proposes the following areas for Korea–Canada cooperation in emerging security domains:

First, the two countries should institutionalize a Bilateral Cyber Policy Dialogue to share intelligence on cyber threats, facilitate military officer exchanges, and conduct small-scale joint cyber exercises. Given the rapid pace of development in cyber threats, it is crucial to promote exchange programs for junior and mid-level cyber officers to build long-term trust and strategic alignment. Unlike large-scale U.S.–ROK cyber drills, a more feasible approach may involve small joint task teams from each country conducting tactical cyber operations together. In addition, Canada’s military-civilian tech ecosystem complements Korea’s own capabilities, making it valuable to launch a technical cooperation initiative to assess current capabilities and chart mutual advancement. This cooperation could eventually serve as a foundation for broader Korea–North America cybersecurity partnerships

Second, greater diplomatic cooperation is needed to address cognitive warfare. Countries like Russia and China are actively engaging in psychological and perceptual manipulation using false information, cyber operations, social media disinformation, and media control. To counter these tactics, Korea and Canada should establish a diplomatic-level framework for sharing real-time information and analysis. Embassies in each country could objectively monitor local political, social, and cultural dynamics to assess whether domestic trends are being influenced by adversarial disinformation. This could be supported by regular meetings between relevant agencies, and the creation of dedicated hotlines for strategic communication. Given Canada’s intelligence-sharing network with the U.S. and Commonwealth partners, such a mechanism would greatly enhance Korea’s cognitive warfare response capabilities

Third, space security cooperation must become a formal part of the bilateral agenda. As the battlespace extends into space, both countries should explore joint military satellite operations, shared reconnaissance data, and collaborative space defense research. Publicizing shared satellite data through joint statements or multilateral forums can demonstrate responsible use of space technologies and contribute to setting international norms. In the long term, Korea and Canada could play a pivotal role in shaping future space law and governance, especially as space exploration missions expand to the Moon and other planets

Future high-level Korea–Canada meetings should continue to refine these emerging security agendas and pursue a comprehensive strategic partnership across technological, diplomatic, and defense domains

Yet even the most advanced coordination in cyber, space, and cognitive security cannot be sustained without a resilient industrial and technological base. To ensure long-term strategic autonomy and joint force readiness, South Korea and Canada must expand their collaboration into defense manufacturing, lifecycle sustainment, and joint innovation. The development of interoperable platforms and MRO ecosystems will serve as a vital enabler of the multidomain cooperation outlined in previous sections

Strategic Pillar 4: Defense Industry, Submarine, and MRO Cooperation

The evolving international security environment has underscored the critical role of defense industrial capacity, particularly in the wake of the Russia–Ukraine war. This conflict has rekindled global awareness of the importance of self-reliant military production and has prompted NATO countries to increase defense investments. This momentum has accelerated innovation across the defense sector and opened strategic windows for like-minded countries such as South Korea and Canada to strengthen bilateral defense industry partnerships

In the twenty-first century, the defense industry is not merely a military enterprise—it also serves as a driver of economic growth and technological innovation. Modern defense ecosystems foster national resilience by advancing dual-use technologies, stimulating job creation, and supporting sustainable industrial bases. For middle powers like South Korea and Canada, a robust defense sector is instrumental in achieving both operational independence and influence within multilateral security frameworks

South Korea has designated its defense industry as a strategic pillar of its national growth agenda. Supported by sustained public-private collaboration, the country has rapidly expanded its global footprint, supplying advanced systems such as the K2 main battle tank, K9 self-propelled howitzer, and FA-50 light combat aircraft to a growing list of international customers. With strong indigenous capabilities in naval, aerospace, and MRO (maintenance, repair, and operations), Korea has emerged as a defense-industrial hub capable of serving the Indo-Pacific and beyond

Canada, for its part, is undergoing a significant recalibration of its defense strategy. As a founding NATO member with increasing responsibilities in the Indo-Pacific and Arctic, Canada is modernizing its defense platforms and broadening its procurement horizons. Ottawa has demonstrated particular interest in technologies suited to extreme environments—including Arctic-capable submarines, maritime surveillance systems, and next-generation cybersecurity tools. These needs align closely with Korea’s comparative advantages, presenting a strong case for bilateral industrial cooperation

The most concrete opportunity for collaboration is Canada’s ongoing Canadian Patrol Submarine Project (CPSP), a large-scale effort to replace its aging Victoria-class submarines with a fleet of eight to twelve Arctic-optimized vessels. With an estimated value of KRW 60 trillion, the CPSP is not only a flagship procurement initiative but also a platform for shaping Canada’s future naval posture. South Korean shipbuilders Hanwha Ocean and HD Hyundai Heavy Industries have both proposed customized designs based on the Dosan Ahn Chang-ho–class and Jangbogo-III Batch II models. These platforms offer proven modularity and can be adapted to Canadian Arctic conditions, including sub-zero propulsion optimization, ice-reinforced hulls, and extended lithium-ion endurance

Beyond submarine design, co-production in Canadian shipyards—such as Halifax or SeaSpan—offers economic and political advantages. Local assembly would not only ensure technology transfer and job creation but also increase domestic buy-in and long-term sustainment flexibility. Although Canada has faced delays and constraints in past naval procurement projects, co-production with Korea offers a potential means of overcoming these bottlenecks through complementary specialization. Drawing lessons from the successful Sweden–Singapore Archer-class cooperation, a Korea–Canada co-design framework would demonstrate adaptive capability-sharing between advanced shipbuilders

Sustainment and lifecycle support must also be planned from the outset. With its globally recognized MRO expertise, Korea can assist Canada in building a maintenance ecosystem that incorporates predictive diagnostics, modular part supply, and real-time digital monitoring. As shown in the Germany–Norway 212CD program, co-developing MRO infrastructure ensures operational efficiency and lowers total lifecycle costs. Korean technical teams can work alongside Canadian engineers to establish localized supply chains and support systems, reducing long-term dependency on foreign contractors

Operational synergy is another area ripe for deepening. Arctic and maritime readiness can be enhanced through joint training programs focused on endurance, stealth, and maneuverability in extreme environments. Korea and Canada could participate in bilateral submarine exercises or co-deploy in multilateral platforms such as RIMPAC and Western Pacific ASW drills. These engagements could evolve into a dedicated Korea–Canada Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) Task Force designed to respond to emerging undersea threats in both the Arctic and Northeast Asia

Sustained cooperation also requires investments in core technology and personnel development. Korea’s Naval Submarine School and Canada’s Royal Canadian Navy training institutions can establish cross-training modules and personnel exchange programs. Joint R&D, particularly in AI navigation, acoustic optimization, and next-generation sonar systems, can be conducted through collaborative grants and dual-lab frameworks. Oceanography research centers and naval engineering institutes in both countries could partner on long-range projects aimed at stealth propulsion and automation

Finally, the CPSP should be seen not only as a defense-industrial initiative but also as a strategic lever for expanding broader defense diplomacy and economic cooperation. Submarine technology is closely tied to emerging sectors such as rare-earth mineral refinement, clean maritime energy, and intelligent sensor networks. Korea and Canada could jointly invest in value-added segments of the supply chain—particularly in rare-earth elements critical to naval platforms and electronic warfare systems. Startups in AI, quantum security, and naval battery systems could be supported through binational innovation funds and NATO-aligned commercialization programs

In short, the CPSP has the potential to serve as the cornerstone of a broader Korea–Canada defense innovation ecosystem. Through this submarine-focused partnership, both countries can combine their strengths in technology, production, training, and sustainability to generate long-term strategic dividends. If executed with foresight and institutional backing, this collaboration could play a transformative role in anchoring a new axis of maritime security architecture across the Indo-Pacific and Arctic domains

Risk and Constraints: Strategic Challenges in Institutionalizing Korea-Canada Security Cooperation

Despite the growing convergence in values and strategic interests between South Korea and Canada, the path toward deepening and institutionalizing their security cooperation is not without obstacles. These challenges span the geopolitical, institutional, and operational domains and include the potential backlash from rival powers, regional diplomatic sensitivities, legal and intelligence-sharing barriers, domestic political uncertainties, technical interoperability issues, and the overarching risk of strategic overextension

One of the foremost risks lies in the geopolitical responses of major powers, particularly China and Russia. As Korea and Canada expand cooperation in areas such as Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA), real-time intelligence sharing, and joint port initiatives—especially in ASEAN regions—China may interpret these efforts as part of a U.S.-led containment strategy in the Indo-Pacific. This perception could prompt China to exert economic pressure, as it did during the THAAD deployment in South Korea, or engage in cyber and informational retaliation targeting critical infrastructure. Russia, meanwhile, may perceive Korea’s increasing engagement with NATO, particularly through Canadian frameworks like KOCAMS and NORAD, as a strategic encroachment. This could result in Moscow ramping up diplomatic and military support for North Korea or escalating friction in the Arctic—where both Canada and Russia hold strategic interests

Diplomatic frictions within the region may also complicate multilateral cooperation. Historical tensions between South Korea and Japan, particularly over sensitive issues such as forced labor and “comfort women,” continue to generate political volatility. These unresolved legacies risk undermining trilateral coordination with Canada, especially during joint exercises or information-sharing efforts. In addition, Canada's potential role as a neutral intermediary may be constrained by its limited historical involvement in Northeast Asian affairs. In Southeast Asia, the Korea–Canada proposal for cooperative ports or surveillance initiatives may face skepticism from ASEAN states committed to strategic neutrality. If such projects are perceived as tools for military balancing, they could provoke backlash or diminish regional trust

Legal and institutional gaps present another major hurdle. The absence of a bilateral Military and Defense Classified Information Protection Agreement (MDIPA) restricts high-level intelligence sharing and hinders joint R&D initiatives in critical areas such as submarine design, cyber infrastructure, and space-based surveillance. Furthermore, Canada’s membership in the Five Eyes alliance gives it privileged access to intelligence networks that South Korea cannot yet participate in directly. As a result, real-time coordination during high-tempo operations—such as missile launches or cyberattacks—could be slowed by reliance on indirect channels. These asymmetries may impede the development of mutual trust in sensitive domains like cyber defense and joint command structures

Domestic political and budgetary variables further complicate long-term cooperation. Canada’s defense modernization efforts have historically been hampered by political polarization, procurement delays, and fiscal constraints. Key projects like the Canadian Patrol Submarine Project (CPSP) have faced criticism for their scale, costs, and transparency. Similarly, the establishment of a Korea–Canada MRO hub in regions like British Columbia or Halifax could face intergovernmental challenges at the provincial-federal level. On the Korean side, electoral cycles frequently reshape the country’s foreign policy priorities. A progressive administration may favor détente with China or North Korea, while a conservative government may push for deeper NATO alignment and military-industrial exports. These shifts risk politicizing Korea–Canada cooperation or interrupting momentum across different policy domains

Operational feasibility also poses limitations, particularly regarding interoperability and cybersecurity architecture. While Korea and Canada participate in joint multilateral exercises like RIMPAC, they lack a shared command doctrine or integrated operational framework. Technological differences, particularly in naval and ISR (intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance) systems, could complicate coordination during crisis scenarios or command post exercises (CPX). In cybersecurity, the structural divide is also clear: Korea’s centralized, military-led approach—anchored by the Presidential Office—differs significantly from Canada’s decentralized, public-private model led by the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security (CCCS). These differences make joint tactical response teams more difficult to form and could hinder fast reaction to hybrid threats or gray-zone operations

Finally, there is a broader strategic risk of overextension. The current blueprint for Korea–Canada cooperation spans an ambitious array of domains—from cyber and AI to submarine production, space law, maritime patrol, and port diplomacy. Without clear sequencing or prioritization, there is a danger of resource fragmentation and bureaucratic fatigue. In the absence of early, visible deliverables, political support may weaken, and cooperation could devolve into a checklist of loosely connected initiatives rather than a strategic framework grounded in institutional durability

To manage these risks, a phased and deliberate implementation strategy is essential. First, early-stage cooperation should prioritize high-impact but low-friction areas such as cyber dialogues, satellite surveillance, and officer exchange programs. Second, legal and institutional foundations must be solidified through the prompt negotiation of a MDIPA and the establishment of a bilateral security coordination office. Third, Track 1.5 and Track 2 diplomacy—featuring think tanks, retired officials, and academic actors—can help depoliticize regional tensions and expand consensus around cooperation with Japan and ASEAN states. Track 1.5 diplomacy—anchored in academic, industry, and civil society exchanges—could serve as a platform for trust-building and norm diffusion, particularly on sensitive issues like cyber sovereignty, information ethics, and space law. Lastly, joint public diplomacy initiatives such as white papers and press briefings can frame Korea–Canada projects around shared values and non-military benefits, such as environmental sustainability and inclusive development. These measures can safeguard strategic alignment while sustaining momentum across different political cycles and threat landscapes

Conclusion

As global security threats become increasingly multifaceted—spanning traditional and non-traditional domains—there is a growing need for comprehensive, adaptive, and collaborative defense strategies. This report has demonstrated that South Korea and Canada, as middle powers with shared democratic values and global responsibilities, are well-positioned to build a robust, multidimensional security partnership. Since the 2024 Korea–Canada Foreign and Defense Ministers’ (2+2) meeting, their cooperation has expanded beyond conventional military engagement to include cyber defense, emerging technologies, space security, and strategic defense industry collaboration

In the Indo-Pacific, both countries are investing in enhanced maritime domain awareness (MDA) and joint port infrastructure, underscoring their shared interest in preserving freedom of navigation and regional stability. Through bilateral and multilateral military exercises—including integration with U.S. and Japanese defense frameworks—they are also building the operational interoperability needed to deter North Korea and respond to regional contingencies

Beyond traditional security cooperation, the two countries are making significant strides in emerging domains. South Korea’s advances in cyber and space technology, when paired with Canada’s capabilities in AI, cybersecurity infrastructure, and space robotics, create a powerful synergy for addressing the challenges of the digital and extraterrestrial battlefield. Likewise, joint submarine development efforts under Canada’s Patrol Submarine Project offer a model for industrial and strategic defense cooperation that strengthens both national defense and economic resilience

In theoretical terms, this study integrates both realist and constructivist interpretations of international security. From a realist perspective, South Korea and Canada’s alignment can be seen as a rational response to shifting power balances and growing systemic uncertainty in the Indo-Pacific. However, their emphasis on multilateral cooperation, rule-based order, and norm entrepreneurship aligns with constructivist frameworks that prioritize ideational factors, institutional identity, and shared values (Wendt, 1999; Acharya, 2014). By operating in this dual mode, the Korea–Canada partnership embodies the complex agency of middle powers—balancing strategic pragmatism with normative commitment in an era of contested order

These developments reinforce the broader case for institutionalizing Korea–Canada cooperation across five dimensions: strategic integration, technological advancement, operational readiness, information sharing, and defense diplomacy. By implementing structured frameworks—such as joint R&D agreements, coordinated training programs, and secure information-sharing platforms—South Korea and Canada can build a security partnership that is both durable and future-proof

Ultimately, this partnership has implications that extend well beyond bilateral interests. It contributes meaningfully to the maintenance of a rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific, supports NATO’s evolving engagement with the Asia-Pacific region, and provides a template for middle-power cooperation in addressing global threats. Through sustained commitment, strategic alignment, and innovation-driven cooperation, South Korea and Canada can solidify their roles as pivotal contributors to regional and global security. In doing so, Korea–Canada cooperation offers a scalable model of middle-power alignment that complements, rather than duplicates, existing U.S.-led frameworks. It also illustrates how middle powers can coordinate beyond the orbit of great-power rivalry, offering a complementary—but independently grounded—approach to regional order-building

Taken together, the findings of this study support the hypothesis that functionally driven, multidimensional security cooperation between geographically distant middle powers can be institutionalized—even in the absence of formal alliances or geographic proximity—when grounded in shared values, strategic complementarity, and norm entrepreneurship

The Korea–Canada case demonstrates how two middle powers, operating under different regional security pressures, can converge across a wide spectrum of defense domains, from maritime security and interoperability to cyber-space resilience and industrial co-production. Rather than being constrained by geographic separation or divergent alliance structures, both countries have leveraged institutional creativity, normative alignment, and strategic complementarities to forge a robust and scalable framework for cooperation

In theoretical terms, this outcome reinforces constructivist insights on the role of identity and norms in enabling cooperation, while also validating realist concerns about the functional imperatives of power balancing and strategic adaptation. The Korea–Canada partnership thus exemplifies a dual-logic approach to middle-power agency—where interest-driven alignment and ideational commitments are not mutually exclusive but mutually reinforcing

Future studies could assess the generalizability of this model by examining whether similar convergence can occur among other middle-power dyads—such as Japan–Germany, Australia–Norway, or France–South Korea—under comparable structural and normative conditions